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Introduction
“Now that, detective, 
is the right question”
(Dr. Alfred Lanning’s holographic projection)1
The ‘truth’ about games
It could very well have been ‘a dark, rainy night’, for all the dramatic events to 
follow. But it was a sunny day in spring 2011, when the world of computer 
game studies seemed to be shaken to the core. After almost two decades, the 
field of ‘game studies’ had gained its reputation as an academic discipline in its 
own right, fueled by its own theoretical discourses and methodologies, repre-
sented by an increasing number of institutions and conferences dedicated to 
computer game research, and game scholars around the world were eagerly 
and confidently gaining an ever better understanding of the issues and implica-
tions of a fascinating new media.
But there was trouble in paradise.
The trouble began when, on March 22nd 2011, Miguel Sicart, associate professor 
at the IT University of Copenhagen’s Center for Computer Games Research, 
used ‘Gamesnetwork’, the Digital Games Research Association’s online discus-
sion list, to promote a PhD course which was to be held the following summer2.
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1 I, Robot (20th Century Fox, 2004)
2 https://listserv.uta.fi/cgi-bin/wa?A2=GAMESNETWORK;4a31a0d2.1103
The title of this course was ‘Against Proceduralism’, and the course description 
was regarded by some as a clear assault on a common conception of the nature 
of games and its proponents, namely “the notion that computer games should 
primarily be understood in terms of formal rules and mechanics – that com-
puter games are, first and foremost, a “procedural” medium”3. Within the hour, 
Ian Bogost, game scholar, designer and one of the implied spearheads of the al-
leged ‘proceduralists’, replied to Sicart’s post, and his response was a simple 
and definite: “No.”4
What Bogost so clearly opposed against was the implication of an ideological 
conflict dividing the game studies discourse, an antagonism based on insur-
mountable differences between opposing theorists. This spontaneous ‘parrying 
reflex’, however, was rooted in the history of the discipline, and even Sicart’s 
affiliation with the Center for Computer Games Research may have added to 
this instanteneous defense.
More than a decade earlier, it was from this institution that a group of game 
scholars kicked off a debate that led to a long-standing controversy and, finally, 
laid the base for a theoretical ‘self-discovery’ which some regard as the starting 
point of today’s game studies as an academic discipline in its own right. This 
debate, which is commonly referred to as the ‘narratology - ludology’ debate, 
evolved around the question whether digital games were to be assessed as a 
narrative media (therefore allowing the re-application of theories and methods 
8
3 for the course description see:
 http://www.itu.dk/en/Forskning/Phd-uddannelsen/PhD-Courses/
PhD%20Courses%202011/Against-Procedurality
4 https://listserv.uta.fi/cgi-bin/wa?A2=GAMESNETWORK;8a85d535.1103
deriving from established disciplines, like literature and film studies), or 
whether the specific nature of interactive games called for a more original ap-
proach, and therefore legitimated the formation of a new discipline5.
Long before March 2011, the ‘narratology - ludology’ debate had reached a 
point where the initial opposition gave way to more fruitful discussions on the 
specific ways ludic elements may also convey meaning, thereby simply consti-
tuting a new form of narrative6, and allowing a more comprehensive under-
standing of the different kinds of narrative that games can enable through their 
ludic design7. And yet, Sicart’s proclamation ‘Against Procedurality’ seemed to 
have hit a nerve layed bare in the early days of today’s game studies discourse, 
and the idea that, again, an artificial ‘war of theories’ (and theorists) might be 
declared, was at the center of Bogost’s response:
“In this context ("Against Proceduralism"), the name you give us has 
rhetorical heft alone. It serves to name an enemy that doesn't exist. It 
serves to cast that enemy as a coarse reductionist "determinist" re-
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5  see: Juul, Jesper: “A Clash between Game and Narrative - A Thesis on Computer 
Games and Interactive Fiction”, Copenhagen, 1999. (Master Thesis, University of Co-
penhagen); Arseth, Espen: “Genre Trouble: Narrativism and the Art of Simulation”, in: 
Wardrip-Fruin, Noah; Harrihan, Pat (Eds.): “First Person - New Media as Story, Per-
formance, and Game”, Cambridge, M.A./London, 2004, p. 45-55; Frasca, Gonzalo: 
“Simulation versus Narrative - Introduction to Ludology”, in: Wolf, Mark P.J.; Perron, 
Bernard (Eds.): “The Video Game Theory Reader”, New York, N.Y./London, 2003, p. 
221-235.
6 see: Brand, Jeffrey E.; Knight, Scott J.: “The Narrative and Ludic Nexus in Computer 
Games: Diverse Worlds II”, Proceedings of the 2nd DIGRA International Conference: 
“Changing Views: Worlds in Play”, 2005.
7  see: Jenkins, Henry: “Game Design as Narrative Architecture”, in: Wardrip-Fruin, 
Noah; Harrihan, Pat (Eds.): “First Person - New Media as Story, Performance, and 
Game”, Cambridge, M.A./London, 2004, p. 118-130.
gime out only to celebrate the machine and to deride the human be-
ings that invent and drive them.”8
In the days following the initial post, a heated debate arose, and the focus 
quickly shifted from the discussion of Sicart’s statement on ‘proceduralism’ to a 
more general controversy concerning the ‘adequate ways’ to address games in 
the game studies discourse. In no more than a week, 117 messages were posted 
in the thread - an outstanding number in comparison to the usual discussions 
on the forum, reflecting how significant the issue was deemed by the commu-
nity. In the course of this controversy, a multitude of different positions were 
presented, ranging from the idea of game systems as art9 to the role given to the 
player, from the fear of “social scientists and cultural critics, swooping down 
from above to wag their fingers at so many trenchant, ignorant technicians”10 to 
the question whether the present discussions didn’t simply reflect the ‘narratol-
ogy - ludology’ debate11 (which it didn’t), and, finally, the debate focussed on 
some participants’ conviction that “cognition ‘rests’ on affect, and not the other 
way around”12.
From a constructivist perspective, however, it is of minor importance which re-
spective positions were taken in the course of the debate. What seems more im-
portant is the observation that the discussion seemed to be guided by attempts 
to find the ‘right’ perspective on games, and that the validity of each position 
10
8 https://listserv.uta.fi/cgi-bin/wa?A2=GAMESNETWORK;1a47fdf1.1103
9 https://listserv.uta.fi/cgi-bin/wa?A2=GAMESNETWORK;b4b9ba76.1103
10 https://listserv.uta.fi/cgi-bin/wa?A2=GAMESNETWORK;b5d662d1.1103
11 https://listserv.uta.fi/cgi-bin/wa?A2=GAMESNETWORK;338adb7d.1103
12 https://listserv.uta.fi/cgi-bin/wa?A2=GAMESNETWORK;e23dd7e9.1103 
seemed dependent on the exclusion of its alternatives. This realist attitude is es-
pecially surprising in the field of computer game studies, a field which is con-
cerned with problems that seem quite similar to those posed by constructivist 
theorists.
In digital games, increasingly complex game systems do not suggest the search 
for the game’s ‘true’ meaning as a viable option; instead of unraveling a pre-
designed narrative or finding the ‘right’ way to play the game, the act of play-
ing can hardly be grasped by the question what players ‘have to do’ in the 
game, but rather by the assessment of what different actions and strategies pro-
vide viable options to confront the game world. Consequently, constructivist 
issues do flare up in the game studies discourse, even if they do so implicitly. 
For instance, Janet Murray’s suggestion to replace the idea of ‘willing suspen-
sion of disbelief’ with the notion of ‘active creation of belief’13 when it comes to 
digital games has become a commonplace in the discourse, and it clearly em-
phasizes the players’ role not only in creating and reinforcing the meaning of 
the game, but also in constituting the ‘nature’ of the game itself through active 
participation in the construction of the game world. Given that the idea of con-
tingencies seems far more productive for the assessment of games and gaming 
experiences than the idea of ‘absolute truth’, the committment to find and argue 
such a truth which dominated the above mentioned debate seems especially 
noteworthy.
This thesis is guided by the assumption that constructivist theory can provide a 
useful framework for the assessment of play and games, and, therefore, prove 
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13 Murray, Janet H.: “Hamlet on the Holodeck. The Future of Narrative in Cyber-
space”, The MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A., 1997, p. 110ff.
to be beneficial for the game studies discourse. Not only does constructivist 
theory and the idea of contingencies promise to be a fruitful perspective for the 
assessment of digital games and player experiences, it might also provide a base 
for contingent theories on games and gaming, neglecting the need to choose one 
perspective over the other, but enabling a variety of different approaches and, 
thereby, an expansion of the field itself: why not have it all?
Guiding perspectives
The close relation between constructivist theory and issues of play and games, 
however, does certainly not suggest constructivism as an encompassing theo-
retical approach fit to ‘solve all problems’ of the game studies discourse. But a 
constructivist approach might highlight certain aspects of the field which cur-
rently pose problems that are hardly accessible from a realist perspective, and 
may provide more viable tools to get a grasp on these issues.
However, even though the application of constructivist theory to the field of 
computer game studies and, more specifically, the assessment of player experi-
ences is at the core of this project, there is another, complementary perspective 
which fuels this endeavour.
While this project is most certainly intended as a contribution to the game stud-
ies discourse, aimed at an expansion of the field’s theoretical foundations, it is 
also intended as a contribution to constructivist theory, aimed at the expansion 
of this theoretical framework’s scope by applying it to and adapting it for the 
assessment of player experiences. 
12
This second perspective is guided by the conviction that constructivist theory is 
not only an epistemological, but an inherently anthropological approach (an ar-
gument which will be examined more closely in the third part of this thesis), an 
approach which, by highlighting the role of mental processes in the construc-
tion of perceived ‘realities’, is closely tied to the terms and conditions of human 
experience. These terms and conditions do not simply constitute the difference 
between what is appraised as real and what is not, but may be accounted for far 
more complex processes of cognitive construction, manifesting themselves in 
many different and seemingly contradictory layers of ‘realities’. 
Experiences of ‘play’ seem to stand out in this regard as a quite peculiar kind of 
‘reality’, and may provide a promising area of application for constructivist 
theory. As Gregory Bateson notes, play-actions are “similar to, but not the same 
as”14 the serious actions they resemble, constituting play as an experience which 
is not regarded as ‘real’ in a narrower sense, but still quite different from an ex-
perience of decided unreality.15 It is this indetermination of play experiences 
which enables an examination of the delicate terms and conditions underlying 
the construction of cognitive realities, and may therefore provide a promising 
object of research for a study guided by constructivist theory.
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14 Bateson, Gregory: “A Theory of Play and Fantasy”, in: Salen, K.; Zimmerman, E.: 
“The Game Design Reader - A Rules of Play Anthology”, MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A., 
2006, p. 316.
15 Even if his argument is derived from a quite different observation, namely the real-
ity of a game’s rules versus the unreality of its fiction, Jesper Juul’s term “half-real” ex-
presses a basic characteristic not only of (digital) games, but of experiences of play in 
general; see: Juul, Jesper: “Half-Real. Video Games between Real Rules and Fictional 
Worlds”, The MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A., 2005, p. 1.
Gregory Bateson’s abovementioned essay “A Theory of Play and Fantasy”16 and 
its use in different academic contexts may serve as a prototype for the dual per-
spectives of this project - the application of constructivist theory to the field of 
game studies on the one hand, and the use of phenomena of play and games as 
an occasion to expand constructivist concepts on the other. While Bateson’s text 
actually focusses on the nature of human cognition, aiming at an assessment of 
‘fantasy’, especially in a psychotheurapeutical context, and employing observa-
tions of play as a mere example for the construction of events experienced ‘as if’ 
they were real17, the essay has become a central text in game theory, emphasiz-
ing the examination of play over its initial objective as an assessment of proc-
esses of cognition and communication. Even though Bateson does not use the 
term ‘experience’ as explicitly as the term ‘play’, it is his focus on ‘play experi-
ences’ which makes this rededication of his text possible, as it allows for a per-
spective on phenomena of play and serves as a conceptual input for theories of 
games and play even in today’s game studies discourse, just as it enables a per-
spective focussed on the terms and conditions of human experience, which 
makes the text a valuable premise for constructivist theory as an anthropologi-
cal approach. 
In order to provide for both perspectives, and in the aim to contribute to an ex-
pansion of game theory and constructivist theory alike, the present study will 
therefore focus on this ‘play experience’, and attempt to develop a viable un-
14
16 Bateson, Gregory: “A Theory of Play and Fantasy”, in: Salen, K.; Zimmerman, E.: 
“The Game Design Reader - A Rules of Play Anthology”, MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A., 
2006, p. 314-328.
17 see: Bateson, Gregory: “A Theory of Play and Fantasy”, in: Salen, K.; Zimmerman, 
E.: “The Game Design Reader - A Rules of Play Anthology”, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
M.A., 2006, p. 321.
derstanding of phenomena of play in terms of a constructivist-anthropology. 
‘The Play Experience’, therefore, does not incidentally serve as the title of this 
thesis; it is this play experience which may provide the pivotal point of what 
may be coined ‘constructivist game studies’.
The Play Experience
As a constructivist perspective allows to focus on the experiential aspects of 
play and an assessment of the processes underlying the construction of these 
experiences, this perspective also suggests an understanding of games as a 
manifestation rather than a cause of this ‘play experience’. Contrary to the idea 
that “games create play”18, which implies the idea of ‘games’ being phenomena 
of the ‘outside world’, enabling ‘play’ when players engage with these ‘objects’, 
it might be suggested that ‘play creates games’, as it is the specific constructions 
underlying an experience of play that decide which activities we perceive as 
‘games’, and which we decide not to label that way. This perspective still allows 
an assessment of game structures and the different ways in which game arte-
facts suggest or negate different experiences, guide player behaviour or convey 
meaning, and is thereby consistent with according practices of the game studies 
discourse. But by emplyoing a constructivist perspective, the implications of 
game structures and mechanics gain significance in their quality as obstacles of 
player interaction, suggesting specific strategies and interpretations on the 
players’ side as more viable than others, rather than artifacts which create expe-
riences in their own right. 
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18 Salen, Katie; Zimmerman, Eric: “What is Play?”, in: Salen, Katie; Zimmerman, Eric: 
“The Game Design Reader: a rules of play anthology”, MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A., 
2006, p. 83.
It is this quality of games as obstacles of player interaction which provides the 
most significant argument for a constructivist assessment of play and games, 
and this argument becomes even more obvious when the basic difference be-
tween digital and non-digital games is taken into account. 
In non-digital games, maintaining the terms set by the game’s rules falls to the 
player(s), as the game may contain suggestions which rules may be applied in 
order to provide a satisfying gameplay experience, but it is the players’ active 
decision to play by these rules, as the game itself does not and can not uphold 
the consequences determined by these rules: while the rules of (non-digital) 
chess state that the game ends when one of the two kings is defeated, there is no 
obstacle other than the players’ devotion to these rules which excludes the op-
tion to continue playing until there are no pieces left on the board. These rules 
and the conditions they specify are neither objective nor absolute, but depend-
ent on social agreements on the players’ side. In this case, the concept of ‘make 
believe’ does not refer to a fictional layer of the game (“let’s act as if we were 
commanding two opposing armies”), but extends to the binding character of 
the rule system (“let’s act as if the defeat of a king ended the game”). 
This kind of play experience in non-digital games reflects the idea of cognitive 
realities as results of social processes of construction19 in a quite straightforward 
way: the game of chess actually ends when one of the kings is defeated, simply 
because players have agreed to end it as soon as this condition is met.
16
19 see: Glasersfeld, Ernst von: “Siegener Gespräche über Radikalen Konstruktivismus”, 
in: Schmidt, Siegfried J. (Ed.): “Der Diskurs des Radikalen Konstruktivismus”, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M., 1987, esp. p. 404-409.
Digital games, however, present their players with a very different kind of ex-
perience. The rules and mechanics of digital games provide obstacles for player 
interactions that are in no way subject to negotiation; in a game of digital chess, 
there is no way to continue the game once a king is defeated, as long as this 
condition is specified in the game’s code. The conditions set in this code are not 
directly accessible to players, but can only be experienced through the actions 
that are possible within the game, and those which are not. In digital games, 
players can explore viable options in dealing with the obstacles presented by 
the game through interaction; these interactions, however, do in no way reveal 
the ‘nature’ of these obstacles themselves, but only the possible ways to work 
around them. This characteristic of digital games is stunningly similar to the 
epistemological considerations underlying (radical) constructivist theory, which 
grant the possibility of ontological reality, but negate the possibility to perceive 
this reality other than through the experience of possibilities and impediments 
it poses to our attempts to circumnavigate the obstacles it presents20. 
Not only does this similarity suggest constructivist theory as a useful theoretical 
framework for the assessment of play experiences in digital games, but it is due 
to that similarity that digital games might provide a rare opportunity to reas-
sess and expand constructivist theory. While there is no way to be certain about 
the existence or nature of an ontological reality, and while the terms and condi-
tions of mental processes underlying the construction of cognitive realities can 
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20 see: Glasersfeld, Ernst von: “Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit und des Begriffs der Ob-
jektivität”, in: Gumin, Heinz / Meier, Heinrich: “Einführung in den Konstruktivis-
mus”, Piper, München, 2005, esp. p. 19. and Glasersfeld, Ernst von: "Knowing without 
Metaphysics: Aspects of the Radical Constructivist Position", in: Steier, Frederick (Ed.): 
"Research and Reflexivity", Sage Publication, London / Newbury Park / New Delhi, 
1991, esp. p. 17f.
therefore not be tested against the ‘actual’ character of such an ‘ontic world’, 
digital games may be the closest thing to a ‘simulation’ of this epistemological 
assumption. If the game’s rules and mechanics are regarded as an emulation of 
what could be seen as equating an ‘ontic world’, as terms and conditions not 
directly accessible to players, but as obstacles to their interactions, determining 
and limiting what kinds of interaction prove viable within the game world and 
which don’t, then the players’ ways to deal with these obstacles and, conse-
quently, make sense of the game world may shed a light on the mental proc-
esses underlying the construction of cognitive realities in general.
Again, it is a focus on the ‘play experience’ which may provide a key to the en-
deavour of approaching digital games as such an ‘epistemological experiment’, 
and promises to tie together the dual perspectives of this project by expanding 
constructivist theory on one hand, and by enabling a thorough discussion of is-
sues central to the game studies discourse on the other. While this focus on the 
‘play experience’ raises a multitude of questions, the research question of this 
project will highlight one specific problem, which again seems crucial both for 
the discussion of the construction of human experiences, and the theoretical as-
sessment of games: why do people play games?
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Research question: ‘Why do people play games?’
This question, which Simon Egenfeldt Nielsen has pointed out as one of the 
‘larger questions’ of the game studies discourse21, may seem broad at first, but it 
gains more accuracy when it is limited by the two perspectives underlying this 
project: from a constructivist perspective, the question ‘why do people play 
games?’ can not be answered in a positivistic or absolute way, but only by de-
veloping viable models of the role of play experiences in processes of cognitive 
constructions. (this ‘ontological non-committment’ will be discussed in the 
Chapter ‘The constructivist game scholars toolbox’).
The aim to root this project in the game studies discourse, however, also negates 
the possibility to answer the question ‘why do people play games?’ in terms of 
possible purposes or benefits that may be tied to playing games. While there is 
no doubt that games may in some ways effect players, and that some of these 
effects may be regarded as beneficial, it is a well-established agreement in the 
game studies discourse to regard games as purposeless and unproductive when 
it comes to players’ motivations to engage in games; a game played for its benefi-
cial effects would simply not meet the definition of a game in the context of 
game studies (a delicate, but viable definition, which will be examined more 
closely in the third part of this project). As this project’s focus is on the play ex-
perience and, therefore, on the players of games, this definitory agreement ap-
plies, and excludes the option of easily dismissing the question ‘why do people 
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21 Egenfeldt Nielsen, Simon; Heide Smith, Jonas; Pajares Tosca, Susana: “Understand-
ing Video Games”, Routledge, N.Y./London, 2008. p. 4. The question Egenfeldt Nielsen 
formulates is “Why are there games?”, but in the course of a constructivist-
anthropological examination, it seems adequate to address the act of playing as a pre-
requisite for the existence of games more directly.
play games?’ by drawing on desirable effects resulting from playing games; in-
stead, this thesis’ focus will be on motivations of play which are immanent to 
the play experience itself: how does play prove beneficial and purposeful even 
if these benefits and purposes are limited to the experience of playing?
Framed by these two perspectives, the research question ‘why do people play 
games?’ promises to make tangible various aspects of games and play, which 
will form the cornerstones of this project and provide its structure.
The structure of this thesis
In the first part of this thesis, after outlining the basic constructivist concepts 
necessary to conduct this study, the basic presuppositions for its conduct will be 
discussed. In an attempt to find a viable framework for the discussion of the 
‘play experience’ rather than to provide final answers, this framework will con-
sist of three ‘constructions’ - attempts to examine and reassess central issues of 
the game studies discourse from a constructivist perspective.
The first of these constructions will give attention to the relation of games and 
reality, examining the conditions under which a game’s rules - even if they are 
regarded as artificial by players - can be appraised as guiding factors for play-
ers’ actions and decisions, and therefore enable satisfying experiences. When 
playing a game, players seem determined to solve problems they wouldn’t 
have without playing the game in the first place, a determination which can not 
be accounted for by the relevance of these problems for the players’ lifes outside 
the game. Instead, the construction will focus on the possible transitions be-
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tween the terms and conditions specified by the game, and the ‘realization’ of 
these rules’ implications as guiding factors for players’ desires and interactions.
The second construction will examine the idea of ‘play’ more closely, and the 
way this concept is defined in the game studies discourse; it will be argued that 
today’s discussions of play and games are dominated by definitions of play that 
employ a delineating conception of play, based on the differentiation between 
‘play’ and ‘non-play’. While this dualist conception is useful in regard to some 
aspects of play, it will be shown that there are problems arising from the as-
sessment of play and games that can not be made tangible by this differentia-
tion. As an alternate approach, the chapter will draw upon the conception of 
‘mechanical play’, and attempt to adapt it as a theoretical perspective for the 
game studies discourse. Based on Friedrich Schiller’s so-called ‘play theory’, it 
will be argued that this mechanical idea of play as an intermediating principle 
between opposing forces may provide a definition more viable for addressing 
play experiences than prevalent delineating conceptions. In order to discuss  its 
implications for the assessment of games and play, the idea of play as an inter-
mediating force will be applied to three different issues relevant to the field of 
game studies, namely the analysis of games, the design of games and the rela-
tion of games and violence.
The third and final construction will address methodical issues arising from the 
specific nature of digital games as rule-based systems and their interrelation 
with player interactions, highlighting the relation of games and narratives. 
While the idea of emergent narratives, which arise from the interaction with the 
game world and are highly dependent on players’ interpretations - has become 
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a widely acknowledged part of digital game theory22, it easily meets its limits 
when it comes to a methodical assessment of the resulting experiences. Con-
trary to traditional media, whose storytelling capabilities rely on the use of rep-
resentational strategies, digital games do not simply present a representational 
narrative which can be unraveled and, consequently, interpreted by their play-
ers. In a recursive process of evaluation, action, feedback, re-evaluation and 
variation, it is the players’ interpretations of the game world which in turn in-
fluence their gameplay decisions and, therefore, the manifestations of gameplay 
events. In striking analogy to constructivist models of reality construction, this 
recursive process is determined not only by the already versatile possibilities of 
the game, but by their combination with a seemingly infinite variety of possible 
player interpretations. The assessment of play experiences, therefore, can not 
approach the emergence of these experiences as mere results of represented 
events embedded within the game, but has to take this multitude of individual 
player interpretations into account. An attempt to make the contingency spaces 
of experience opened up by digital games tangible for methodical analysis must 
therefore account for the multitude of possible player interpretations, while at 
the same time avoiding to dissolve into arbitrariness by‚ still tracing the result-
ing experiences back to the terms and conditions presented by the game. The 
second construction will discuss a possible strategy to fulfill these requirements 
on the example of a specific gameplay segment of the XBOX game Dead Rising 
(Capcom, 2006).
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22 see: Jenkins, Henry.: “Game Design as Narrative Architecture”, in: Wardrip-Fruin, 
Noah; Harrigan, Pat: “First Person - New Media as Story, Performance, and Game”, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A., 2004, p. 118-130.
After the first part of this thesis has set the stage for an assessment of the ‘play 
experience’ by approaching principle matters of play and games from a con-
structivist perspective, the second part will shift the focus more specifically on 
mediated experiences and the role digital games can play in the process of con-
structing these experiences. The second part will consist of three case studies, 
which serve to highlight different aspects of this process, and together will 
stake out the definitory framework constituting the concept of ‘experience’ un-
derlying this thesis.
Following the distinction between first order and second order realities23, the 
first case study will attempt to break down the construction of experiences in 
what will be called ‘experiential set up’ and ‘experiential perspective’. These 
concepts mark the difference between the subsumption of certain elements and 
their relation as ‘events’ on the one hand (‘experiential set up’), and the evalua-
tion and interpretation of these events through the application of values and 
beliefs (‘experiential perspective’) on the other. In a comparison of the mediated 
events surrounding the attacks on the world trade center at september 11th 2001 
and the narrative structure of the hollywood movie Independence Day (20th Cen-
tury Fox, 1996), it will be shown how a largely similar experiential set up can 
suggest very different experiences once a certain experiential perspective is ap-
plied. This distinction will serve as a conceptional tool to make the interplay be-
tween media strategies and the construction of (play) experiences more tangi-
ble.
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Konstruktivismus und Pychotherapie”, in: Gumin, Heinz / Meier, Heinrich: 
“Einführung in den Konstruktivismus”, Piper, München, 2005, p. 89-107.
In order to enable a closer look at this relation, the second case study will ex-
amine a well-established experiential topos of western culture, which is also a 
recurring motive in digital games, namely the contemporary zombie topos, 
which has gained shaped since George A. Romero’s adaptation of the tradi-
tional zombie theme. Based on an assessment of the ‘horror experience’, which 
will be argued as a central experiential theme in contemporary culture, it will be 
shown that the contemporary zombie topos enables this experience not merely 
on a fictional level, but that it is the experiential set up of the topos itself which 
incorporates the idea of ‘horror as isolation’, which will be argued as central to 
the ‘horror experience’. 
This assessment of the experiential set up of the contemporary zombie topos 
will tie together the second and third case study in an attempt to develop a vi-
able understanding of the interplay of experiential set up and the contingency 
field of experiences opened up by the application of experiential perspectives. 
Even though the zombie topos is central to popular culture and the fictional ar-
senal of digital games alike, there is no example for the topos in digital roleplay-
ing games or, more specifically, Massive Multiplayer Online Roleplaying Games 
(MMORPGs). In the third case study, it will be argued that this absence can be 
accounted for the specific experiential set up constituted by the rules and me-
chanics employed in MMORPGs, which suggest experiences quite contrary to 
those of ‘horror’. These specific rules and mechanics will be clarified in com-
parison to the rules and mechanics common in another game genre, the ‘Sur-
vival Horror Game’, which are much more consistent with the idea of ‘horror as 
isolation’. On the specific example of ‘game inventory’ in both game types, the 
case study will try to show how contingency fields of experience are opened up 
or neglected by the specific form by which an experiential set up constitutes 
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opportunities and obstacles for the construction of experiences, and intends to 
show how the construction of play experiences, while highly dependent on in-
dividual player interpretations, is nonetheless related to the terms and condi-
tions determined by the experiential set up of the game’s rules and mechanics.
Finally, after the basic concepts of ‘play’ and ‘experience’ have been clarified 
from a constructivist perspective, the third part of the thesis will address the 
research question ‘why do people play games’ more directly by attempting a 
thorough examination of the ‘play experience’ itself. It will be argued that the 
notion of ‘adaptive advantages’ arising from play as a training ground for later 
real life adaptation does not provide viable answers neither in regard to the 
conception of ‘play’ constituting the games studies discourse, nor in regard to 
the constructivist and therefore player-centered approach to the ‘play experi-
ence’ underlying this thesis. Instead, it will be asked how play experiences may 
be desirable due to features inherent to this play experience rather than ascrib-
ing the desirable qualities of play to expected beneficial effects resulting from 
this experience.
In an attempt to provide a viable concept underlying these inherently seductive 
capabilities of play, the concept of ‘fun’ as the basic motivation for playing 
games will be argued to be too general an assumption, and will be dismissed in 
favor of a discussion of ‘satisfaction’ as a key element of play experiences, a 
concept which will be shown to be related to constructivist considerations on 
the human desire to solve problems and, therefore, the willingness to construct 
problems in order to do so.
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Based on this idea of pleasure and satisfaction as an inherent factor of play ex-
periences, the research question will be examined in regard to the specific quali-
ties of play, qualities that will be argued to allow for a mode of constructing ex-
periences that enables an emergence of satisfaction by being consistent with the 
most intuitive processes of reality construction. In order to do so, and employ-
ing a constructivist-anthropological perspective, a model of experience will be 
developed, a model which highlights experiences of play as manifestations of 
an inherently human trait, which will be labeled as ‘system experience’. It will 
be argued that experiences of play enable the organization of perceptions in sys-
temic terms without reservation, thereby allowing for an explorative attitude, 
which is close to intuitive cognitive processes, contrary to the truncation of ex-
periential systems for a ‘higher purpose’.
This model of ‘system experience as an inherently human trait’ aims to provide 
a viable answer to the research question ‘why do people play games?’ by ap-
proaching the ‘play experience’ as a unique manifestation of cognitive construc-
tion processes. The ‘play experience’ will be shown to consist in the freedom to 
explore a specific experiential system and its assumed functionalities by assess-
ing actions and their consequences within the system, contrary to an experience 
heeding the consequences actions might have outside the system. While this 
‘play experience’ is counteracted in everyday life by ideas of pragmatism, effi-
ciency or societal demands, it enables an emergence of satisfaction that might 
account for the pleasure inherent to play. This quality to enable satisfying expe-
riences within an experiential system will be suggested as a possible answer to 
the research question ‘why do people play games?’, an answer which conforms 
with the definitory demands of the game studies discourse, and is consistent 
with the constructivist-anthropological perspective this thesis attempts to apply.
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Part 1: 
Constructivist Game Studies
“What you see is what you get”
(Flip ‘Geraldine’ Wilson)24
1.1 The Constructivist Game Scholar’s Toolbox
1.1.1 Contingency as a key concept  
The concept of radical constructivism, as formulated by Ernst von Glasersfeld25, 
gives up the idea that we can rely on our perceptions to positivistically portray 
an ontological reality in favor of an instrumentalist approach to knowledge: 
whatever we perceive to be real has to be the basis for our quest for knowledge, 
and knowledge can only provide viable ways to make sense of these percep-
tions. Following Glasersfeld’s conception, we can not know that there is a force 
such as gravity; we can only know that we perceive objects falling to the ground 
in a certain manner, and we have developed the concept of gravity as a viable 
explanation. This key idea of viability is closely connected to the concept of con-
tingency: as our perceptions can at best be regarded as symptoms, not as depic-
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24 Flip (The Flip Wilson Show, NBC, 1970-74)
25 see: Glasersfeld, Ernst von: “Radical Constructivism: A Way of Knowing and Learn-
ing”, The Falmer Press, London/Washington D.C., 1995.
tions, of an external reality, they can allow for a multitude of viable explana-
tions (just like a running nose can be a symptom for a cold as well as an al-
lergy).
While constructivist theory has found its way into many fields of research, it 
promises to be especially rewarding to approach computer games from a con-
structivist perspective. Contrary to more traditional media, computer games do 
not conceal their contingent character. In contemporary computer games, there 
is not one way to play the game, but a multitude of viable options to interact 
with complex sets of the game’s possibilities and restraints. This makes it espe-
cially hard to analytically approach player experience, as the game itself only 
provides a contingency field of possible of gameplay events, not a stringent 
course. Giving up the idea of ‘absolute truths’ in favor of contingencies, how-
ever, is at the core of constructivism or, more sprecifically, of radical constructiv-
ist epistemology.
1.1.2 Constructivism as a long-range theory: Epistemology
Perception and Reality 
The core of constructivist theory could be described as a specific answer to the 
question: ‘How do we know what we think to know is real?’. The basic onto-
logical question whether there is an objective reality that persists apart from our 
perception, or if what we call realities is no more than constructs of our imagi-
nation has historically been answered in a broad range from what usually is de-
scribed as the antagony of realism and idealism. While realists assume that an 
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objective reality exists (and that it must therefore be the aim of any kind of re-
search to get to a better understanding of this reality), idealists reject this pre-
sumption of an external reality in favor of an understanding of realities as in-
ternal constructs of our minds, an approach culminating in tendencies of sol-
ipcism, the idea that all perception is just an effect of imagination26. 
This ongoing debate has its roots in the tradition of scepticism, which argues 
that whatever we think to know about “reality” can only be derived from what 
we sensually perceive; but in order to know whether and when our senses de-
ceive us, we would need to check our perceptions with the things percepted, 
which is not possible, as these “realities” are not accessible apart from our sen-
sations. According to the scepticist argument, external reality - if it exists - may 
not be perceived as it is, making any attempt to make conclusive assertions 
about this reality futile. 
This (methodical) paradox presents a real challenge for scientific enterprises: 
what use can any kind of science, any kind of research be, if whatever answers 
we find, whatever hypothesis we think to prove are dependent on the unprov-
able reliability of our perception, and thereby not rooted in knowledge, but in 
faith27?
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26 see: Glasersfeld, Ernst von: “Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit und des Begriffs der Ob-
jektivität”, in: Gumin, Heinz / Meier, Heinrich: “Einführung in den Konstruktivis-
mus”, Piper, München, 2005.
27 For a critical discussion of (early) constructivist theory and rationalism see: Abel, 
Bodo: “Grundlagen der Erklärung menschlichen Handelns - Zur Kontroverse zwischen 
Konstruktivisten und Kritischen Rationalisten”, Mohr, Tübingen, 1983.
In regard to ontological questions, the sceptical argument has so far presented 
an impregnable dilemma. If science claims to be legitimated only by standards 
of truth, science has to be illegitimate. So, why make this claim?
Instrumentalism: Models of Understanding
In reaction to this dilemma, constructivism represent a different appoach. While 
there may be no way to check our knowledge for its consistency with ontologi-
cal reality, there may still be other criteria for the quality of our findings. There 
may not be an external reality, or if there is, we may not be able to perceive it as 
it is. But whatever we experience as real gives rise to what we experience as 
problems; the quality of our knowledge may, therefore, be measured by its abil-
ity to provide steps towards what we experience as solutions. 
As a consequence, the merit of science does not lie in generating models of ex-
planation, but in models of understanding, the question not being “what is this 
thing?”, but rather, “how can I understand this thing?”. Models of understand-
ing do not claim to represent truth, as the range of these models is limited by 
their “ontical noncommitment”28. They claim to make phenomena understand-
able “as if” they were represented by the model, rather than “as what” they 
really are29. This is why constructivist theorists are so insistent of constructivism 
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28 see: Glasersfeld, Ernst von: “Siegener Gespräche über Radikalen Konstruktivismus”, 
in: Schmidt, Siegfried J. (Ed.): “Der Diskurs des Radikalen Konstruktivismus”, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M., 1987, esp. p. 402.
29 comp.: Glasersfeld, Ernst von: “Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit und des Begriffs der 
Objektivität”, in: Gumin, Heinz / Meier, Heinrich: “Einführung in den Konstruktivis-
mus”, Piper, München, 2005, esp. p. 13.
being an epistemological rather than ontological approach30, as it focusses on 
our ability to know and understand rather than on the “nature of things”. From 
a constructivist perspective, the focus of research must lie on what is called 
“cognitive realities” rather than ontical reality: how do we (as individuals and 
as societies) construct what we believe to be true in order to confront our per-
ceptions of “the real”?
This does not mean that scientific explanation becomes coincidental or arbitrary. 
While there may be a whole set of conflicting models of what we perceive to be 
the same phenomena, the merit of any hypothesis or model is measured by its 
functionality in a socio-epistemological context. Does what we think to know 
prove to be a sustainable hypothesis when dealing with what we experience, 
and the phenomena we define as a result of these experiences?
The sustainability of these sets of knowledge is not defined by concepts of truth, 
but by the concept of viability.
Viability
In order to distinguish the idea of knowledge in terms of viability from the idea 
of knowledge being an analogous representation or reality, Glasersfeld employs 
the image of a blind wayfarer crossing a forest day after day31. There may be 
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30 see: Glasersfeld, Ernst von: “Siegener Gespräche über Radikalen Konstruktivismus”, 
in: Schmidt, Siegfried J. (Ed.): “Der Diskurs des Radikalen Konstruktivismus”, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M., 1987, esp. p. 402-404. 
31 see: Glasersfeld, Ernst von: “Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit und des Begriffs der Ob-
jektivität”, in: Gumin, Heinz / Meier, Heinrich: “Einführung in den Konstruktivis-
mus”, Piper, München, 2005, esp. p. 19.
many possible ways that lead through the forest, and in time, the wayfarer will 
have constructed a certain image of the forest according to the various paths 
that have led him through the woods and those that turned out to be dead ends. 
The actual forest - representing the concept of external reality in the metaphor - 
does not reveal itself, the wayfarer does not learn anything about the trees and 
rocks themselves, they merely represent obstacles, regulations for the empirical 
perception of the viability of certain paths. 
The experience of the forest does not contain trees or rocks, it can only contain 
the spaces in between, up to the point where the space is externally limited by 
these obstacles. 
While philosophical tradition has for a long time shared the common idea of 
knowledge being an analoguous representation of reality, the concept of viabil-
ity is based on the functionality of an explanation in regard to our perceptions. 
As an epistemological concept, the notion of viability allows for different, even 
contradictory models of understanding, as long as they are not intended to rep-
resent a truthful explanation of the phenomena experienced. The criterion for 
the quality of models of understanding is not how ‘true’ they are, but their ca-
pability to withstand experience. This implies the limited range of any viable 
model, as experience itself is limited to presuppositions of an observer, whose 
perceptions are already pre-defined by a certain observing situation in a specific 
socio-cultural context. 
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1.1.3 Constructivism as a mid-range theory: Societies
Realities as a social construct
While constructivism abandons the concept of truth in favor of the idea of vi-
ability, it does not give up the possibility of knowledge by resiliating to the epis-
temological hopelessness of solipcism. But knowledge is no longer understood 
as something that can be acquired in regard to an object of research and tested 
against this objects features; instead, knowledge itself is a social construction, 
resulting from processes of communication 32  and negotiation in order to de-
velop answers that enable successful operation within a social context.33 
These negotiatory processes take place on two different, if related, levels. For 
one, definitory agreements in a specific context lead to categories in which ob-
servations can be made and negotiated. In order to measure the speed of a car, 
there must be a definition of the concept “speed” and an agreement how speed 
is measured, described and communicated. 
On another level, on which speed may be subject to judgemental debate, nego-
tiations take place in regard to debates of why a certain speed may be consid-
ered too fast or too slow in a specific situation. 
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32 This is why Ernst von Glasersfeld insists on communication being a key element in 
the construction of viable concepts. see: Glasersfeld, Ernst von: “Siegener Gespräche 
über Radikalen Konstruktivismus”, in: Schmidt, Siegfried J. (Ed.): “Der Diskurs des 
Radikalen Konstruktivismus”, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M., 1987, esp. p. 404-409.
33 This does not mean that social processes aim at the parallelization of conclusive in-
terpretations: conflict and disagreement in regard to a topic are not only common phe-
nomena, they are strategies in processes of parallelization. Disagreement in regard to a 
certain problem does not need to be resolved in order to establish the problem itself as 
a social reality. 
First order realities
In constructivist theory, these levels are accounted for by the distinction be-
tween first and second order realities. Paul Watzlawick employs the example of 
gold34: on a level of first order realities, gold has specific physical properties 
(weight, density, color). While it is dependent on agreement whether the weight 
of gold is measured in pounds, kilograms or ounces, the weight itself can be 
measured by any observer alike with the same results, thereby constituting an 
empirical base for perception. While this perception is not void of presupposi-
tions (measuring the weight of gold requires the appliance of the concept 
“weight”, not “density”), it can be made regardless of the observers interpreta-
tions. First order realities can be referred to as “objective” realities, as long as 
this refers to the objectivity of specific data deriving from perception based on 
definitory agreement, not to the objective perception of ontological truth. 
Second order realities
Contrary to perceptions on the level of first order realities, the experience of 
second order realities is dependent on subjective concepts of value. Second or-
der realities cannot be measured, but merely evaluated in regard to a set of val-
ues and beliefs; on a social level, they are subject to negotiation. 
The symbolical meaning of gold, which legitimates its aesthetical as well as 
economical value, cannot simply be measured, it is a construction resulting 
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Konstruktivismus und Pychotherapie”, in: Gumin, Heinz / Meier, Heinrich: 
“Einführung in den Konstruktivismus”, Piper, München, 2005, p. 91f.
from socio-cultural negotiations and agreements, dependent on a specific expe-
riential context. While second order realities are often referred to as “subjective” 
realities, the extensive influence of social and cultural constructions and nego-
tiations in determining the viability of concepts on this level of reality must be 
taken into account. 
Interdependency of first and second order realities
While the concept of first and second order realities initially requires a distinc-
tion, it is important to point out the interdependency between these levels in 
order to open up for new perspectives. As perceptions on the level of first order 
realities require definitory agreements, these agreements can be argued to be a 
result of the construction of second order realities, just as second order realities 
are constructed in reaction to perceptions of first order realities: the decision to 
agree on terms of measuring the weight of gold derives from a presupposition 
that information about physical properties of materials is valued information, 
just as the experience of worth ascribed to gold derives from the perception that 
gold is not a common material, a perception on the level of first order reality. 
The alternate negotiation of second order realities and the agreements presup-
posing the perception of first order realities may therefore themselves be argued 
to result from processes of social constructions. 
Constructivist theory is inevitably social theory. As the construction of cognitive 
realities relies on processes of communication, all knowledge arises from the 
social context it is generated in. Any kind of constructivist science, no matter in 
what field of research it is employed, needs to be aware of the social context it 
takes place in in order to uphold the viability of its findings.
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1.1.4 Constructivism as a low-range theory: digital games as con-
structed realities
Once the assumption is made that knowledge is only possible as the result of 
(social) processes of construction on an epistemological level, the constructed-
ness of cognitive realities must further be employed for any subsequent level of 
theorization: constructivist epistemology also demands for constructivist con-
ceptualization in regard to societies and processes of socialization (mid-range 
theories), and finally in regard to any particular phenomena to be examined 
(low-range theories).
But even without the assumption of constructivist epistemology and the subse-
quent application of constructivist conceptions as a mid-range theory, the as-
sessment of (digital) games can draw on constructivist theory.
When it comes to understanding the experience of computer games from a 
player-centered approach, constructivist theory provides viable perspectives 
even if it is limited to its use as a low-range theory.
A key argument for this thesis lies in the specific situation of players confronted 
with a computer game. When in the following I will try to identify the com-
puter games’ equivalent to what has been discussed in terms of external, first 
order and second order realities, this identification will itself be an auxiliary 
construction, an instrumentalist model of understanding that will hopefully 
prove viable in the course of this project. What I hope to achieve by this model 
is a better understanding of the processes framing the experience of players en-
gaged in a game. 
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Confronted with digital games, players usually do not perceive or experience 
the game’s code (the way game developers and some scholars do), but the pos-
sibilities and limitations this code provides, experiencing the resulting game 
mechanics as paths between viable options and non-viable restraints. If the 
game world is to be described as a virtual reality, the virtual equivalent of ex-
ternal reality would be this code, in its property of being perceptible only 
through the operational possibilities it provides or hinders. 
These possibilities, the rules that are inscribed into the game, and the variety of 
possible gameplay decisions, is perceived analoguous to first order realities: 
every player has the same possibilities in the game, and is limited in the same 
regards, once there is an initial agreement on the terms under which these pos-
sibilities are measured: these terms include specific hadware demands, a basic 
understanding of computer interfaces, and the idea that the game world is ap-
proached in terms of playing a game. The number of viable gameplay possibili-
ties may be numerous or even infinite, but the framework provided by the 
game’s mechanics is the same for every player. 
While the potential gameplay possibilities provided by the game mechanics are 
the same for every player, specific gameplay decisions are not. The operation 
within the game’s limits is dependent on the players values and beliefs, inter-
twined with interpretations of the events provided by and executed in the 
game. Equivalent to the construction of second order realities, players may de-
cide whether they accept the games goals as their own, whether they accept the 
challenges provided by the game and accept some gameplay decisions as viable 
options, while disregarding others. 
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The experience of the game world as a construction of second order realities be-
comes a presupposition of the perception of the game mechanics as first order 
realities: the operative perception of game mechanics as first order realities is 
dependent on the players interpretation of possible courses in order to try them 
out. 
In the following chapter I will try to experimentally apply these basic construc-
tivist concepts as a model of understanding to three different aspects of com-
puter game studies. These aspects, which again can be regarded as ‘construc-
tions’ deriving from agreements, definitions and practices of the discipline, will 
be discussed from a constructivist perspective a in order to provide viable an-
swers for the further assessment of games and play. 
First, the problem of ‘games and reality’ will be addressed: while it is generally 
accepted that players know that the games they are playing present staged and 
artificial experiences, the immersion in these ‘virtual worlds’ is easily taken ‘for 
real’, and the experience of success or failure they provide can satisfy needs and 
desires that seem anything but virtual. This relation between experiences ‘taken 
for real’ and perceptions deriving from a ‘game world’ that presents itself only 
by enabling or hindering successful operation will be assessed in a first ‘con-
struction’, which reflects an epistemological level of constructivist theory.
Second, the question of ‘play’ and its definitions in the academic discipline of 
game studies will be discussed. Based on the assumption that any academic 
discipline constitutes itself by defining its object of research, thereby ‘construct-
ing’ the reality it sets out to assess even before it is analytically approached, this 
second ‘construction’ will focus on the idea of ‘play’ as an opposite of ‘non 
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play’, as it is central to historical theories of play and games. The viability of 
this discriminating conception of play will be questioned, and an alternative 
model will be suggested. The second ‘construction’, therefore, addresses the 
implications of constructivist theory as a mid-range theory, highlighting the so-
cial constructedness of academic definitions and re-assessing central assump-
tions in order to propose alternative (and, hopefully, more viable) definitions.
Finally, the basic problem of contingent player experiences will be the focus of a 
third construction. The relation between games and narrative will serve as a 
starting point to suggest a methodology which accounts for the multitude of 
possible player experiences, without dissolving into arbitrariness by neglecting 
the game artifact as a base for the construction of these experiences. The third 
‘construction’, therefore, employs constructivist concepts as a low-range theory 
by focussing on the specific construction of play experiences in computer 
games.
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1.2 First construction: Rules and Reality
“Is all that we see or seem
But a dream within a dream?”
(Edgar Allan Poe)35
The first construction will focus on rules as a defining trait of computer games 
and discuss how satisfying experiences depend upon the reality status of a 
game’s rules. It will be argued that the acceptance of these rules as a guiding 
factor for players’ choices is a relevant factor for the game’s reality status and 
therefore a prerequisite for satisfying gameplay experiences.
1.2.1 Reality status of games: representation, interaction and rules
Computer games make the promise to enable satisfying experiences for their 
players. In order to keep that promise they have to be accepted as real by play-
ers to a certain degree; according to Frijda’s law of apparent reality “emotions 
are elicited by events appraised as real, and their intensity corresponds to the 
degree to which this is the case.”36 
But how ‘real’ are games? Are games part of what we think of as reality, or what 
about them is considered real? And how real do they have to appear in order to 
enable satisfying gameplay experiences?
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35 Poe, Edgar Allan: “A Dream Within a Dream”, in: Poe, Edgar Allan; O’Neill, Edward 
H. (Ed.): “The Complete Tales and Poems of Edgar Allan Poe”, Dorset Press, New York, 
N.Y., 1989, p. 24f.
36 Frijda, Nico H.: “The Laws of Emotion”, in: American Psychologist, Vol. 43, No. 5, p. 
352.
Game scholar Jesper Juul has a valid point when he states that games are half-
real, because while the dragon I fight in the gamecontext is not real, the rules of 
the game are (or simply put: because I am ‘really playing a game’)37. But the 
apparent reality of games doesn’t stop here. 
While players do know that they are playing a game, at some point the player is 
able to ignore the fact that the dragon is not real. But accepting the importance 
of victory and the presence of a dragon as a reality is not only important when 
playing a game, it is a phenomenon thoroughly discussed in regard to tradi-
tional media as the “willing suspension of disbelief”. Looking for the specific 
ways in which games can be accepted as ‘real’, and how this distinguishes them 
from traditional media, is not a simple task. The difference cannot be described 
in terms of  active versus passive reception alone, as even in traditional media, 
suspension of disbelief requires recipients to actively exercise creative efforts, as 
Janet Murray points out:
“As the literary theorists known as the "reader response"school have 
long argued, the act of reading is far from passive; we construct al-
ternate narratives as we go along, we cast actors or people we know 
in the roles of the characters, we perform the voices of the characters 
in our heads, we adjust the emphasis of the story to suit our interests, 
and we assemble the story into the cognitive schemata that make up 
our own systems of knowledge and belief. Similarly when we watch 
a movie, we take the separate spaces of the various sets and merge 
them into a continuous space that exists only in our own minds.”38
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Worlds”, The MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A., 2005.
38 Murray, Janet: “Hamlet on the Holodeck”, The MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A., 1998, p. 
110.
Belief (or ‘suspension of disbelief’) does not require proof that the narrated 
events are real; it does require the absence of proof that they are not. This is 
why we can accept the absence of certain parts of a fictional space which are not 
explicitly shown in a movie: the camera doesn’t point in their direction, but 
they might still be there. As a technical convention we have accepted that 
someone else determines the camera’s angle, and we don’t grow suspicious if 
there are certain things that are not shown to us. 
This convention does not apply to interactive media: interactive media let us 
interact with virtual objects, they let us turn the camera ourselves, and we ex-
pect to find something there that confirms our idea of the represented world. 
Murray employs the example of a virtual telephone, part of an interactive learn-
ing environmet, to show how interaction can lead to acceptance of virtual ob-
jects as real:
“...we included a working telephone, represented by a photograph of 
a phone whose keypad could be clicked on. Students found the 
phone in an apartment they were free to explore by stepping through 
a photographed space. Near the phone were the numbers of people 
they had been motivated to telephone by the plot of the story (and 
whose answering machines they reached when they called). If they 
punched in a number outside the game, they heard the authentic out-
of-service message used in Paris. The story was mostly told in well-
directed video segments, which the students also found enjoyable, 
but the telephone was one of the most popular features of the story. 
This was because it behaved as a functional virtual object and be-
cause it became part of the accomplishment of a specific goal. In 
short, it became real through use.”39
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Interaction is a way to test the boundaries of virtual environments: do the ele-
ments of the world ‘work’ as I expect them to do when I interact with them, or 
do I end up looking behind the scenes, realizing that the world is fake, a staged 
scenario just pretending to be real. Does the world become “real through use”, 
or do I get proof that it is only make-believe?
While the option of testing a world by interacting with it marks a difference be-
tween traditional and interactive media, it still doesn’t account for computer 
games as a specific form of interactive media. If we consider games as rule-
based systems, it is not enough to examine how certain elements represented in 
the game world can be accepted as ‘real’. Instead, it is the idea of ‘rules’ that 
needs to be investigated. While representational elements have to withstand in-
teraction in order to be accepted as real, rules are intended to guide the way we 
interact with the system in the first place. How can these rules become accepted 
as real enough to become a guiding factor for our choices?
In this chapter, I will attempt a discussion of the concept of ‘rules’ and the ac-
ceptance of these rules as ‘real enough’ to become a guiding factor for the 
choices players make in a game.
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1.2.2 What is ‘real’?
In this context, this is not to be read as a metaphysical question. Instead, the 
question of reality has to be asked in regard to perception and experience40. 
What do we regard to be real, and what’s the concept to be put in opposition to 
the experience of reality? 
Something is considered to be ‘real’ if one assesses it in terms of “it is” instead 
of “it could be” (terms of “it is not” actually correspond to the “it is” category, 
as it is perceived as reality that the thing “is not”; this does change the value as-
signed to the thing, but not the status of perceived reality of the assigned value). 
The acceptance of something as ‘real’ requires some kind of “realization” first, a 
mental change leading to a state where something is regarded in factual terms. I 
might learn that “X is a nice person”, a notion I didn’t have before I met X. Or I 
might realize that there’s a movie called “Movie”, which I didn’t know before I 
stumbled upon the title on the Internet Movie Database41.
Reality, conviction and the proof of truth
But what are the necessary factors for realization in terms of mental changes?
In terms of an experiential rather than metaphysical discussion, this is a ques-
tion of belief. In the example of X being a nice person, I will hardly ever find ab-
solute proof that X is “nice”. First of all, my idea of “nice” will be subjective, not 
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thing perceived. The focus is on the assessment of perception and experience rather 
than on the possibility of gathering data about an outside world. 
41 http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1040023/
absolute. Secondly, I will base my evaluation of X’s character on my individual 
experiences, and the assumptions resulting from these experiences.  
These assumptions are not arbitrary, but according to constructivist theory42 re-
sult from the viability of previous evaluations on the one hand, and from social 
negotiations on the other; they arise from a set of values and beliefs, which are 
again based on social constructions. These values and beliefs are dynamically 
constructed through processes of communication in order to enable operation 
within a social context43.
While these processes of evaluation could lead this chapter into a whole new 
direction, what’s important is that the concept of “realization” does not refer to 
the “truth” of the thing perceived (“is X truly a nice person, in accordance with 
the individuals idea of “nice”), but about the acceptance of the thing as real. The 
perceived compatibility with the individual’s values and beliefs constitutes the 
basis for these realizations.
48
42 see: Glasersfeld, Ernst von: “Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit und des Begriffs der Ob-
jektivität”, in: Gumin, Heinz / Meier, Heinrich: “Einführung in den Konstruktivis-
mus”, Piper, München, 2005, esp. p. 19.
43 This is why Ernst von Glasersfeld insists on communication being a key element in 
the construction of viable concepts. see: Glasersfeld, Ernst von: “Siegener Gespräche 
über Radikalen Konstruktivismus”, in: Schmidt, Siegfried J. (Ed.): “Der Diskurs des 
Radikalen Konstruktivismus”, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M., 1987, esp. p. 404-409.
1.2.3 Rules and Commands
In most games representation plays an important role, but it is their rules which 
characterize games in comparison to other media. In common understanding, 
rules ‘need to be followed’. But the way rules work is different from the idea of 
‘commands’. 
While commands imply the necessity of obedience, rules merely constitute con-
ditions under which choices can be made, they are conditional criteria. “You 
must kill the enemy” is not a rule, but a command, as it doesn’t consider dis-
obedience. Rules are constituted by “if...then” terms: “If you kill the enemy, then 
you win the game” / “if you don’t kill the enemy, then you lose the game”44. It 
is the player’s choice what action to take, and while the choice might depend on 
the desired outcome, thereby making one action more likely to be chosen than 
another, it is still a choice. 
Contrary to commands, rules do not tell the player what she has to do. They 
merely describe the consequences to be expected if certain actions are carried 
out in order to provide guidelines for the player. They can, however, have a 
guiding function - “ruling” the players behaviour.  But these consequences have 
to be relevant for the player’s actions in order to qualify as guiding factors.
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44 While grammatically unusual, the use of “if/then” refers to basic principles of com-
puter programming. The command sequence “if/then/goto” is one of the most basic 
forms of how programming languages provide a way to enable a system to react to 
data input. 
1.2.4 How to Rule a Kingdom
Rules can be thought of as operating on two different levels, fulfilling different 
functions on each level. On a first level, certain actions or features45 of someone 
or something are linked with specific consequences. If the “subjects” (in case of 
a game: the players) are able to actively respond to these specified rules, and re-
gard them as relevant for their choice of action, this takes place on a second 
level, which I would like to call the level of realized rules.46
The distinction between these two levels reflects the distinction between first 
order and second order realities as it is conceived of in constructivist theory47. 
First order realities refer to constructions of reality whose perception is depend-
ent on agreement in a specific social context. The weight of an item, for exam-
ple, can be measured by different observers, who will all gather similar read-
ings of data, as long as their measurement is based on a shared concept of 
weight and an agreement on what they have defined as units of measurement 
(i.e. kilograms, punds etc.). This level of reality might be called “objective”, as 
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45 Rules can be specified regarding actions or features alike. As this model is to be ap-
plied to game rules (and as game designers are concerned with guiding players ac-
tions, not their features) the focus will be on action-centered rules in this chapter.
46 This also slightly corresponds with the distinction between mechanics and dynam-
ics in Marc LeBlanc’s MDA model., see: LeBlanc, Marc: “Tools for Creating Dramatic 
Game Dynamics”, in: Salen, Katie / Zimmerman, Eric: “The Game Design Reader - A 
Rules of Play Anthology”, The MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A., 2006, p.438-459. Specified 
rules are nothing else than a games mechanics. Realized rules, however, are not the 
same as game dynamics, even if the realization (or non-realization) of rules is what 
leads to dynamics when the game is played. 
47  see: Watzlawick, Paul: “Wirklichkeitsanpassung oder angepaßte “Wirklichkeit”? 
Konstruktivismus und Psychotherapie”, in: Gumin, Heinz / Meier, Heinrich: 
“Einführung in den Konstruktivismus”, Piper, München, 2005, p. 91f.
long as it is clear that it doesn’t refer to the objectivity of the perception in re-
gard to an external truth, but to the fact that modes of perception have been 
“objectified” by means of social agreement. 
Contrary to perceptions on the level of first order realities, second order realities 
cannot be measured according to previous and accepted social agreements, but 
merely evaluated in regard to the individual’s set of values and beliefs. On a 
social level, they are subject to negotiation, not a pre-arranged mode of percep-
tion. Second order realities are defined by a judgemental evaluation. While the 
weight of an item can be measured and perceived by anyone who applies the 
agreed upon modes of measurements, the item’s beauty, its relevance or - more 
general - its meaning are subject to the individual’s set of values and beliefs. 
How can this distinction be applied to a game’s rules, when the question is how 
players achieve the transition from “really playing a game” to accepting the 
game’s goals and challenges as factors real enough to enable satisfying experi-
ences? 
Specified Rules as 1st order realities: The King’s Fancy
On the level of specified rules, according to the idea of first order realities, terms 
are set which link certain actions to specific consequences. The ruler of a king-
dom might, for example, specify that anyone who kills a noble is to be exiled to 
a faraway island. As mere terms, this does not yet constitute a rule, as long as 
no consequence concerning the kingdom’s subject’s behavior is assumed. On 
this first level, the level of specification, rules serve as an organizing principle. 
The ruler might simply want to react to the fact that a certain number of his 
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subjects kills nobles on a regular basis and therefore decide that it may be a 
good idea to separate these assassins from the rest of the kingdom’s inhabitants. 
If he specifies exilation as a consequence for future assassinations, this will sim-
ply mean that from now on assassins will be transferred to the island, while 
non-assassins will remain in the kingdom.
On this first level of rules, the ruler is not a ruler yet, he’s merely an administra-
tor (even when administering his/her own rules), sorting out subjects who ful-
fill the specification from those who don’t and setting a consequence by separat-
ing them geographically. It is important to note that specifications on this first 
level may just as well concern inanimate objects. Specified consequences can be 
applied to pieces of wood as well as living human beings. The specification may 
be that dry pieces of wood are put in the cellar, while damp pieces are left in the 
sun to dry. On the levelof specified rules, whatever the specifications are, and 
no matter to what or whom they are applied, the idea is not yet to change the 
subject’s behavior, but to react to their current behavior by applying organizing 
principles.
On the level of specified rules, choice is a factor concerning the ruler, not the 
ruled. It is the ruler’s choice what specifications to set. On this level, it is the 
king’s fancy that those who kill a noble will be living on a faraway island 
henceforth. It is not yet taken into account how the subjects will react to the 
specifications, the specifications are merely applied for their own - or the ruler’s 
- sake.
When Cinderella in the fairy tale sorts the bad lentils from the good ones, she, 
too, simply applies specifications to the lentils: “the good into the pot, the bad 
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into the crop”. Cinderella does not ‘rule’ the lentils, as the lentils have no choice 
in how to react to the specifications. The lentils, as well as the king’s subjects, 
are regarded as no more than passive gamepieces on the level of specified rules. 
Realized Rules as 2nd order realities: The King’s Power
Now, one could argue that in the fairy tale, it is not the lentils that are subject to 
Cinderella’s rule, but Cinderella herself who is subject to the rule of her step-
mother. If we examine this part of the fairy tale as an exemplary rule-based sys-
tem, it becomes clear that the subject of the rule (Cinderella) is indeed following 
her stepmother’s rules in order to get a reward (she’ll be allowed to join her 
stepsisters at the king’s festival if she sorts out the lentils). It is her choice 
whether she does as requested and gets her reward, or ignores the request and 
stays at home. This takes us to the second level of rules, on which the conse-
quences linked to an action by specification lead to the emergence of rules as a 
relevant factor for the subject’s decisions. I’d like to call this the ‘level of real-
ized rules’.
Realized rules require the subject to be actively able to make choices regarding 
the rules. Cinderella chooses to follow her stepmother’s rule. Agency, the ability 
to deliberately carry out an action or to decide not to, is the precondition for the 
realization of rules. On the level of realized rules, exiling assassins to a faraway 
island will most likely be more than the fancy of an obsessive ruler, but an at-
tempt to diminish the assassination of nobles. The function of the rule becomes 
a change of circumstances. While specified rules require action only on behalf of 
applying the rule, realized rules aim at the action of the subject in regard to the 
rule. On this level, rules always open up more than one possible outcome; if a 
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subject kills a noble, she will be exiled to the island, if she doesn’t she’ll be al-
lowed to stay in the kingdom. 
In order for the rule to have any influence on its subjects’ behavior, it is impor-
tant for the rule to be realized, meaning that the subjects need to make the rule a 
relevant factor in their decisions. If the specified rule says that everytime a no-
ble is killed, the king will drink a glass of water, it is not to be expected that the 
rule will have any influence on the killing of nobles. To make choices based on 
specified rules, the subjects need to know about the rule, and they need to care 
about the consequence, or the rule will not be realized. 
The realization of rules takes place on the level of second order realities, as it 
requires a personal judgement on the relevance of the rule. Without the subject 
(or player) relating the specified rule to her own values and believes, the speci-
fied rule can be perceived as a fact, but will not be realized as a guiding factor 
for the subject’s / the player’s decisions.
1.2.5 Immersive Realization of Rules
Rules can only set the terms in which choices can be made. But as long as a 
player does not share the values assigned to the game system, these rules have 
no influence whatsoever on the choices made in the game. While the player can 
still acknowledge the consequences of the specified rules, and even understand 
what behaviour they are supposed to elicit, the player’s choices will necessarily 
depend upon other factors than the acceptance of the rules as a guideline.
With this idea of immersion into the logic of the game’s rules, the argument 
comes full circle with the introductory question: what is the relevance of a 
game’s reality status in regard to enabling satisfying gameplay experiences? 
Only when a specified rule’s consequence in the game world is accepted as a 
relevant consequence for the player’s actual desires is the player able to im-
merse into the game world. This is why I would suggest calling this kind of re-
alization  “immersive realization of rules”. 
If it is necessary for players to accept the game rules’ consequences as factors 
for the fulfillment or limitation of their actual desires in order to immerse play-
ers into the game, does that mean that the rewards and punishments of success-
ful games need to be considered as such outside the game world’s context? 
Does there have to be a gain on the player’s bank account if she wins the game? 
Is it necessary to beat her with a stick if she loses?
It would be, if immersion started with the consequences of the game’s rules. But 
immersive realization begins at the players’ end, with the desire to fulfill their 
needs. The player may feel the need to prove herself, without experiencing the 
possibility to do so outside the game. Defeating a Dragon in the game world 
may be a good chance to be a hero and to enable the experience of accomplish-
ment. 
While the specified rules just specify what happens if the dragon is defeated, 
and what happens if he’s not, the player needs to accept the defeat as a real 
achievement in order to fulfill her need for accomplishment. But accomplish-
ment can only be experienced if the player decides to forget that she’s just play-
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ing a game. Heroes are not known to excel at that48. The experience of reality is 
not an effect of immersion49, it is a precondition for the immersive benefits de-
sired by the player. Janet Murray states:
“We do not suspend disbelief so much as we actively create belief. 
Because of our desire to experience immersion, we focus our atten-
tion on the enveloping world and we use our intelligence to reinforce 
rather than to question the reality of the experience.”50 
 
If the experience of immersion is desired by the player, the acceptance of the 
game’s rules ‘as real’ is a necessary precondition to achieve this goal. Without 
this acceptance, the game’s goals may still be reached, but it is the player’s 
goals that make her play the game and guide her choices.
Digital gameworlds have continuously become more complex, more appealing 
and more convincing over the last decade, and they will most probably con-
tinue to do so. While this makes it easier to accept them as real, it doesn’t make 
it necessary. It’s necessary because a game, whatever its benefits may be, con-
sists of two sides: the game world, its rules, its fictions and its challenges on one 
side, and the player, her values and beliefs and her desire for satisfying experi-
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48 Or are they? Heroes are winners of games, even if these games can be deadly seri-
ous. But this might lead too far in the context of this chapter.
49 The idea of immersion as a phenomenon dependent on media strategies, luring 
players (or recipients in general) into a state where the they grant the experience a 
status of reality, is a common notion in scholarly discussions of games and media. cf. 
Ryan, Marie-Laure: “Narrative as Virtual Reality: Immersion and Interactivity in Lit-
erature and Electronic Media”,  The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, M.D., 
2003, esp. p. 90 and p. 106-110; McMahan: “Immersion, Engagement, and Presence - A 
Method for Analyzing 3-D Video Games”, in: Wolf, J.P. Mark / Perron, Bernard (eds.): 
“The Video Game Theory Reader”, Routledge, New York & London, 2003, p. 67-68.
50 Murray, Janet: “Hamlet on the Holodeck”, The MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A., 1998, p. 
110.
ences on the other. Only by granting recognition to the game world as a reality, 
players can sustain a system they are part of, a system they expect to recognize 
themselves in exchange. 
1.2.6 Conclusion: the ‘Reality of Games’
While this chapter does not intend to address the question of reality in a meta-
physical sense, it can be argued that games can be experienced ‘as real’ by the 
player. 
The game’s rules even need to be accepted as real to some extent before they 
can fulfill the player’s desire for satisfactory experiences.
Rules can be understood as the specification of consequences, but they will only 
become realized as rules guiding players behavior if these consequences are ex-
perienced as relevant for players. 
These two dimensions of rules have been traced to a point at which it becomes 
plausible that it may be in the player’s interest that the game is experienced as 
real; only then will it become a potential tool for adressing their desire for satis-
fying experiences. 
So, if there is a general rule that applies to games rather than in games, it might 
be specified like this: “IF you accept the game as real THEN playing the game 
can be a satisfying experience.”
As a result, it does not make sense to seek out the factors for experienced reality 
in the nature of games alone. If anything, the questions that need to be asked 
must aim at the constitution of the player and her quest for satisfaction, and 
therefore at the human condition in general. 
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1.3 Second Construction: Play Definitions
“It ain’t necessarily so”
(Porgy and Bess)51
The second construction examines the persistence of delineating, dualistic con-
cepts of play, which are rooted in historical play theories, but are still common 
in contemporary game studies discourses. The alternative of a mediating con-
cept of play will be discussed, and experimentally applied to different areas of 
the field of game studies.
1.3.1 Delineating concepts of play
The idea of games as ‘something completely different’, detached from the ‘rest 
of life’, is not only dominant in public and medial discourses, it is also a persis-
tent motif in the game studies discourse. Delimiting concepts of play and 
games, trying to distinguish games from non-games and play from non-play, 
are the cornerstone of essential historic game theories. Theoretical considera-
tions in today’s field of game studies are mainly iterations of the basic assump-
tion that ‘games’ and ‘play’ need to be positivistically defined and thereby dis-
tinguished from phenomena that are not to be regarded as play or game. 
In the following chapter I will show the persistence of delineating concepts of 
‘play’ in historic play theories. The texts I will focus on still fuel today’s game 
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51  Porgy and Bess (Gershwin, George; Gershwin, Ira; Heyward, E. DuBose/Theatre 
Guild New York, 1935)
studies discourse when it comes to questions of play; questions that can hardly 
be seperated from those regarding games, as Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman 
state: 
“Games create play: of that there is no doubt. But there is much more 
to the relationship, as four texts from Johan Huizinga, Roger Caillois, 
Gregory Bateson, and Brian Sutton-Smith point out.”52 
It is these four texts which will provide the base for the following argument on 
delineating concepts of play. While this delineating character is easily identified 
in the theories of Caillois and Bateson, Johan Huizinga’s approach will need a 
much closer look to identify his underlying conception of play. A discussion of 
these texts will show that today’s game studies discourse regarding ideas of 
‘play’ is at its core affected by definitions which presume a certitude about what 
play ‘is’ (and what it is not) - a certitude that is not necessarily fit to address the 
problems of contemporary game studies. Sutton-Smith’s text on ‘The Ambigu-
ity of Play’ will be employed to examine this problem more closely.
As an alternative approach, I will discuss the possibility of a mediating concept 
of play, which I will identify as a key concept underlying Friedrich Schiller’s 
‘play-theory’. This concept of mediating play will be traced back to mechanical 
metaphors and the mechanical concepts of play, error and tolerance. While it 
will be shown that a mechanical idea of play is not completely absent in con-
temporary theories of play and games, it is scarcely made use of in the assess-
ment of contemporary problems in the field of game studies.
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52 Salen, Katie; Zimmerman, Eric: “What is Play?”, in: Salen, Katie; Zimmerman, Eric: 
“The Game Design Reader: a rules of play anthology”, MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A., 
2006, p. 83.
I will therefore discuss how this mediating concept of play might be more vi-
able than delineating concepts in addressing the challenges of today’s game 
studies, exemplified by three examples: the analysis of games, the design of 
games and the relation of games and violence.
Johan Huizinga
It seems obvious that any theoretical focus on ‘games’ and ‘play’ calls for a posi-
tivistic definition of these phenomena, thereby leading to delineating concepts, 
asking ‘what is play, and when does it become serious? What is a game, and 
where is the border between games and real life?’. These are the questions Jo-
han Huizinga addresses at the beginning of his treatise “Homo Ludens. A Study 
of the Play-Element in Culture”53, first published in 1938. It is, however, note-
worthy that his initial answer to these questions is the suggestion that the op-
position between ‘play’ and ‘seriousness’ may be an unsustainable assumption:
“In our way of thinking, play is the direct opposite of seriousness. At 
first sight this opposition seems as irreducible to other categories as 
the play-concept itself. Examined more closely, however, the contrast 
between play and seriousness proves to be neither conclusive nor 
fixed. We can say: play is non-seriousness. But apart from the fact 
that this proposition tells us nothing about the positive qualities of 
play, it is extraordinarily easy to refute. As soon as we proceed from 
‘play is non-seriousness’ to ‘play is not serious’, the contrast leaves 
us in the lurch - for some play can be very serious indeed.”54 
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53 Huizinga, Johan: “Homo Ludens. A Study of the Play-Element in Culture”, The Bea-
con Press, Boston, 1955.
54 Huizinga, Johan: “Homo Ludens. A Study of the Play-Element in Culture”, The Bea-
con Press, Boston, 1955, p. 5.
But while Huizinga tries to dissolve the opposition between the ‘fun’ of playing 
and the ‘seriousness’ of life, this does in no way mean that his conception of 
‘play’ relinquishes the idea of delineating the concept from its opposite. What 
exactly this opposite is, however, and what it means for his definition of play 
can not be pointed out without clarifying the structure of his argument - and, 
from a contemporary perspective, its shortcomings.
The main problem in identifying Huizinga’s perspective arises from the lack of 
clarification when it comes to the difference between ‘play’ and ‘games’. In the 
english edition of the text, Huizinga addresses the semantic difference between 
the terms, but without drawing conceptual conclusions: while this difference is 
not mentioned at all in the german edition55, the english edition treats it as a 
dismissable exception of the ‘rule’ that the compliance of verb and noun hints to 
the peculiarity of the phenomenon of play: “To some extent this is lost in Eng-
lish by the doublet play and game. Nevertheless the fact remains that in order to 
express the nature of the activity the idea contained in the noun must be re-
peated in the verb.”56 For Huizinga, there is no conceptional difference between 
the act of playing and the artifact related to this activity. This would not really 
be a problem if the unclarity remained on a semantical level: an emphasis on 
the ‘freedom’ of play combined with a conception of games as areas of freedom 
could provide a consistent base for his study. But this is not the conception 
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55 Huizinga, Johan: “Homo Ludens. Vom Ursprung der Kultur im Spiel”, Rowohlt, 
Reinbeck bei Hamburg, 2004, p. 48.
56 Huizinga, Johan: “Homo Ludens. A Study of the Play-Element in Culture”, The Bea-
con Press, Boston, 1955, p. 37.
Huizinga employs, which begins to show even in his initial discussion of the 
‘nature and significance of play’:
“First and foremost, then, play is a voluntary activity. Play to order is 
no longer play: it could at best be but a forcible imitation of it. By this 
quality of freedom alone, play marks itself off from the course of the 
natural process. [...] Play is superfluous. The need for it is only ur-
gent to the extent that the enjoyment of it makes it a need. Play can 
be deferred or suspended at any time [...]Here, then, we have the first 
main characteristic of play: that it is free, is in fact freedom.”57 
While this conception clearly emphasizes the ‘freedom’ of play as a defining 
characteristic, and may well remain uncontradicted as a definition of the mere 
activity of play, it breaks down when, only a few pages further, the summariza-
tion of characteristics of play aims to incorporate the idea of rules and restric-
tions, which might better suit a definition of ‘games’ than one of ‘play as an ac-
tivity’: 
“Summing up the formal characteristics of play we might call it a 
free activity standing quite consciously outside ‘ordinary’ life as be-
ing ‘not serious’, but at the same time absorbing the player intensely 
and utterly. It is an activity connected with no material interest, and 
no profit can be gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper 
boundaries of time and space according to fixed rules and in an or-
derly manner.” 58 
Contrary to the prior assertion that ‘play to order is no longer play’, the ‘free 
activity’ of play now proceeds “according to fixed rules and in an orderly man-
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con Press, Boston, 1955, p. 8.
58 Huizinga, Johan: “Homo Ludens. A Study of the Play-Element in Culture”, The Bea-
con Press, Boston, 1955, p. 13. 
ner” - thereby employing a characteristic of games as a defining aspect of play, 
and consequently negating the difference between the two concepts. Corre-
spondingly, the summarization emphasizes the idea of play as being ‘not seri-
ous’, an idea which Huizinga has earlier dismissed as pointless for a definition 
of play - a dismissal which can be argued for the idea of ‘play’ rather than the 
idea of ‘games’, as the idea of “sacred earnest”59 does not so much conform 
with the idea of ‘play as a free activity’, but is instead related to the acceptance 
of artificial limitations, which seems much closer to the idea of the restrictions 
provided by ‘games’.
The ambiguity of Huizinga’s definitions arises from a commingling of concepts 
of ‘play’ and ‘games’, which persists through his examinations. While this 
makes his initial definitions too elusive for a clear-cut evaluation, Huizinga’s 
focus becomes more clear in the progress of his argument, when he brings ex-
amples for ‘play’ as a predominant phenomenon in different cultures. When he 
tries to identify the ‘civilizing function’ of play in such diverse spheres as law 
and war, art or philosophy, the examples he employs keep recurring to the idea 
of fixed rules and the obligation to follow them. 
The most vivid example for Huizinga’s emphasis on the obligatory character of 
rules may be his discussion of the potlach - a custom which is specifically as-
cribed to Indian tribes in British Colombia, but can be traced throughout cul-
tures, and might even be related to any culturally organized kind of ‘wasteful 
habit’ whatsoever: 
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“In its most typical form as found among the Kwakiutl tribe the pot-
lach is a great solemn feast, during which one of two groups, with 
much pomp and ceremony, makes gifts on a large scale to the other 
group for the express purpose of showing its superiority. The only 
return expected by the donors but incumbent on the recipients lies in 
the obligation of the latter to reciprocate the feast within a certain pe-
riod and if possible to surpass it.”60
While at this point the potlach seems hardly different from any other kind of 
cultural convention involving the reciprocal donation of presents, its specific 
relevance for Huizinga’s argument becomes clear when he points out the often 
self-destructive nature of these ‘donative festivals’:
“In the potlach one proves one’s superiority not merely by the lavish 
prodigiality of one’s gifts, but, what is even more striking, by the 
wholesale destruction of one’s possessions just to show that one can 
do without them. [...] if one chieftain breaks a copper pot, or burns a 
pile of blankets, or smashes a canoe, his opponent is under an obliga-
tion to destroy at least as much or more if possible. A man will defi-
antly send the potsherds to his rival or display them as a mark of 
honour.”61
In the portrayal of this self-destructive element of the potlach, Huizinga’s con-
ception of play becomes strikingly apparent: not only is play unproductive, as it 
provides no material gain, it can even persist to a point where it results in exis-
tential material loss; what counts is not the prospect of advantages gained by 
winning the game, but the submission to its rules at all costs. 
Nikolaus König:  The Play Experience
65
60 Huizinga, Johan: “Homo Ludens. A Study of the Play-Element in Culture”, The Bea-
con Press, Boston, 1955, p. 58.
61 Huizinga, Johan: “Homo Ludens. A Study of the Play-Element in Culture”, The Bea-
con Press, Boston, 1955, p. 59.
This notion of ‘play for play’s sake’ is fortified when Huizinga portrays another 
example of ritual play, the kula:
“The kula is a ceremonial voyage starting at fixed times from one of 
the island groups east of New Guinea and going in two opposite di-
rections. Its purpose is the mutual exchange, by the various tribes 
concerned, of certain articles having no economic value either as ne-
cessities or useful implements, but highly priced as precious and no-
torious ornaments. [...] In the kula they pass temporarily from the 
possession of one group into that of the other, which thereby takes 
upon itself the obligation to pass them on within a certain space of 
time to the next link in the kula chain.”62
While the self-dectructive character of the potlach seems completely absent in 
the kula, it is again the unconditional and obligatory character of its rules that is 
emphasized by Huizinga. The portrayal of a joyous, yet binding organization of 
peaceful cohabitation serves to argue the submission to mutual rules as an in-
dubitable human ideal:
“At the root of this sacred rite we recognize unmistakably the imper-
ishable need of man to live in beauty. There is no satisfying this need 
save in play.”63
The close connection between the idea of ‘play’ as a human ideal and the obli-
gation to abide by agreements, to ‘follow the rules’, lies at the heart of Huiz-
inga’s examinations, and it can be traced back to his etymological discussion of 
the term ‘play’, when he argues - in admitted opposition to general etymologi-
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cal acceptance - a correspondance between the terms ‘play’ and ‘pledge’, the 
latter being rooted in the Old English verb plegan and the Old Frisian pflegan:  
“The oldest meaning is ‘to vouch or stand guarantee for, to take a 
risk, to expose oneself to danger for someone or something’. Next 
comes ‘to bind or engage oneself (sich verpflichten), to attend to, take 
care of (verpflegen)’. The German pflegen is also used in connection 
with the performance of a sacred act, the giving of advice, the ad-
ministration of justice (Rechtspflege), and in other Germanic lan-
guages you can ‘pflegen’ homage, thanks, oaths, mourning, work, 
love, sorcery and - lastly but rarely - even ‘play’.”64
While the etymological validity of his argument is of little relevance at this 
point, Huizinga’s determination to argue an obligatory character of ‘play’ most 
certainly is. What Huizinga calls ‘play’ is actually the following of culturally 
stipulated rules which apply within a spatially and temporally delimited ‘magic 
circle’65 - a definition which does not account for the ‘freedom’ he has earlier 
defined as a characteristic of ‘play’, but which is instead consistent with the idea 
of games as rule-based systems - a seemingly obscure mixing of concepts. But 
this emphasis on the submission to rules as a cultural and ethical obligation 
may well be rooted in Huizinga’s political agenda: Huizinga having been vice-
president of the League of Nations’ Committee of Intellectual Cooperation, the 
threat posed to international law by the rise of national socialism in the 1930‘s 
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might also be the key to an appropriate evaluation of his examinations of play66. 
In the light of a political movement which did not only bend the rules estab-
lished with peaceful cooperation in mind, but simply ignored them, Huizinga’s 
insistence on a ‘pledge to abide by the rules’ as an ethical obligation seems 
much less like a theoretical obscurity.
When it becomes apparent that the ‘games’ he has in mind are neither joyous 
pastimes nor sacred rituals, but a legal and ethical framework which holds the 
promise to secure peace and cooperation in the face of clear and present danger, 
Huizinga’s determination becomes far more tangible. Throughout the text, this 
agenda keeps shining through, and at some rare points, the connection between 
international law and the ethical obligation of play is even made explicit, as in 
the remarks on the notion of chivalry as an aesthetic safeguard in his chapter on 
‘play and war’:
“Most of the tales we hear of noble battles in beautiful style are based 
not so much on the sober relation of annalists and chroniclers as on 
literary vision, either of contemporaries or their successors, in epic 
and song. Nevertheless it would be wrong to conclude that this en-
nobling of war by viewing it in the light of ethics and aesthetics is 
but a ‘fair seeming’, or cruelty in disguise. Even if it were no more 
than a fiction, these fancies of war as a noble game of honour and 
virtue have still played an important part in developing civilizations, 
for it is from them that the idea of chivalry sprang and hence, ulti-
mately, of international law. Of these two factors, chivalry was one of 
the great stimulants of mediaeval civilization, and however con-
stantly the ideal was belied in reality it served as a basis for interna-
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tional law, which is one of the indispensable safeguards for the 
community of mankind.”67
The committment to rules Huizinga calls for is not just a fancy artificial handi-
cap heightening the ‘fun’ of the game, it is the foundation of ‘a noble game of 
honour and virtue’, which is supposed to protect against the doom of civiliza-
tion itself. 
From this perspective, the initial idea of ‘play as freedom’ becomes much less 
important than the submission to ‘the rules’ - similar to the possessions sacri-
ficed in the potlach, freedom, too, can be sacrificed for the ‘greater good’ of a 
binding ethical set of rules; in the face of imminent war and destruction, the 
honourable committment to mutual rules promises to avert the danger of chaos 
and destruction: 
“The ‘law of nations’ derives from the agonistic sphere as the con-
sciousness, or voice of consciousness, which says: ‘This goes against 
honour, is against the rules’. Once a thorough-going system of inter-
national obligations based on ethics has been developed, there is 
hardly any room for the agonistic element in the relations of States, 
for the system tries to sublimate the instinct of political struggle in a 
true sense of justice and equity.”68
For Huizinga, it is the committment to rules which alone provides control over 
the ‘free play’ of destructive, ‘instinctual’ powers - a dedication to ‘play along’ 
in order to ensure the integrity of otherwise frail social agreements. In this re-
Nikolaus König:  The Play Experience
69
67 Huizinga, Johan: “Homo Ludens. A Study of the Play-Element in Culture”, The Bea-
con Press, Boston, 1955, p. 95f.
68 Huizinga, Johan: “Homo Ludens. A Study of the Play-Element in Culture”, The Bea-
con Press, Boston, 1955, p. 100.
gard,  ‘freedom’ becomes a threat: in the awareness that the arrangements up-
holding a peaceful cohabitation will only persist as long as the parties invoved 
are willing to committ to them, those who choose to ‘play against the rules’ are 
seen as a threat to this delicate system of mutual agreements - a threat which 
becomes apparent in Huizinga’s decided warnings about the ‘spoil-sport’:
“The player who trespasses against the rules or ignores them is a 
‘spoil-sport’. The spoil-sport is not the same as the false-player, the 
cheat; for the latter pretends to be playing the game and, on the face 
of it, still acknowledges the magic circle. It is curious to note how 
much more lenient society is to the cheat than to the spoil-sport. This 
is because the spoil-sport shatters the play-world itself. By withdraw-
ing from the game he reveals the relativity and fragility of the play-
world in which he had temporarily shut himself with others. He robs 
play of its illusion - a pregnant word which means literally ‘in-play’ 
(from inlusio, illudere or inludere). Therefore he must be cast out, for 
he threatens the existence of the play-community.”69
Only when Huizinga’s underlying conception of play as an obligation to follow 
the rules is kept in mind, the delineating character of this conception becomes 
apparent: the line he draws is one between play as an obligation to follow the 
rules, and the negligance of these rules by the ‘spoil-sport’. These are the two 
options which define what play is, and what is not: one can either follow the 
rules or not follow the rules. For Huizinga, there is no space between. 
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Roger Caillois
While Huizinga’s insistence on the submission to rules as a defining characteris-
tic of play is not apparent in his initial and explicit definition, but requires a 
close examination of his argument, the conception of play Roger Caillois em-
ploys in his book “Man, Play and Games”70 is much easier to identify, and the 
delineations he employs are much more obvious. 
Caillois most certainly does not draw the line between the unconditional fol-
lowing of rules and the disorderly conduct of enacted freedom. Instead, he ac-
counts for the compatibility of freedom and obedience by the differentiation be-
tween ‘ludus’ and ‘paidia’ activities of play - two principles constituting differ-
ent ‘poles’ of play, and between which spans a ‘continuum’ in which every play 
activity can be localized. While ‘ludus’ refers to kinds of play that are guided by 
rules, and therefore conforms with Huizinga’s conception of play as the sub-
mission to rules, ‘paidia’ aims to grasp “spontaneous manifestations of the play 
instinct”71, and therefore encompasses the ‘freedom’ which Huizinga empha-
sizes in his explicit definition, but disregards as a ‘threat’ to orderly play in his 
actual argument. 
The differentiation between ‘ludus’ and ‘paidia’, however, does not serve the 
purpose of defining play, but in combination with the four ‘fundamental cate-
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gories’ of play Caillois proposes - agon, alea, ilinx and mimicry72 -, it rather 
aims at a systematic organization of different forms of play. The base for this 
differentiation is a conception of what play might be, which provides a frame-
work for defining play that is regularly drawn upon in contemporary play dis-
courses:
“[...] for the present, the preceding analysis permits play to be de-
fined as an activity which is essentially:
1. Free: in which playing is not obligatory; if it were, it would at once 
lose its attractive and joyous quality as diversion;
2. Separate: circumscribed within limits of space and time, defined 
and fixed in advance;
3. Uncertain: the course of which cannot be determined, nor the re-
sult attained beforehand, and some latitude for innovation being 
left to the player’s initiative:
4. Unproductive: creating neither goods, nor wealth, nor new ele-
ments of any kind; and, except for the exchange of property among 
the players, ending in a situation identical to that prevailing at the 
beginning of the game;
5. Governed by rules: under conventions that suspend ordinary 
laws, and for the moment establish new legislation, which alone 
counts;
6. Make-believe: accompanied by a special awareness of a second 
reality or of a free unreality, as against real life.”73
It is of little relevance for the present argument that Caillois’ definition is mostly 
carried out ex negativo by stating certain features which do not apply to play. It 
is at this point a merely semantical difference whether one calls play ‘free’ or 
‘not obligatory’, whether it is seen as ‘self-sufficient’ or as ‘unproductive’. What 
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does matter, however, is the underlying assumption that play - and each of its 
characteristics - can be seen as one of two exclusionary options, thereby broach-
ing the issue of what Watzlawick has repeatedly tried to advise against as a pit-
fall of dualist thinking: the idea of opposites, which enforces that either one or 
the other option has to apply - tertium non datur74. With few exceptions, Caillois’ 
definition employs dualist delineations to state what play is and what it is not: 
play is not obligatory, it is spatially and temporally limited, its course can not be 
determined, play does not create goods or wealth, ordinary laws are suspended, 
and finally, it is not real life. Caillois’ definition therefore relies on the assump-
tion of complementary phenomena of non-play, which are implicitly character-
ized as being either obligatory, not limited to a certain space or time, following 
a predetermined course, creating goods or wealth, or governed by ‘ordinary 
laws’. And finally, ‘real life’ is fundamentally and explicitly regarded as an op-
posite of play. 
It is this opposition in which the delineating character of Caillois’ conception of 
‘play’ becomes apparent. His definition is based on positivistic categories, 
which serve to distinguish ‘play’ from ‘non-play’. While he shares Huizinga’s 
notion that ‘play’ takes place within ‘boundaries of time and space’, he is much 
more consistent in separating ‘play’ from other, more ‘serious’ activities, which 
might serve the production of goods or be guided by laws that affect not only 
the play-sphere itself, but are valid on a much broader scale. And, most cer-
tainly, Caillois’ conception of ‘play’ is opposed to the idea of ‘real life’.
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Gregory Bateson
It is especially this alleged opposition between ‘play’ and ‘real life’ that is exam-
ined more closely in Gregory Bateson’s essay ‘A Theory of Play and Fantasy’. 
Contrary to Huizinga and Caillois, however, it has to be noted that Bateson is 
not primarily interested in phenomena of ‘play’ itself; his initial aim is to clarify 
the significance of abstraction for communication. The focus of his paper is on 
different levels of abstraction and their implications for negotiatory processes. 
‘Play’ is not Bateson’s primary object of interest, it rather serves as a useful “ex-
planatory principle”75, and its assessment as a prerequisite for the discussion of 
negotiations and re-evaluations of ‘fantasies’ in a psychotheurapeutical context:
“The resemblance between the process of psychotherapy and the 
phenomenon of play is, in fact, profound. Both occur within a delim-
ited psychological frame, a spatial and temporal bounding of a set of 
interactive messages. In both play and therapy, the messages have a 
special and peculiar relationship to a more concrete and basic reality. 
Just as the pseudocombat of play is not real combat, so also the 
pseudolove and pseudohate of therapy are not real love and hate. 
The ‘transfer’ is discriminated from real love and hate by signals in-
voking the psychological frame; and indeed it is this frame which 
permits the transfer to reach its full intensity and to be discussed be-
tween patient and therapist.”76
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The idea of ‘play’ that Bateson argues as ‘resembling the process of psychother-
apy’ is derived from his argument on different levels of abstraction, which de-
termine the relation of communicative events and their denotations, as well as 
the relation between the ‘speakers’ participating in the communicative act and, 
thereby, the intention behind these events. Whenever a statement (be it a verbal 
statement or a physical action) is regarded not as a discrete information, but as 
denoting something else it stands for, this process operates on two different lev-
els of abstraction, which Bateson calls metalinguistic and metacommunicative77.
Metalinguistic messages serve a seemingly simple purpose: the basic abstrac-
tion on a metalinguistic level consists in the indication that a statement does not 
stand for itself, but that it denotes something else:
 “‘The verbal sound ‘cat’ stands for any member of such and such a 
class of objects’ or ‘The word, ‘cat, has no fur and cannot scratch’.”78 
This seems pretty obvious when the statement concerned is a verbal statement: 
of course, the word ‘cat’ is not a furry animal, nor is it a meaningless vocal ut-
terance. The significance of metalinguistic messages becomes more obvious 
when the statements are not verbal expressions, but expressed actions, as Bate-
son shows on the example of ‘threats’:
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“The clenched fist of threat is different from the punch, but it refers 
to a possible future (but at present nonexistent) punch.”79
Similar to the relation of ‘words’ and ‘meaning’, the ‘clenched fist’ is not a 
meaningful event in itself, it is a message that relates to another event (the pos-
sible future punch). The punch itself is not (yet) real, but is referred to as a fu-
ture possibility through the evocative character of the clenched fist.
With the example of a denotative use of actions rather than verbal expressions, 
however, it also becomes obvious that the mere awareness of the denotative 
character of these expressions alone is not sufficient to establish a coherent 
communicative frame. The denotative use of the clenched fist may be intended 
as a friendly warning, a hostile intimidation, a deceitful pretense or simply a 
substitution for the actual punch. Or it may be a playful act, an ‘invitation to 
play’. These different intentions are addressed on what Bateson calls a ‘meta-
communicative level’. 
Metacommunicative messages provide information about the intention of a 
statement or action, therefore determining whether these actions are conducted 
in good or bad will, or whether they are ‘serious’ or ‘playful’. The purpose of 
metacommunicative messages is a clarification of the participants’ relation80, an 
establishment of a serious, playful, friendly or hostile frame of experience.
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While metacommunicative messages can convey a variety of different inten-
tions, it is the message ‘This is play’ which is most important for Bateson’s ar-
gument, as it resembles a situation that is also reflected in the psychotherapeu-
tical setting: 
“These actions in which we now engage, do not denote what would 
be denoted by those actions which these actions denote.”81
or:
“The playful nip denotes the bite, but it does not denote what would 
be denoted by the bite.”82
The framing ‘This is play’, therefore, allows for processes of abstract negotiation 
by evoking a meaning without actually ‘meaning’ it, or - to avoid an ambiguity 
of the term ‘meaning’ - events can be addressed in an abstract manner because 
they are not really taking place; play is paradoxical because within a frame of 
play, events can exist only because they are not real:
“Paradox is doubly present in the signals which are exchanged 
within the context of play, fantasy, threat etc. Not only does the play-
ful nip not denote what would be denoted by the bite for which it 
stands, but, in addition, the bite itself is fictional. Not only do the 
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playing animals not quite mean what they are saying but, also, they 
are usually communicating about something which does not exist.”83
In play as well as in psychotherapy, this act of ‘communicating about something 
which does not exist’ allows for a ‘playful’ (re-)assessment of the meaning this 
‘something’ would otherwise denote; this playful negotiation of abstract mean-
ing does not simply tolerate the absence of the negotiated meaning, it requires its 
absence. In order to evoke ‘that which isn’t there’, the evocative actions must 
resemble the actions they refer to, while not actually being these actions: they 
are ‘play-actions’, which are “similar to, but not the same as”84 the ‘serious ac-
tions’ they resemble:
“[...] play is a phenomenon in which the actions of ‘play’ are related 
to, or denote, other actions of ‘not play’.”85
Bateson’s theory therefore, while strictly speaking not being an actual ‘play-
theory’, accounts for the interrelation between ‘play’ and ‘real life’ by acknowl-
edging the resemblences between ‘real actions’ and their abstract evocation in 
play. Play does not consist in specific actions, but in the way actions are framed 
and consequently interpreted as resemblences of other actions, thereby opening 
up spaces of negotiation for these other actions’ meaning.
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This concept of play, however, again requires a distinction between play and 
non-play. While the transition between ‘play’ and ‘not play’ may not be easily 
determined, there is an assumed border between the two, and while neither ob-
server nor participant can always be sure whether an activity is part of one side 
or the other, the difference between the two sides is not dissolved: play-actions 
have a “special and peculiar relationship to a more concrete and basic reality”86, 
thereby linking play and reality in a way that at the same time delineates the 
two as seperate ideas.
Brian Sutton-Smith
This clarity dissolves in Brian Sutton-Smith’s considerations on ‘The Ambiguity 
of Play’. His argument is based on the observation that while no one seems to 
doubt that the idea of ‘play’ derives from phenomena that everyone experiences 
at certain times and in specific cirumstances, and that, on an intuitive level, 
anyone can easily determine if and when they experience ‘play’, any kind of 
theoretical undertaking to describe and define what it is that constitutes this 
‘play experience’ leads to inconsistencies and contradictions:
“We all play occasionally, and we all know what playing feels like. 
But when it comes to making theoretical statements about what play 
is, we fall into silliness. There is little agreement among us, and much 
ambiguity.”87
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In an attempt to “bring some coherence to the ambiguous field of play theo-
ry”88, Sutton-Smith identifies a variety of ‘play rhetorics’, all leading to different 
conceptions of play, guided not simply by different observations of the same 
‘subject matter’, but bringing forth this subject matter in the first place by creat-
ing ‘persuasive discourses’, which strongly promote what falls under the cate-
gory of ‘play’ and what doesn’t: 
“Authors seek to persuade us in innumerable ways that their choice 
and their direction of research of study is sound. These identifica-
tions of theirs, and their persuasiveness, implicit or otherwise, are 
the intellectual odor that is to be known here as their rhetoric.”89
These various play rhetorics are not simply self-contained or arbitrary con-
structs, but derive from limiting presuppositions from which a specific play 
rhetoric emerges - hinting at predominant rhetorics that can either be ‘broader’ 
or ‘narrower’ than the specific play rhetorics they give rise to:
“Of the broader kind are those [rhetorics] that derive from beliefs 
about religion, politics, social welfare, crime, and morality - that is, 
from all the matters that priests, politicians and salespersons con-
stantly harangue folks about. [...] They constitute the incessant dis-
course about who we are and how we should live. [...] The rhetorics 
of science are generally of a narrower and more explicit kind. Sci-
ence, after all, has its own epistemological rhetorics of reliability, va-
lidity, and prediction. Scholarship in general has its required consis-
tency, coherence, and authenticity. All of these scientific and scholarly 
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tenets are also rhetorics, because they assume and propagate the 
view that there is a knowable world, or a knowable text, and then, 
acting as if that assumption is real (a hypothetical fiction), proceed to 
their methodical undertakings.”90
What Sutton-Smith implicitly shows by revealing the various “ideological un-
derpinnings of play theories”91 is that the noted ‘ambugity of play’ may not so 
much be a characteristic of ‘play’ itself, but rather the result of the “first distinc-
tions”92 underlying different play discourses, epistemological “blind spots”93 
which are not themselves made explicit, but still pre-determine the object of re-
search: 
“[...] the rhetorics of play express the way play is placed in context 
within broader value systems, which are assumed by the theorists of 
play rather than studied directly by them.”94
In light of the persuasive purpose of play rhetorics, it is not surprising that they 
do not so much provide conclusive models illuminating ‘play’ as an obvious, if 
complex, phenomenon, but rather use different conceptions of play as vehicles 
to promote and perpetuate their own respective sets of values and beliefs: while 
‘play’ denotes all that is not-serious, superfluous and gratuitous, discussions of 
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play at the same time consolidate the respective concepts of ‘non play’ as all 
that is serious, necessary and obligatory, thereby promoting and legitimating a 
set of values and beliefs through the instrument of play theories. It is due to the 
diversity of these sets of values and beliefs that play seems such an ambiguous 
concept: depending on the respective ideas of ‘non play’, almost anything can 
be regarded as ‘play’ if it fits the purpose. When Sutton-Smith tries to illustrate 
the diversity of play, he lists more than 200 examples of activities that are some-
times regarded as play95. These examples include such diverse activities as: 
imaginations, flower arranging, playing tricks, dancing, playing the piano, Christmas, 
football or windsurfing.
While the intention of this list is to “illustrate the diversity of play phenome-
na”96, it also clearly highlights another aspect of play, which shows the main 
problem of delineating play-concepts: while the examples listed can sometimes 
serve as examples for play, any item on the list can also be regarded as non-play 
from another perspective. The question arises if ‘play’ can actually be grasped 
by examining specific activities. Maybe the idea of ‘play’ may better be sought 
in the way these activities are experienced, thereby consisting more in the atti-
tude in which certain activities are discussed, experienced and, consequently, 
promoted as ‘play’ or ‘non-play’.
Contrary to the idea that “we all know what playing feels like”, ‘play’ appears 
as a rather elusive phenomenon. Any attempt to positivistically define it and 
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draw a line between ‘play’ and ‘non-play’, therefore, may shed a light on the 
underlying conceptions of ‘non-play’ rather than enabling a phenomenological 
assessment of ‘play’. When the ‘ideological underpinnings’ of play theories are 
revealed and the “cultural construction”97  behind different play concepts be-
comes evident, it seems that ‘play’ itself may not actually be the object of inter-
est, but rather an opportunity to promote the respective opposite of play as an 
ideology “to believe in and live by.”98
The ‘play theories’ of Huizinga, Caillois, and to some extent even Bateson can 
all be considered from this perspective.99 The notion of ‘play theory’ as being 
guided by ideologies of ‘non play’ reveals an important issue of delineating 
play concepts: while the particular examinations present very different and 
elaborate categories marking the assumed difference between ‘play’ and ‘non-
play’, it is not so much the ‘nature’ of play that is elaborated on, but the respec-
tive nature of ‘non-play’; while ‘play’ itself is constantly hinted at and referred 
to, the assumptions about ‘what play is’ are made long before the examination 
takes its course. Play, after all, is the starting point of these examinations rather 
than their conclusion, and it is due to the fact that we all seem to “know what 
playing feels like” that play seems a phenomenon so self-explanatory that its 
nature can be pre-supposed, and the consequential assessments mostly focus on 
delineating it from its opposite rather than assessing its inherent complexities.
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This delineating character of explicit ‘play theories’ seems almost inevitable 
when the aim is on an assessment of either ‘play’ or ‘non-play’. Implicitly, any 
focus on ‘play’ already suggests a delineation, a positivistically determined as-
sumption on where the line between ‘play’ and ‘non play’ is to be drawn. In the 
following, I will discuss an alternative approach, which suggests an idea of 
‘play’ that is not one side of a coin, but achieves a more elaborate model of play, 
which might prove useful for a closer examination of ‘play phenomena’ in the 
game studies discourse. 
Friedrich Schiller
Friedrich Schiller’s so-called ‘play theory’ is different from other theories of 
play in that he does not intend to understand play in contrast to non-play. As 
phenomena of games and play are not the underlying focus of his model, he is 
able to develop a concept of play that is not a premise, but a result of his con-
siderations.
In his treatise ‘On the Aesthetical Education of Man in a Series of Letters’ (1793/
1795)100, Schiller argues that human beings are positioned between two dispers-
ing ‘drives’: the ‘sense-drive’ (which includes concepts like feelings, experience, 
daily life and nature) on one hand, and the ‘form-drive’ (which is present in the 
idea of principles, ideals, reason or morals) on the other:
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“The object of the sense-drive, expressed in a general concept, we call 
life, in the widest sense of the term: a concept designating all material 
being and all that is immediately present to the senses. The object of 
the form-drive, expressed in a general concept, we call form, both in 
the figurative and in the literal sense of this word: a concept which 
includes all the formal qualities of things and all the relations of 
these to our thinking faculties.”101
‘Beauty’ in the context of Schiller’s aesthetic, cannot arise from the absolute sur-
render to  one of the two drives, but requires a balance of these dispersing 
forces:
“[...] the term beauty is neither extended to cover the whole realm of 
living things nor is it merely confined to this realm. A block of mar-
ble, though it is and remains lifeless, can nevertheless, thanks to the 
architect or the sculptor, become living form; and and a human be-
ing, though he may live and have form, is far from being on that ac-
count a living form. In order to be so, his form would have to be life, 
and his life form. As long as we merely think about his form, it is life-
less, a mere abstraction; as long as we merely feel his life, it is form-
less, a mere impression. Only when his form lives in our feeling and 
his life takes on form in our understanding, does he become living 
form; and this will always be the case when we adjudge him 
beautiful.”102
The balance between sense-drive and form-drive, therefore, requires a third 
concept, which achieves this balance of life and form as ‘living form’. Schiller 
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calls this third concept ‘play-drive’ (‘Spieltrieb’) - not in the sense of a delineat-
ing concept of play which might serve to distinguish playing cards from the se-
rious sides of life, but in the sense of a moderating principle which is set as a 
third concept between the dispersing forces of sense-drive and form-drive. This 
play-drive constitutes sense-drive and form drive in relation to each other, while 
at the same time being comprehensible only as an intermediate concept serving 
as a moderator between the two:
“Since, in contemplation of the beautiful, the psyche finds itself in a 
happy medium between the realm of the law and the sphere of 
physical exigency, it is, precisely because it is divided between the 
two, removed from the constraint of the one as of the other.”103
What Schiller employs is not a cultural image of play contrasting the serious-
ness of life. His concept of play cannot be understood in terms of ‘game arti-
facts’, marked-off phenomena seperate from other cultural domains, but as an 
integrative concept, balancing disperse forces and only existent as an interme-
diate principle.
It is the great asset of Schiller’s discussion of play that it does not derive from 
the observation of playing games - Schiller explicitly excludes these “frivolous 
things”104 from his considerations. While dedicated game and play theorists aim 
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at positivistically defining games and play by contrasting their features to non-
games and non-play, his concept of play is not a tool to define games, but de-
rives from a general disussion of balancing out conflicting demands, leading to 
a concept that cannot be understood in contrast, but only in combination with 
other forces. Claus Pias therefore calls this concept of play a “general regulating 
principle”105  (“ein allgemeines Regelungsprinzip”) and puts it in relation with 
James Watt’s centrifugal governor (ca. 1788), arguing the importance of this idea 
for 20th century cybernetics. 
The basic concept of the centrifugal governor, as simple as it is, has far-reaching 
consequences in regard to the idea of cause and effect: designed as a regulating 
mechanism for steam engines, the governor is dependent on the amount of 
steam produced by the engine. The more steam is produced, the faster the gov-
ernor will turn; the faster the governor turns, the more it will reduce the pro-
duction of steam by gradually closing a valve connected to it. The resulting de-
cline of steam output will make the governor move more slowly, which will 
gradually open the valve again, leading to an increasing in steam output (and 
so on). The governor balances the two dispersing factors of increase and de-
crease, balancing the two in dependence of each other.
While the design of the centrifugal governor can serve as a very specific mental 
image illustrating the idea of self-regulating systems (which has later become a 
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key concept of cybernetics106, constructivism107 and systems theory108) it is also 
consistent with Schiller’s considerations of play, and might therefore suggest 
exploring this concept in terms of mechanical metaphors.
1.3.2 A mechanical conception of play 
It has to be noted that this mechanical idea of ‘play’ is not completely absent in 
the game studies discourse. Again it is Salen and Zimmerman who provide a 
definition implying a mechanical concept of play:
“Think about the use of the word ‘play’ in the sense of the ‘free play’ 
of a gear or a car’s steering wheel. The ‘play’ is the amount of 
movement that the steering wheel can move on its own within the 
system, the amount the steering wheel can turn before it begins to 
turn the tires of the car. The play itself exists only because of the 
more utilitarian structures of the driving-system: the drive shaft, ax-
les, wheels, and so on. The ‘rules’ created by these elements make the 
free movement of play possible. Play emerges from the relationships 
guiding the functioning of the system, occuring in the interstitial 
spaces between and among its components. Play is an expression of 
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the system, one that takes advantage of the space of possibility cre-
ated from the system’s structure.”109
While Salen and Zimmerman clearly take into account the mechanical denota-
tions of the term ‘play’, and in their definition resist the urge to conceive of play 
as the opposite of ‘non-play’, they still adhere to a dualist conception of the 
phenomenon:
“Play is free movement within a more rigid structure.”110
Although this definition quite openly refers to mechanical metaphors, it still 
suggests ‘play’ as one of two opposing poles. Contrary to the historical play 
theories discussed above, this opposition does not evolve around play and ‘real 
life’. Instead, this conception of play addresses the relation of ‘play’ and 
‘games’, the seemingly contradictory notion that ‘playing games’ involves the 
acceptance of restrictions and limitations while at the same time allowing the 
player a certain ‘freedom to play’. 
Games, in this conception, are the ‘rigid structure’, which constitutes one pole 
of the experience of ‘playing a game’. And it is convincing to assume that the 
opposite pole can be described as ‘freedom’. But ‘play’, in a mechanical sense, is 
not equal to this idea of freedom. It is freedom within the structure, it is neither 
Nikolaus König:  The Play Experience
89
109 Salen, Katie; Zimmerman, Eric: “Defining Play”, in: Salen, Katie; Zimmerman, Eric: 
“Rules of Play: Game Design Fundamentals”, MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A., 2004, p. 
304.
110 Salen, Katie; Zimmerman, Eric: “Defining Play”, in: Salen, Katie; Zimmerman, Eric: 
“Rules of Play: Game Design Fundamentals”, MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A., 2004, p. 
free nor rigid, but the relation of these irreconcilable concepts; and again, play 
seems paradoxical.
It is this paradox that makes the idea of play so elusive, and seems to account 
for a certain indecisiveness when it comes to the assessment of play in the game 
studies discourse: how can play be freedom, if it is also restricted? And how can 
a game demand submission to rules, if its aim is to bring forth freedom?
tertium datur: play as an intermediating force
In order to make this paradox more tangible and, finally, more applicable for 
the assessment of ‘playing games’, the duality of ‘restrictive rules’ and ‘player 
freedom’ must be given up in favor of a third concept, which can draw upon 
Schiller’s notion of ‘play’: a concept which can not simply be understood as an 
effect of the exclusive forces of ‘restriction’ and ‘freedom’, but enables the inter-
play of both through its own inherent characteristics.
These ‘inherent characteristics of play’ as an intermediating concept become 
quite obvious when the idea of ‘mechanical play’ is examined with a focus on 
its mediating qualities, rather than its emergence from the system’s restrictions. 
Contrary to Salen and Zimmerman’s illustration, which highlights the ‘free-
dom’ to turn a car’s steering wheel a little before this freedom gives up to the 
‘function’ of turning the car’s tires, a focus on the exact “spot” at which me-
chanical play itself takes place may help to identify its own inherent function:
For example, a piston moving inside a cylinder needs to have a certain amount 
of ‘play’. If there is not enough play, the piston will get stuck in the cylinder, and 
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movement is no longer possible; the static form prohibits the dynamic motion. 
If there is too much play, the piston will not move in the intended direction; the 
form ist lost in favor of undirected motion.
‘Play’ therefore defines the range of aberration within a system in which the 
functioning of the system is already possible, but not yet endangered: the sys-
tem’s parts need a certain amount of ‘freedom’ in order to contribute to a dy-
namic system, but at the same time a certain amount of constraint is required in 
order to ‘keep the parts within the system’.
This characteristic of mechanical play is evident in the concepts of ‘error’, 
‘fault’, ‘irregularity’, ‘variation’ and - finally - ‘tolerance’. ‘Play’ is not simply an 
effect of the colliding forces of freedom and restraint, it is a third concept, which 
negotiates between the two through its own ‘logic’ - a logic which cannot be 
grasped by the absoluteness of restrictions, nor by the openness implied by 
freedom. ‘Play’ does not employ the strict logic which opposes freedom and re-
straint, but rather the ‘fuzzy’ logic of possibilities. While freedom as well as re-
straint may either apply or not apply, ‘play’ present a third option: it provides 
contingencies, which can not be grasped by concepts of ‘yes’ and ‘no’, but by 
the simple, yet elusive category: ‘maybe’.
If play is assessed as a category of contingencies, mediating between opposing 
demands, how can this concept be applied to the assessment of ‘playing 
games’? In the following, I will attempt to address three very different issues of 
contemporary game studies, and examine how an according idea of ‘play’ as a 
mediating principle between two diverging forces can change the way these is-
sues can be approached.
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1.3.3 The ‘Stitches’ Problem: Immersion and the ‘active creation of 
belief’
In Massive Multiplayer Online Roleplaying Games, players are regularly given 
the possibility to enact heroic deeds through the completion of quests. In some 
cases, the fictional layer provides a conclusive explanation for the fact that these 
deeds are not a one time event, but consist of more or less important errands, 
which will only temporarily solve a fictional problem. For example, if players 
are asked to gather berries for a town’s cook, it is obvious that a certain amount 
of berries will only temporarily provide the supplies necassary to feed the 
townsfolk. When hundreds and thousands of players share a game server and, 
thus, participate in the same ‘game world’, this kind of quest is easily integrated 
into the game’s fiction: luckily, I am not the only hero in this world providing 
his or her services, or the single task of gathering enough berries to feed the 
townspeople could keep me endlessly busy. In most cases, I do the quest once, 
and can then proceed to other deeds. In these cases, the fact that a vast number 
of players is doing the same quests as I am is consistent with the experience of 
the game’s fictional layer.
This kind of consistency starts to crumble when quests do not consist of ‘har-
vesting’ supplies that ‘naturally’ replenish with time, and will always be in de-
mand. When quests involve the killing of enemies, for example, the completion 
of the quest by an individual player is not as easily reconcilable with the fact 
that others, before and after her, are successfully completing the same quest as 
she is. Even though a certain spot has been cleared of enemies multiple times 
before I get the respective quest, this spot will be swarming with enemies which 
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I can proceed to kill in order to complete it. And after I have cleared the spot, 
the enemies will respawn after a certain period of time, allowing others to fulfill 
the same quest requirements as I did and kill the same enemies all over again. 
Some games address this ‘problem’ by providing explanations on a fictional 
level. In the MMORPG Everquest 2 (Sony Online Entertainment, 2004), for in-
stance, enemies like skeletons or ghosts will shout things like “Others will take 
my place!” or “I will use your bones to fix what you break!” before they die - 
referring to their nature as ‘haunted creatures’: these enemies cannot really be 
killed, as they are ‘already dead’, and whatever caused them to appear will con-
tinue to spawn ‘others’ just like them - allowing for infinite numbers of players 
to ‘solve’ the same problem.
This kind of fictional explanation, however, is only possible when the enemies 
in question are nameless goons, which an evil force keeps conjuring - similar to 
the regrowth of berries in the woods. Sometimes, however, the enemy to be 
killed is a unique creature, a specific ‘person’ with its individual history and 
identity. In World of Warcraft (Blizzard Entertainment, 2004), for instance, players 
in the earlier stages of the game meet ‘Stitches’, a horrible monstrosity, who 
threatens the townsfolk of Darkshire in the scary forests of Duskwood. Stitches 
is not just another goon, he (or she) is a very specific monster, which the player 
even helped to accidentally create in the preceding questline. 
After the player has killed Stitches, she is exuberantly celebrated as the liberator 
of Duskwood - after all, she has disposed of a particularly gruesome scourge, 
and has spared the townsfolk certain doom. So far for the fiction.
In a single player game, after completing the quest, Stitches would be done with 
once and for all.  As World of Warcraft, however, is a multiplayer game, accomo-
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dating thousands of characters per server111, it must provide ‘Stitches’ for eve-
ryone. Any time a player does the quest, a new version of Stitches spawns, in 
order to allow for this player to dispose of her very own Stitches. If a player 
who has already killed Stitches crosses the area of Duskwood, it is very likely 
that she will encounter Stitches again, because another player is currently doing 
the according quest.
While this experience does not make sense in the game’s fiction - as the fiction 
itself emphasizes the ‘unique’ nature of Stitches - it still is a common experience 
in MMORPGs. An experience which poses a challenging problem for the analy-
sis of the game, especially when the game’s immersive qualities are assessed 
from a perspective of delineating concepts of play:
Following a delineating definition, play is considered to be an opposite of non-
play, it is conceived of as an activity that takes place “outside ordinary life” and 
in form of “a free unreality, as against real life”. The re-appearance of Stitches 
clearly menaces this illusion of play as a clearly separate phenomenon, it threat-
ens the ‘magic circle’. While in a delineating model, playing the game provides 
the experience of being a hero and fulfilling exceptional deeds, the repeated en-
counter with previously defeated enemies questions the idea of the individual 
player’s distinctiveness, and forces her to acknowledge that whatever she ac-
complishes is also accomplished by thousands of others: after all, she is not the 
uncontested liberator of Darkshire, but one in a million (or, in the case of World 
of Warcraft, one in a few millions, for that matter).
94
111 see: http://www.warcraftrealms.com/eu_realmstats.php 
The clash of individual player accomplishments and the experience that these 
accomplishments are shared with millions of other players clearly presents a 
breach of the game world’s immersion. Applying delineating concepts of play, 
the continuation of player immersion can only be explained as a deliberate act 
on the players’ side: players choose to ‘turn a blind eye’ on the fact that their 
uniqueness proves to be an illusion. Concepts like the “active creation of be-
lief”112 account for this idea of player patience in the face of a crumbling game 
world. In awareness of this ‘problem’, and in order to ‘avoid’ it, Blizzard has 
even come up with a technical solution. Since the game’s Cataclysm-Expansion 
(Blizzard Entertainment, 2010), players enter a “phased” version of Darkshire 
when encountering Stitches - a ‘parallel world’ within the game, which is only 
accessible to players on the same ‘stage’ of the quest. Whenever a player has de-
feated Stitches, she will not be able to see ‘other versions’ of this monster ever 
again while playing on the same character.
From the perspective of non-delineating, mechanical concepts of play, however, 
this ‘clash’ doesn’t seem that much of a problem. When play is not conceived of 
as one of two opposites (either opposed to the seriousness of non-play or as the 
freedom opposing the restrictions of the game’s rules and mechanics) but as a 
third concept with its own demands, negotiating between opposing faculties, it 
is possible to integrate these ‘opposing faculties’ which play can achieve to tie 
together. In the case of the ‘Stitches problem’, these faculties may be identified 
as the experience of individual and distinguished achievements on one hand, 
and the awareness of a vast community sharing the same experience on the 
other. Metaphorically, these faculties may reflect a society in which individual 
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self-realization is a constant demand, which at the same time is suggested to be 
achievable through the acquisition of mass-produced articles - a contradiction 
which becomes apparent in the suggestive allusions to an individualistic life-
style in any IKEA catalogue.
The balancing characteristics of play - if conceived of as a mediating concept - 
make it possible to negotiate these conflicting demands, and to ‘playfully’ find a 
way to deal with this contradiction - a contradiction which, without the balance 
of play, could easily prove unmanageable.
1.3.4 The design of challenge and the question of serious games
While the label ‘Serious Games’ alone quite placatively challenges the idea of 
delineating play from ‘the seriousness of life’, the attempt to use play for any 
kind of educational or informative purpose also raises the question how play 
and games can be designed in order to ‘teach’ or ‘persuade’ in the first place: at 
what point of play are players confronted with issues that they can become 
aware of, reflect upon and maybe allow to influence their current beliefs?
The answer to this question may be found in a phenomenon which distin-
guishes games from other forms of entertainment, education and information: 
the idea of challenge.
The well-established design principle “as simple as possible, as complex as nec-
essary” does not apply when it comes to the modeling of ‘challenges’ in game 
design. In order to provide players with interesting and challenging tasks, while 
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at the same time avoiding player frustration, the principle applied seems much 
more rigorous: “as complex as possible, as simple as necessary”. 
Again, this idea of challenge as a ‘limitation of viable possibilities’ clearly hints 
at the presence of conflicting forces within the game: the conflicts fueling a 
game’s challenges can always be found in the tight spot between the game’s 
goals and the obstacles which prevent players from reaching these goals easily.
A delineating conception of play would suggest to conceive of these opposing 
faculties of ‘goals’ and ‘obstacles’ as manifestations of different poles: the ‘free-
dom to play’ on one hand, the ‘restrictions of the game’ on the other. While the 
restrictions of the game’s rules present obstacles that need to be overcome, it is 
the prospect of reaching the game’s goals which motivates players to ‘play’ un-
til they have found a way to beat the game. This focus on the opposing factors 
of ‘goals’ and ‘obstacles’, however, highlights the conditional framework within 
which play takes place - the exterior requirements of play, in their positive (i.e. 
motivating) and negative (i.e. restricting) manifestation. What is left is the un-
satisfying conclusion: in games, players aim to solve problems they wouldn’t 
have if they didn’t play the game.
Contrary to this, a mediating concept of play allows to ask for the ‘tight spot’ 
itself, as it addresses the very nature of the ‘playful attitude’ that enables actions 
which tie together the opposing forces of ‘goals’ and ‘obstacles’, of ‘desire’ and 
‘obligation’. In ‘serious games’, where the persuasive character of games is in 
question, this mediating concept of play may provide a more viable perspective 
on how this persuasion can take place by addressing play as the negotiation of 
opposing forces rather than deciding which of these forces may be called ‘play’, 
and which may not.
Nikolaus König:  The Play Experience
97
In Mary Flanagan’s game Profit Seed (Tiltfactor, 2009), players “play as the wind 
in a game about genetically modified crops”113. At the beginning of each level, 
players are presented with increasingly detailed background information about 
the legal, economical and social issues evolving around the planting, distribu-
tion and patenting of genetically modified seeds. While the ‘goal’ of each level 
is to plant natural seeds in specific fields while avoiding the accidental planting 
of genetically modified seeds, this task is hindered by different gameplay chal-
lenges, which reflect the background issues presented at the start of the level. 
The rising percentage of genetically modified crops, for instance, is reflected in 
the natural / modified seed ratio in the game, making it harder to ‘pick’ the 
natural seeds while avoiding the accidental planting of genetically modified 
seeds. And the legal restrictions imposed on farmers by seed companies is re-
flected by the challenge to not only plant the ‘right’ seeds, but also planting 
them in the right order: specific fields can only be used for planting after certain 
other fields have been harvested - an additional artificial restriction which can 
lead to rather frustrating experiences.
But what exactly is it the game tries to convey? Is it the legal and economical 
complexities that the ‘manipulated seeds’ market poses? Or is it the importance 
to keep planting natural seeds, while avoiding those which are genetically ma-
nipulated? These issues clearly present diverging demands, which need to be 
tied together through play. The ‘topic’ of the game cannot be layed out as only 
one of these issues; what the game presents is the challenge to ‘deal with’ the 
difficulties that arise when these diverging demands are both taken seriously. 
While ‘planting seeds’ may constitute the game’s goal, the aim for this goal be-
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comes a challenge through the opposing force of the artificial limitations of the 
‘manipulated seeds trade’. Hence, the game’s ‘topic’ does neither consist in 
goals nor obstacles alone, but in the conflict that arises when these two faculties 
converge.
It is this enactment of ‘conflict’ through play which constitutes the ‘serious 
topic’ of the game. Contrary to the idea of ‘teaching’, which implies a specific 
topic or content to be ‘taught’, the mediating character of play suggests an al-
ternative idea of ‘learning as orientation’: play allows for the negotiation of di-
verging demands and the development of strategies to position oneself in this 
‘realm of opposition’.
1.3.5 Play and Violence
In public and academic discourses on possible relations and dependencies be-
tween virtual and ‘real violence’, a delineating conception of play inevitably 
leads to the question of ‘causes and effects’ and the conditions of transfer proc-
esses between virtual experiences and their implementation in the ‘real world’. 
The key question is whether experiences made in the game, ‘seperate from the 
real world’, can in consequence effect behaviour in this ‘real world’. The argu-
ment that serious and educational games are effective and convincing instru-
ments of persuasion leads to growing concerns when it comes to ‘violent gam-
ing’: if desired attitudes and behaviour can effectively be triggered through 
games, then the same might be suggested for strategies of violence.
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Again, a mediating conception of play enables a different perspective: as a me-
diating faculty, play-actions may not present ‘blueprints’ to be copied in real 
life, but open up spaces of negotiation between opposing forces. So, what are 
these opposing forces in the case of ‘violent games’114?
On the one hand, there is the demand to be aware of and follow society’s ‘rules’ 
of interaction and peaceful cohabitation, a demand which necessitates a certain 
amount of adaptation and submission, the willingness to constrain oneself in 
favor of the standards called for by a social environment. In opposition to this, 
there is the individual desire to formatively affect the environment one is living 
in, the desire to experience a ‘sense of agency’ and to take action in order to 
shape the world in a purposeful way - a desire which may qualify as an abstract 
base for what is often called ‘violence’.
And once again, it is through play that these diverging forces - the desire to 
shape the world, and the willingness to get shaped by it - can be tied together. 
Playfully, these opposing forces can be balanced. As a tool, play promises to en-
able Schiller’s ideal of freedom, and to enable ‘beauty’ in life and form, not by 
submitting to either the ‘interior’ demands of one’s wishes and desires, nor to 
the ‘exterior’ demands of society, but by experiencing ways to balance these 
demands. 
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But not only does a mediating conception of play question the seemingly obvi-
ous connection between the playful enactment of violence and the emergence of 
violent strategies in real life. It may even suggest a quite contrary hypothesis: 
the possibility that it is not play that leads to violent behaviour, even if takes the 
form of a playful enactment of seemingly violent acts, but rather a lack of play 
which accounts for experiences that finally lead to what is often subsumized as 
‘violent behaviour’.
In his book “Play”115, psychiatrist and play researcher Stuart Brown recon-
structs the childhood and youth of Charles Whitman, the notorious ‘Texas 
Tower Sniper’ who, in the summer of 1966 (long before the emergence of digital 
games and, therefore, the games and violence debate) climbed the observation 
deck of an administrative building at the University of Austin, Texas, and shot 
16 people - the first so-called ‘campus shooting’. 
In his assessment of the possible causes of the crime, Brown emphasizes the 
‘lack of play’ which charaterized Whitman’s childhood and youth: 
“In Charlie’s home, the constant mantle of control and fear didn’t al-
low the emergence of normal patterns of play. Charlie wasn’t al-
lowed to play outside with other kids. Instead he was forced to stay 
inside and do something ‘useful’, like practice piano. When Charlie 
did get away from his father, when he was out with his mother at the 
grocery store, his father was still there controlling events by CB ra-
dio. When friends of the family did come over, the first thing the 
elder Whitman would do was put Charlie on display, demanding an 
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impromptu piano recital or showing off some other trick he had 
taught Charlie.”116
In this environment of constant control, which did not allow for ‘error’ or ‘tol-
ernace’ towards deviant behaviour, any emergence of ‘play’ was immediately 
prohibited. According to Brown, it is precisely this ‘lack of play’ which accounts 
for the later outburst of violence, an outburst which presents a desperate act of 
final autonomy:
“As Charlie matured, his repertoire of responses to the world was 
narrow, kept within the boundaries of his father’s ambitions for him, 
and closely monitored. A master of outward conformity, he was in-
wardly seething for years. He sought out no real mentor’s to break 
his father’s control, so that by the time of the Texas Tower Massacre, 
he lived emotionally alone, persevering on a path he could not mas-
ter, driven not by his own desires or needs, and without alternatives. 
His final (and only) really autonomous action, narrow in scope, but 
devastating in effect, was an attempt to gain some inner relief by acts 
of murder-suicide, well described in his diaries.”117
Convincing as this causality may seem, it has to be noted that Brown again em-
ploys a delineating concept of play: contrary to the oppressive restrictions en-
forced by Whitman’s father, play represents Whitman’s individual desires, 
which he has never been free to explore and enact. In this dualist conception, 
the totality of one force leads to a suppression of the other, which at some later 
point comes into it’s own: Whitman’s ‘freedom’, which he has been denied for 
so long, finally prevails, even if it is in a desperate and devastating act. What 
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Brown calls ‘autonomy’ is just another word for the freedom to acknowledge 
one’s inner desires - an opposition to the external restrictions imposed by a so-
cial environment.
According to a mediating concept of play, however, play does not constitute 
personal ‘freedom’ in opposition to societal ‘restrictions’, but presents a way to 
negotiate these conflicting forces, it constitutes ‘autonomy’ by allowing the ex-
ploration of strategies to negotiate between external demands and internal de-
sires. While Brown’s notion of a ‘lack of play’ as a possible explanation for ag-
gression and - finally - violence seems viable, it may be too simple to limit this 
relation to the suppression of freedom through societal limitations. A mediating 
concept of play does not present freedom as an alternative to restrictions, but 
addresses the possibility to balance these conflicting faculties by allowing the 
exploration of strategies to acknowledge both and finally dissolve the opposi-
tion. Play enables to develop the ‘repertoire of responses’ which allows to act 
upon individual desires while still accomodating external demands, instead of 
enforcing total submission to either of these forces.
In his conception of dispersing forces, Friedrich Schiller opposes two extremes 
of absolute submission as different ways “man can be at odds with himself”118: 
the “savage”, who submits to feelings alone and disregards principle; and the 
“barbarian”, who submits to principles alone and consequently destroys feel-
ing. 
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Both contradict Schiller’s aesthetical ideal, but it is not the nature of either force 
that he vilifies, but the idea of total submission to either. By mitigating this to-
tality, play provides an intermediate space which allows for the negotiation and 
balancing of opposing forces - be they principle or feeling, restrictions or free-
dom, societal demands or individual desire. Through play, these opposite poles 
can both be accounted for, while neither is accepted as an absolute and total 
condition.
As has been pointed out, the exclusion of ‘game artifacts’ is the prerequisite of 
Schiller’s argument, and allows for the emergence of a mediating concept of 
‘play’ that is not pre-determined by an assumed difference between play and 
non-play, between the ‘freedom of play’ and the ‘seriousness of life’ or even the 
diverging ideas of ‘play’ and ‘games’. But once this concept has taken form, it 
might provide a viable and productive perspective when it is again applied to 
the ‘frivolous’ manifestation of play in form of ‘gameplay experiences’. 
Contrary to the well-arranged nature of either freedom or restriction, however, 
the more elusive characteristics constituting this idea of play present their own 
challenges when they are to be the base for an assessment of phenomena of play 
and games; concepts like error and tolerance, fault or abberration do not prom-
ise to be definite categories which may either be ‘true’ or ‘false’, but denote 
rather ambiguous and volatile spaces of possibility. Play, in this conception, is 
neither a specific attitude nor a certain activity, but a contingent experience.
The next chapter will, therefore, address the contingent character of gameplay 
experiences, and examine how an assessment of these contingencies may be 
possible without dissolving into arbitrariness.
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1.4 Third Construction: Contingency
And then she kissed me and I realized 
she probably was right
There must be
 fifty ways to leave your lover
(Paul Simon)119
The third chapter addresses possible ways of applying constructivist concepts 
to computer games as a media as a low-range theory. Exemplary, the relation of 
games and narrative will be assessed from a constructivist perspective, and a 
methodological approach accounting for the contingent character of gameplay 
experiences will be suggested.
1.4.1 The relation of games and narrative
The relation of games and narrative has been subject to thorough discussion in 
the game studies discourse for quite some time. At the beginning of this discus-
sion, the demand was to clarify whether computer games could be thought of 
as narrative media at all, or if their media-specific strategies could only be un-
derstood in completely different terms. 
In the ensuing “narratology-ludology debate”, narratologists  - mainly guided 
by theoretic concepts deriving from literature studies - were looking for ways 
to identify classical narrative concepts in games, understanding games as repre-
sentational media in a traditional sense, comparable to film or literature, while 
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ludologists insisted on the necessity to approach games from a different per-
spective, stating that “the computer game for all practicality can not tell stories - 
the computer game is simply not a narrative medium”120
Instead, games were perceived as rule-based systems, contrary to the narrative 
possibilities of storytelling media. The rule-based nature of games was not  con-
ceived of as heightening the narrative possibilities of the media, but as the abil-
ity to render possible player action: “If I throw a ball at you, I don’t expect you 
to drop it and wait until it starts telling you a story”121
Since the early and fervid days of this discussion, it has become clear that the 
narrative possibilities and the rule-based character of a medium are not so 
much of an antagonism. Currently, the narrative potential of rule based-systems 
is widely acknowledged and regularly leads to exciting new concepts and find-
ings. Not only has it become obvious that any methodology aiming at the 
analysis of games’ narrative qualities must take into account the rule-based na-
ture of the medium, it has even been argued that games can be viewed as narra-
tives in regard to a completely new kind of story: the story of systems rather 
than events. 
“In Persuasive Games, I advance a theory of how videogames make 
arguments and influence players. Games represent how real and 
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imagined systems work, and they invite players to interact with 
those systems and form judgments about them”.122
Representation 
Still, the narrative concepts searched for in computer games are thought of in a 
representational way, the medial implementation of a content being a represen-
tation of the author’s conceptions, while the process of uncovering the resulting 
‘stories’ or ‘systems’ is thought of as an unveiling of the underlying informa-
tion. Embossed by a semiotical understanding, narrations are still regarded as 
codes to be deciphered, enabling a a process of unraveling which may be suc-
cessful if the information is recovered, but may fail if there are flaws in the rep-
resentation or in the process of decription. The material is analysed in order to 
recover “what is behind” the representation, what it might convey. 
While the paradigm of narrative representation has proven useful in examining 
a multitude of phenomena, it might not be the only viable way to deal with the 
relation of narrative and games. Concerning questions of the narrative potential 
of gameplay experience and re-tellable events, a representational model might 
not even be viable anymore in providing a way to understand the phenomena 
we perceive in a satisfactory way: if games’ narratives are thought of in terms of 
semiotical representation, reducing the narration to the interpretation of signs 
implemented in the game product, how does this account for the multitude of 
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possible narratives arising from the course of game actions123, which again are a 
result of players’ decisions, which again are dependent on the players’ attitude 
towards the game rather than the decisions of a game designer?
In the following, I will argue that a constructivist model of games might present 
a useful alternative to representational thinking when it comes to the relation of 
games and narrative. This approach is based on the assumption that game nar-
ratives can be understood as cognitive realities constructed by the player; narra-
tive, in this model, is not developed by a game designer, then embedded into 
the media product, and finally deciphered by the player by means of interpreta-
tion. 
Rather, the player is confronted with what could be described in terms of first 
order realities: the game mechanics - or to be more exact: the experience of the 
game world’s characteristics as she can perceive them by interaction -put the 
idea of players in compliance with the characteristics of an operating observer. 
The interaction with the gameworld according to its rules and mechanics can 
lead to a multitude of different gameplay events. But these events still can be 
perceived as first order realities: it can empirically be observed by anyone that a 
certain gameplay run led to a certain outcome, as long as no values are applied. 
Only when the events are interpreted by the player in order to make sense, they 
become second order realities, interpreted events that are understood in terms 
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of making sense within a set of values and beliefs: cognitive realities, or 
(player-) constructed narratives. 
The creation of meaning by the player cannot be understood in semiotical 
terms, as it is a construction based on the player’s active engagement with the 
game world’s possibilities. How the player will interact depends on the player’s 
expectances, her values and beliefs and her efforts to make sense of her own ac-
tions in the game world’s context. 
The combination of empirically perceptible first order realities, the player’s atti-
tude towards the game defining her role as an operative observer, the game 
context providing feedback which affects the viability of her actions and the fi-
nal interpretation of events as realities of second order enable the construction 
of game narratives by the player.
1.4.2 Constructing game narratives
In the following case study, I would like to show how the interaction with a 
game simulation, consisting of a set of system elements with pre-scripted be-
haviour, can lead to the construction of narratives by the player. What will be 
important is the fact that dramatic, re-tellable events are dependent upon the 
player’s individual goals and perspective, which disqualifies them as narratives 
in a representational sense, as they can not simply be re-traced to a game de-
signer’s mind. Game designers merely set up a ‘friction surface’ against which 
the player can test the viability of her actions and interpretations.
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The aim of this case study is to find a way to make emergent narrative in games 
accessible to methodic analysis, taking into account the multitude and subjec-
tivity of narrations on the players’ side, while still making the dependency of 
these constructions on interconnections with the game product itself tangible. 
The Set Up
In the action-/survival horror game Dead Rising (Capcom, 2006), the player’s ac-
tions are represented by the character Frank West, a freelance photojournalist 
who is about to investigate a rumoured lockdown of the small town Willamette, 
Colorado. At the beginning of the game, Frank is dropped by helicopter at the 
rooftop of the Willamette shopping mall. 
In an early cutscene, Willamette is introduced as a rather dull place, offering 
hardly anything more interesting to do than “kill time at the shopping mall” - a 
prophecy that will soon become true in the most literal sense: Willamette has 
been stage to a zombie outbreak, most of the townsfolk being transformed into 
dumb, yet deadly undead. 
Shortly after the shopping mall turns out to be the key setting of the game, the 
player is witness to the breaking of barricades and the invasion of hordes of 
undead; the game clearly references George A. Romero’s movie Dawn of the 
Dead (Laurel Group, 1978), a shopping mall - based zombie drama, which plays 
with the idea of the undead rerturning to the place they felt happiest at when 
they were still alive: the buyer’s paradise of the shopping mall. 
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When the player is informed that Frank will be picked up by the helicopter 72 
hours later (3 days in-game time equal 360 minutes realtime, if there are no 
repetitions due to dying and reloading or game-pausing), the main objective 
becomes clear: try to survive long enough, and be on the rooftop on time on the 
third day, or Frank will be left behind. 
In order to experience the main timeline of gameplay, there is not much more to 
bear in mind. However, the game offers some minor structural objectives, for 
example the timed  execution of specific assignments that lead to what is staged 
as a gradual disclosure of the events that led to the horrific situation on hand; 
on a fictional level, this path of “finding the truth behind all this” could be re-
garded as a major motivation for the ambitious journalist Frank. 
What I would like to focus on is another structural objective, called “escort mis-
sions”.
Escort Missions
As the player/Frank is moving around the spatious shopping mall, he is regu-
larly being informed via radio about the location of “survivors” who are strug-
gling for their lives in scattered spots in the mall. Every time a survivor is lo-
caöized, the player can choose to try and reach these NPCs in a designated time 
and rescue them by guiding them back to a small area beneath the roof, the “se-
curity room”, which for the most part of the game is the only safe spot in the 
mall. Once survivors have been escorted to the security room, they are safe 
from any zombie attacks, and the player can watch the security room slowly fill 
up with happy and relieved people who don’t get tired of thanking Frank for 
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saving their lives. (It might be argued that this makes the security room feel 
more and more ”homely”, representing an encouraging social environment, but 
this is not important for the present case study). 
While the increasing number and strength of zombies (together with a few 
other additions gradually increasing the difficulties presented by the game), one 
of which will be mentioned later) makes it hard enough to move through the 
shopping mall alone, escorting survivor-NPCs provides an even bigger chal-
lenge. Survivors are less self-reliant than Frank, which makes them easy targets 
for the zombies, and they do not always act as prudently as one would wish. 
They keep getting killed or turned into undead on a regular basis, and some-
times the hardest part for players doing escort missions becomes avoiding to 
kill the survivors herself, as they tend to show up in the most inappropriate 
spots, therefore risking being accidentally cut up by Franks own chainsaw (or 
whatever tool he’s using at the time). 
The ‘chaos’ that is represented by escort missions is increased by two factors: 
first, there is usually more than one survivor to be rescued. Second, every 
survivor-NPC is provided with a different behaviour, which makes every sur-
vivor require a slightly different strategy in trying to rescue them. In combina-
tion, the player more often than not finds herself entrusted with the lives of a 
disorganized bunch of hard-to-handle people, running to and fro in order to 
safe the stragglers, while hoping that the more hasty don’t rush into certain 
doom. 
While it may be argued that escort missions are just a spice-up to the gameplay, 
as none of these missions are obligatory in order to keep playing, I would con-
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sider escort missions an integral part of the game. Not only do escort missions 
provide a relevant source for experience points, therefore advancing the 
player’s avatar, providing him with necessary upgrades for the harder stages of 
the game (leveling up gives the player additional hitpoints, skills or inventory 
slots); more importantly, on a fictional level, escort missions may even be re-
garded as the most significant aspect of the game considering Frank’s evolution 
as a character: in a very early cutscene, Frank meets a group of about a dozen 
people who are trying to defend a barricade at the shopping mall’s entrance, 
thereby preventing the zombies from entering the mall. As the barricade finally 
breaks, the player is witness to the deaths of the barricade builders, without the 
game providing any way to come to their help. The player’s only option is mak-
ing Frank run for his own life. While the player may be concerned with these 
people’s fates, Frank’s only concern is to safe himself. 
When in the next cutscene Frank is asked about the whereabouts of the barri-
cade builders, he can only stutter: “I don’t know... I hope they got away...”, fol-
lowed by a long, embarassing silence. The player’s knowledge that all these 
people have died while Frank was standing right next to them increases the 
displeasing intensity of the scene. On a fictional level, this implies ‘responsibil-
ity for other people’s lives’ as a major theme for the rest of the player’s game. 
Seperating first order realities and pseudo-social context
The description of the basic setup - while already limited to certain aspects rele-
vant for the following example - contains information about empirically percep-
tible first order realities, as well as hints to the pseudo-social context provided 
by the game world. 
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First order realities include the gameplay possibilities: the player is able to con-
trol a character, interact with zombie enemies by killing them, she gets informa-
tion about her own hitpoints up to the point of dying, and interaction with sur-
vivor NPCs allows for different outcomes defined by the death or survival of 
these NPCs. All these elements refer to the basic mechanics of the game, guided 
by the game’s rules: if a survivor-NPC is hit by zombie enemies several times, 
the NPC ‘dies’, meaning that interaction is no longer possible and the NPC can-
not be escorted to the goal-area of the security room.
These elements can be perceived by any player or observer, irrespective of the 
values, beliefs or expectances the observation is guided by. 
Contrary to this, the suggestion of Frank being a daredevil photojournalist, the 
implied self-evidence of the game events as a killing spree (“Kill-time at the 
shopping mall”) or the motif of responsibility for others are open to interpreta-
tion.
These fictional elements provide a pseudo-social context: a framework against 
which the player can test her construction of second order realities before decid-
ing upon these constructions’ viability. Contrary to the demands of first order 
reality, second order realities - which are to be argued as specific game narra-
tives contrary to representational narrative - cannot be right or wrong. They can 
only provide interpretations viable for the player, or fail to be satisfying in this 
regard. The viability of the player’s construction of second order realities is de-
pendend on her reaction to the context provided by the game world (substitut-
ing social mechanisms of feedback and sharing beliefs): can the player arrange a 
cowardly playstyle with the game’s assumption of Frank being a daredevil 
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character? Can she arrange with the sacrifice of survivors when Frank’s respon-
sibility for others is demanded for on a fictional level? Maybe she can, but the 
pseudo-social context provided by the game must be taken into account in or-
der to do so. Killing survivors on purpose is not irrespective of the demand for 
responsibility, it is a revolting act, and may as such prove a viable strategy, im-
plying that she chooses to play Frank as not complying with the standards oth-
ers impose on him. 
But the set up does not yet contain any actual game events. It does already in-
clude a fair amount of narrative elements, but not in terms of game narrative; 
before game specific narratives can arise, the player needs to interact with the 
game world’s elements in order to create these events as a combination of the 
game world’s possibilities and her own behaviour in regard to these events. In 
order to explore game narratives, it is necessary to examine the actual gameplay 
arising from the basic set up and the narrative possibilities it allows for. 
Rocks and Hard places: players’ decisions
In the following, I would like to examine a specific set of escort missions in re-
gard to different outcomes and the narrative space that it is opened up by their 
enactment, as the behaviour of the survivors, the spatial set up and the scripted 
events connected with these missions will later be argued to be the elements 
that form the possible gameplay experiences and resulting narrative interpreta-
tions. 
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All the missions to be described here are accessible on the afternoon of the first 
day (in-game time), and are thereby mostly combined with one of the “cases” of 
the continuos background objective; however, as these cases are not a relevant 
factor in the designated section of the game, they will not be subject to further 
analysis. 
The detail in which these missions and the related NPC-behaviour is described 
is due to the relevance of these elements and their combinations for the multi-
tude of gameplay enactments and the resulting narrative interpretations, as will 
be argued below. 
Escort missions: mechanics in terms of first order realities
In a first segment, I will refer to the basic elements of the escort missions and 
the NPC survivors involved regarding the behaviour of system elements with-
out augmenting them with player-centered values, thereby constituting empiri-
cally perceptible elements in terms of first order realities. I will, however, hint at 
the fictional properties of these elements arising from their basic features on a 
level of game mechanics, especially in regard to NPC behaviour. 
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Image 1: Map of the Willamette Shopping Mall (Dead Rising, Capcom, 2006)
Escort Mission 1: Barricade Pair A / B
At about 4 pm in-game time, Frank receives a transmission hinting the player at 
two people barricading themselves in a clothing shop in Al Fresca Plaza. Arriv-
ing at the designated spot, the player needs to remove some pieces of furniture 
that form the barricade before entering the clothing shop and meeting Burt and 
Aaron. Unluckily, while Aaron is cowering behind a shop counter, Burt mis-
takes Frank for a zombie and starts attacking him. In order to talk to Burt, and 
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thereby convincing him and Aaron to let themselves be escorted to safety, the 
player first needs to beat up Burt quite a bit, until he gives up the fight and is 
willing to start a conversation. 
This is easier said than done, as the hits need to be concerted carefully: if Burt is 
hit once too often, he panicks, and any chance to talk to him is forfeit. And if too 
powerful a weapon is used, Burt is easily killed, which again makes the success-
ful completion of the mission impossible. 
After Burt is convinced, however, Aaron instantly follows; the player can try to 
escort both survivors to the security room.
NPC behaviour: Burt
Burt is easy to handle as an escortee. The player can equip him with a weapon 
of choice, and Burt will make efficient use of it. If asked to move to a certain lo-
cation, he will promptly obey, trying to avoid most of the zombies in the way. In 
case of a skirmish, Burt will aid Frank as well as any other escortee. On a game-
play level, Burt is self-sufficient, acting in a way that may seem exemplary for 
efficient playstyle. On a fictional level, Burt could be described as heroic, taking 
responsibility for others while taking good care of himself. 
NPC behaviour: Aaron
While Aaron, like Burt, can be equipped with any weapon the player sees fit, he 
will hardly ever use it. Aaron acts like he’s scared (who would hold it against 
him), moving slowly and staying behind, being constantly held up by zombies 
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and getting involved in annoying skirmishes. As he is hardly ever defending 
himself, he is dependent on the player (or Burt) to save him, making him an 
additional challenge in the mission rather than an asset on the level of game-
play. On a fictional level, Aaron represents a cautious, even cowardly character, 
who tries best to keep pace, but always ends up causing trouble for himself and 
others.
Escort Mission 2: A Mother’s Lament
After 5 pm in-game time, a woman named Leah can be found hiding in a jewel-
lery shop in Al Fresca Plaza, just across the clothing shop Burt and Aaron were 
just picked up. Leah seems rather distressed, and after Frank has talked to her a 
little, the player learns of her tragic fictional background: she has just lost her 
baby-daughter to a zombie attack. Still, the conversation ends with Leah joining 
up with Frank, and with the player now being responsible for the safety of three 
survivors. 
NPC behaviour: Leah
According to Leahs distress on a fictional level, on the level of gameplay her 
behaviour is discomposed and erratic. Although she essentially follows given 
directions, she does so in a dazed and circuitous manner, which makes her a 
favoured target for zombie attacks. Relying on her ability to move by herself 
usually ends up in her death, so the player needs to be constently aware of her 
position and surroundings. 
Contrary to Burt and Aaron, she cannot be equipped with any weapons; in-
stead, the player can decide to let Frank carry Leah on his shoulders, which will 
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happen a lot, since it is an obvious reaction to her inability to successfully navi-
gating through the zombie hordes on her own.
Carrying a person in the game is a trade-off: on the one hand, zombies do not 
attack Frank while he is carrying somebody as long as he doesn’t stand still. On 
the other hand, carrying a person prevents Frank from fighting enemies, 
thereby making it harder to take care of the other survivors’ safety. While carry-
ing Leah, Frank can move fast and safe, while the rest of the group is all the 
more in danger of ending up far behind and on their own. 
On a fictional level, Leah represents the helpless victim, a wounded sheep in 
desperate need of a shepherd. Contrary to Aaron, whose inaptitude is part of 
his personality, Leah’s tragic situation sparks sympathy and understanding for 
her ineffectiveness; her death cannot be vindicated by the awkwardness of her 
own actions, as it is Frank who is perceived as the one responsible, not Leah 
herself. 
If the player decides to rescue Burt, Aaron and Leah, it doesn’t matter in which 
order the survivors are picked up. But it is of importance that even reaching the 
locations where the survivors are found provides a strenuous task: at this point 
of the game, no area can be reached without straining fights against immense 
numbers of zombies, and even keeping Frank alive is not to be taken for 
granted. As soon as one group of survivors is picked up, taking care of them 
becomes an additional challenge. No matter whether the player needs to talk to 
Leah while being responsible for Burt and Aaron, or whether it’s the other way 
round, it is a real challenge to pick up any survivors while at the same time pro-
tecting those already part of the group from being killed. Hence, at this point 
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the loss of any of them could already be experienced as a setback, an opposition 
to the player’s efforts. 
However, as the direct way from Entrance Plaza to Paradise Plaza (from where 
the security room is accessed) is still locked at this point of the game, the only 
way to guide the survivors to safety is to leave Al Fresca Plaza at the south exit 
to the Food Court, then leaving the Food Court and crossing Leisure Park, re-
entering Paradise Plaza and reaching the access to the security room. 
Escort Mission 3: Rescuing Sophie
When Frank exits to Leisure Park after picking up the escort quests, a cutscene 
starts, and the player learns that a group of escaped convicts have hijacked a 
military jeep, and are ruthlessly hunting for zombies and civilians alike in Lei-
sure Park with a machine gun. 
The convicts’ current victims are a young woman and an elderly man (maybe 
the woman’s father), the latter being shot by the convicts in the cutscene. When 
the cutscene is finally over, the young woman (her name is Sophie) is running 
from the convicts, across the park from where the player finds himself/Frank. 
The only way to save Sophie is to ask her to join Frank (and the other survi-
vors), and in order to do so, the player must navigate Frank straight across the 
park, literally running after her, thereby forcing him and the escortees to take a 
considerable detour from the direct path to Paradize Plaza and the security 
room. If Frank reaches Sophie before she is killed, she instantly joins the escort 
group. 
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NPC-behaviour: Sophie
Though her character represents a state of slight shock, Sophie is slightly better 
at finding her own way than Leah or Aaron; still, she is not as self-sufficient as 
Burt. From time to time she panicks and doesn’t move on, requiring the player/
Frank to hold her hand and guide her a few steps before she will walk on her 
own again. The option to hold her hand replaces the option to equip her with a 
weapon, so she doesn’t help in killing enemies either. The necessity to hold her 
hand from time to time presents a difficulty in two regards: first, the player can 
either carry Leah or hold Sophie’s hand, thus anytime the player helps out So-
phie, Leah is left staggering on her own, putting her life at risk. 
Second, holding an escortees hand does not hold advantages like carrying them 
does: while fighting is not an option, similar to carrying a person, Frank and the 
escortee can still be attacked by enemies. Every time Frank or Sophie take dam-
age from zombies or convicts, Sophie lets go of Frank’s hand, allowing him to 
fight, but at the same time requiring him to return to Sophie immediately to 
take her hand again if she is to move on. The same situation arises if the player 
accidentally runs Frank/Sophie into any kind of obstacle. This makes the proc-
ess of guiding Sophie to the security room a difficult and annoying task in itself, 
while adding to the difficulty of taking care of the other escortees at the same 
time. 
On a fictional level, Sophie represents a different kind of victim than Leah does. 
She is a young girl, with all her life yet to life, while Leah’s life has just been 
shattered to pieces by the loss of her baby daughter. Accordingly, Sophie’s 
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movements may be a little insecure, but instead of requiring constant assistance, 
all she needs is a little push from time to time before she can carry on on her 
own. While Leah’s death may be exerienced as the tragic end to a tragic story, 
losing Sophie would all the more seem senseless and undesirable.
Getting personal: Bringing them all back home
While these are only the basic elements of the game simulation, the actual 
gameplay events arising from this setup can vary in a broad range, before they 
can be interpreted by the player as a narrative, thereby being constructed as 
second order realities. 
As an operative observer, the player has to interact with these basic elements in 
order to experience the gameplay events, the interaction being predetermined 
by the player’s attitude towards the game arising from her disposition to the 
game world’s pseudo-social context. 
In my attempts on the escort missions I tried to be largely in accordance with 
my perception of this pseudo-social context, my basic strategy guided by my 
desire to play Frank as a responsible character, protecting the weak and saving 
as many survivors as possible. 
Thus, the resulting goal embossing the basic strategy was to pick up all 4 survi-
vors and get them to safety.
The basic strategy (the ‘ideal run’)
In all of the following gameplay runs, it was my strategy to pick up Burt and 
Aaron first, as their NPC-behaviour (especially Burt’s ability to watch out for 
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Aaron to a certain degree) made it possible for them to watch out for them-
selves while I was talking to Leah. When all three had joined, I tried to guide 
them to the Food Court safely, which meant carrying Leah to the Food Court 
entrance first, then clearing a path through the zombies back to Burt and Aaron, 
the latter mostly being held up by groups of zombies, while Burt stayed with 
him and did his best to repel the rush of enemies. 
The Food Court itself presents a minor goal in the strategy, for it allows to re-
group the survivors, replenish their health and re-equip weapons; upon exiting 
the Food Court, however, the Leisure Park Cutscene (in which Sophie’s ‘father’ 
is killed), triggers the convict’s assault and therefore the countdown for the res-
cue of Sophie. 
In Leisure Park, my next goal was to reach Sophie while carrying Leah, hoping 
that Burt and Aaron would be able to follow; while the exit to Paradize Plaza 
(the next stop before the access spot to the security room) is just a short run 
from the Food Court, picking up Sophie is a considerable detour, greatly in-
creasing the risk of losing one of the other survivors to attacks by zombies or 
the convicts. 
After picking up Sophie, I would try to lead the four survivors to the entrance 
to Paradize Plaza, which again is easier said than done, as the entrance is over-
run with zombies by the time, making it necessary to clean up the area before it 
is possible to enter the Plaza. 
Paradize Plaza itself should be the easiest part of the run, as the area is well 
known at this stage of the game, and while there is the usual amount of zom-
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bies to be taken into account, there are no additional obstacles. The crossing of 
Paradize Plaza mainly involves the basic game tactics of clearing paths through 
zombie hordes while at the same time sending the survivors to those spots al-
ready cleared, until everyone is gathered at the entrance to the warehouse, the 
access area to the security room. 
Getting real: the gameplay runs
In the following I will present several actual gameplay outcomes arising from 
the basic situation, before they will be interpreted in regard to their narrative 
value. The events constituting these gameplay runs could still be described in 
terms of first order realities by an observer, as the loss of a specific survivor at a 
certain point or the movement patterns of the characters can be perceived 
largely independent of individual interpretation. Still, it can hardly be avoided 
that certain judgemental attributes slip into the description, in order to make 
the textual account at least fairly comprehensible124. 
Gameplay Run 1
In a first run, the strategy was successful in gathering all survivors and crossing 
Leisure Park without significant difficulty. Real problems arised only when 
crossing Paradize Plaza. Though their hitpoints were mostly drained at this 
point due to the previous crossing of three zombie infested areas, all survivors 
were already gathered at the entrance to the warehouse / security room except 
Aaron, who fell behind and got involved in a struggle with a considerable 
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amount of zombies. While I / Frank ran back in order to save him, the other 
survivors become target of another group of zombies, despite of Burt’s efforts to 
defend them. After an unsuccessful attempt to rescue Aaron, he died, leaving 
Frank far off from the rest of the group. The time it took to get back was enough 
to get all the other survivors killed, before Frank himself fell victim to the at-
tacks. 
Gameplay Run 2 
The second run was similar to the first in getting all survivors to Paradize Plaza 
alive. Crossing the Plaza this time proved to be a little more difficult, as So-
phie’s panic attacks required me / Frank to take her hand more often to guide 
her along, hence having to stop carrying Leah, who in the meantime started 
staggering along on her own and engaging in skirmishes far off from the group. 
The constant process of switching between guiding Sophie, then looking to see 
where Leah had wandered off, picking her up and carrying her a little closer to 
the warehouse / security room entrance, just to find that Sophie had been di-
verted by zombies again lead to a great deal of disarrangement; in the general 
confusion, I lost track of Burt and Aaron, just to find that Aaron had been held 
up in a spot far behind, while Burt was coming to his rescue. As I / Frank was 
hopelessly seperated from them at that point, it took some time to reach them. 
Aaron could finally get rescued, but not before Burt got bitten by zombies and 
turned into an undead himself. This led to Burt attacking Frank on arrival, lead-
ing to me / Frank killing zombie-Burt in self-defense. As this was not an ac-
ceptable outcome (I will refer to the ‘acceptable’ later), I let Frank being killed 
by zombies on purpose in order to restart the mission from the last savepoint. 
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Gameplay Run 3
The third run ended much earlier than the first two. 
After leaving the Food Court, I / Frank led the three survivors across the park 
to Sophie, who is at that time being closely followed  by the three convicts in 
their machine-gun-equipped jeep. Blocking the road (actually, the jeep-
mechanics cause the jeep to get stuck in trees or walls from time to time, in or-
der to give the player a possibility to melee-attack the driver or gunner), the 
convicts get the group of survivors stuck between them and hordes of ap-
proaching zombies. As Aaron is way off again, and Leah (who had to be 
dropped in order to talk to Sophie), is surrounded by a group of zombies, and 
as the basic strategy I had chosen is to run from the convicts instead of fighting 
them, I decide to rescue the survivors from zombie attacks before picking up 
Leah again and proceeding to the entrance to Paradize Plaza. While I / Frank 
sucessfully tries to hold the zombies off, the convicts take down one survivor 
after the other, and finally kill Frank. 
Gameplay Run 4
In the fourth run, I led the survivors across Leisure park to Sophie in order to 
rescue her. On the detour, Burt, Aaron and Leah suffered a considerable amount 
of damage by zombies and convicts, but it was especially the process of talking 
to Sophie that finally became the biggest challenge of the fourth run. While the 
convicts were relentlessly firing at Frank, Sophie became surrounded by a con-
siderable number of zombies; during the time it took to get close to her and be 
able to click at her (in order to ask her to join) Burt and Aaron, trying to keep 
pace (with Burt probably slowing down in order to protect Aaron), had split up. 
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As Leah had to be dropped in order to talk to escort Sophie, she, too, was soon 
lost in crowds of zombies.  While I / Frank desperately tried to get hold of So-
phie’s hand, the remaining escortees had already fallen victim to zombie / con-
vict attacks. Despite the loss of the others, I decided to move on, finally manag-
ing to get Sophie to safety. 
(emergent) game narratives as second order realities
While the different gameplay runs are all guided by the same set of game ele-
ments and system behaviour, and by the player’s same basic strategy and goals, 
they still lead to different events due to the simulation’s ability to create unpre-
dictable, seemingly coincidental variations. But they are obviously not stories 
told by the game in a representational sense, as the distinctive elements of the 
runs, while dependent of the game mechanics, only take form through player 
interaction. But at this point, these have merely been described in their capacity 
of events, not as narratives. 
In order to create second order realities arising from these events, hereby con-
structing a narrative from each of these gameplay runs, the player needs to 
augment them with values in her aim to ‘make sense’ of these events. 
In any of the four cases, it is up to the player to interpret them in one or the 
other way, by means of giving certain elements specific attributes, and aligning 
the resulting narrative construction with her approach to the game world to 
check the viability of these narrative endeavours against what she chooses to be 
guiding principles of her playing experience.
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In the following, I will try to give more specific narrative interpretations of the 
different gameplay runs, arising from my attitude as a player in taking the role 
of Frank in the different attempts to put my basic strategy into practice. 
Narrative Interpretation, first run: the weakest link
A viable narrative interpretation of the first run could include the largely suc-
cessful advancement of the group, contrasted by the failure just before the goal, 
caused by the frailty of one of their weaker members. 
The group of survivors determinedly fought their way through hordes of zombies; work-
ing together as a group, counteracting their personal strengths against their weak-
nesses, seemed to provide a way to safe them all. But just when safety was finally within 
reach, one of the weaker members of the group fell behind. No one is left behind, so the 
other survivors wouldn’t leave without their mate. But, alas, the delay is enough for 
their enemies to gain advantage, and in a furious struggle to fight for their lives, they 
all die together. So close! The responsible behaviour of decent people lures them on to 
destruction, as they risk their own well being in favour of the survival of another. 
The base for this narrative construction is the experience of failure in regard to 
Frank’s / my goal to rescue the survivors, a goal in accordance with the affor-
dances established by the pseudo-social context of the game world. While in the 
early cutscene mentioned before, Frank is considered responsible for the deaths 
of the barricade builders, this time I try to legitimate the failed rescue mission 
by Aaron’s inaptitude: I did my best to get the survivors to safety, but Aaron’s 
failure to keep pace made it impossible to reach that goal. In order to make 
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sense of the resulting desaster, the resulting narrative construction emphazises 
the near success of the run, as well as putting the blame on Aaron, thereby 
transforming the events into a lesson about a group’s dependence on their indi-
vidual members.
Narrative Interpretation, second run: a heroes tragedy
Interpreted as a narrative in retrospect, one might emphasize the tragedy of 
Burt, whose heroic character leads him to an undesirable end. 
Trying to protect the weak, Burt risks his own life, and while Aaron is indeed saved 
from death, Burt in consequence meets an even more horrible faith as he is bitten and 
infected by zombies, becoming an undead himself, and being turned into part of the evil 
he had fought so bravely. 
Subsequently, Burt’s tragedy leads to a tragic dilemma for Frank. He and Burt are tied 
together by their mutual heroic desire to protect the weak and save as many survivors as 
possible; in that, they are of the same breed. Burt is not as much a victim in need of 
Frank’s help, but more of a companion, sharing similar values and fighting side by side 
with Frank, a brother-in-arms. While the loss of any other of the survivors might have 
been dramatic and definitely undesirable, losing Burt to the zombies and even having to 
kill him after he has become a soulless undead is too much to bear for Frank, leaving 
suicide as his only option. That all the other survivors are hereby abandoned to their 
fates, however, sheds a dubious light at Franks decison: he is not really as strong as he 
pretended to be; faced with the unimaginable, he seeks the easy way out instead of taking 
responsibility for those left behind. His own weakness becomes a death sentence for 
those still relying on him; is he really Burts counterpart, or does he have more in com-
mon with Aaron in the end?
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This narrative interpretation emanates from the experienced inequity of Burt’s 
transformation into a zombie. As Burt is not experienced as a victim, but as a 
hero-type character - contrary to the other survivors, who are experienced as 
dependent on Frank in order to survive - his death as a consequence of his en-
deavour to protect a weaker member of the group is experienced as a tragedy. 
As Burt’s heroism is taken as an example for the player’s intention to play and 
enact Frank’s character, Burt’s death cannot be accepted as collateral damage, 
but is experienced as the unsuccessful end of the mission, especially as Burt is 
not instantly killed, but turned into a zombie, requiring Frank / the player to 
kill him herself: what use is there in carrying on, trying to save some of the sur-
vivors, after having killed one of the others. Burt has met a horrible fate, doing 
exactly what the player is trying to make Frank do; if there was a chance to get 
the other survivors to safety, it would be experienced as random and erratic, as 
there is no reason why Frank would  succeed where Burt would not. 
Narrative Interpretation, third run: out of the frying pan...
A narrative interpretation of this gameplay run might be spun around the kill-
ing of the survivors by the escaped convicts, as well as the rescue of their vic-
tim, Sophie. 
When all hell turns loose, a couple of survivors successfully fights for their lives against 
myriads of undead. But their efforts are in vain, as they are hunted down by twisted 
humans. The obvious danger and unnatural threats of the living dead can be overcome, 
just to be surpassed by the banale cruelity of fellow humans, who do not care for their 
equals, instead rejoicing in the sadistic pleasure of killing the unoffending. The biggest 
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threat to man is man himself? But maybe the survivors are themselves to blame for this 
tragedy: they may yet have had a good chance to get away with their lives, had not the 
decision been made to try and rescue Sophie. Instead of getting themselves to safety, the 
group took a considerable detour in order to get to her, only to be killed by the convicts 
because of their altruistic efforts; still, the endavour made no difference for Sophie, who 
was killed just the same. 
While the element of malevolent humans, presenting an even greater risk than 
the brainless hordes of undead, is a common motive in the zombie genre, and is 
a constant origin of challenge throughout Dead Rising itself, the senselessness of 
their actions becomes tangible in contrast to a gameplay strategy that is legiti-
mated by the goal to rescue surviving humans, while the enemies to be ‘killed’ 
are regarded as soulless antagonists. The endangerment of the survivors by 
“fellow humans” fractures this dualist interpretation. Even more, it fractures the 
legitimation for the objectives chosen in the basic strategy, as this strategy is to 
side with fellow humans in a struggle against non-human agressors, therefore 
emphazising a strictly partial approach to the conflict. The condemnation of the 
ruthless convicts, however, is contradicted by the assumed cause of failure in 
this gameplay run: in the end, it is the survivors’ altruistic ideals that leads to 
the decision to risk their own lives in order to safe Sophie and, therefore, to 
their demise. From a metaphorical perspective, the survivors are killed by their 
own compassion, and even worse, their sacrifice is to no avail.
Narrative Interpretation, fourth run: the lost sheep
Even more than in the third run, Sophie might be considered a key factor of the 
narrative in the fourth:
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The group decides to risk their own lives in order to rescue the young girl, Sophie, who 
obviously has no chance of escaping the convicts on their own. Again, this is more than 
a hypothetical danger, as the other survivors, one by one, get killed trying to save So-
phie. But this time, their sacrifice is not in vain: while the others die, Sophie can be 
saved. Instead of giving up, Frank (the player) grabs the young woman’s hand and leads 
her to safety: the deaths of his companions will not be meaningless. Frank and Sophie 
will have to deal with the failure to save the others; their friends have died so they could 
live. And so they would. 
It has to be noted that, while the first three runs led me to returning to the last 
save point and retrying the mission, I continued playing after the fourth and 
last run. Although the initial goal of the base strategy - the rescue of all four 
survivors - had not been reached, the rescue of Sophie obviously sufficed in or-
der to be satisfactory. While I / Frank  had to deal with the loss of the three 
other survivors, it was exactly their deaths that made me experience the rescue 
of Sophie as the main objective. While the deaths of the other survivors in the 
other runs disavowed my / Frank’s capability to play a meaningful role in the 
game context, carrying on thereby not being experienced as a viable course of 
action, the deaths of Burt, Aaron and Leah in this run were legitimated by the 
endeavour to rescue Sophie, thereby gaining additional impact as pseudo-social 
factors. On a gameplay level, the experience should have been even less satis-
factory than the second run, in which only one survivor had been lost; yet, the 
construction of narrative as a second order reality led to a shift in values in the 
mission, not only affecting re-tellable events, but also gameplay decisions.
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1.4.3 Summary: making contingencies tangible
An analysis of emergent narrative in a specific sequence of Dead Rising has 
shown that a multitude of emerging game narratives arising from subjective 
player interpretations can still be linked to the basic setup of the game. While 
the examined gameplay events and narrative interpretations are only a limited 
assortment of a multitude of possibilities, thereby constituting only a few viable 
paths through the game’s possibility spaces, it could be illustrated that these 
paths are subjective, but in no way coincidential. 
Perceptions on the level of first order realities are interpreted according to the 
player’s values and beliefs, and the resulting attitude tested against the possi-
bilities and limitations of the game world. The ensuing operations and interac-
tions with the gameworld in turn constitute gameplay events, which again are 
subject to the player’s interpretation, forming recursive processes of construct-
ing meaningful cognitive realities of second order.
As a result, the ‘narrative content’ of a game can not be assessed in terms of rep-
resentation, distinguishing games from traditional, non-interactive media, in 
which the idea of ‘representation’ can mostly be regarded as a viable concept. 
Instead, a methodical assessment of games’ narrative potential must take the 
contingent character of this media into account, and consider the recursive in-
terplay between players’ interpretations, values and beliefs and the constitution 
of gameplay events through players’ interactions with the game world.
In order to make this interplay more tangible, the next part of this thesis will 
therefore examine the relation between the terms and conditions of games (and 
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mediated events in general) and the player’s values and believe as constituting 
preconditions for the emergence of ‘experiences’.
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Part 2: 
Constructing (Gaming) Experiences
“Let me paint you a picture:
My knights will skirmish.
Lanes of power will open up
 to my bishops and rooks.
Pawns will naturally be forfeit.
I’m even prepared to sacrifice my queen
 because I assure you,
my goal will be attained at any cost:
The King must die.”
(Mark Frost / David Lynch)125
Games cannot simply be distinguished according to the fictional topoi they em-
ploy, but by the way these topics are modelled as systems in the game, and by 
the resulting set of possible actions and decisions leading to gameplay experi-
ences. 
Similar to genre classifications regarding traditional media, classifications of 
“game types” are problematic and incoherent, as the criteria for these classifica-
tions vary depending on the focus underlying the classification attempt: some-
times games are classified in regard to their fictional layer (zombie games, pi-
rate games, science fiction games), sometimes in regard to the game interface 
and modes of interaction (first person shooters, third person strategy games, 
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stealth games, racing games), sometimes in regard to the intended effect on 
players (horror games, party games, educational games).
When it comes to the different experiences encouraged by a specific game, a fo-
cus on the game’s fiction may be regarded as unessential at best, and in some 
cases even as misleading. When players engage in a game, and the game ‘un-
ravels’ its inherent meaning, this meaning is not so much determined by the fic-
tional guise of the game world, but by the possibilities of action and conse-
quence provided by the game’s mechanics because, as Soren Johnson points 
out, a game’s “theme” is not its “meaning”:
“Ultimately, designers need to recognize that a game’s theme does 
not determine its meaning. Instead, meaning emerges from a game’s 
mechanics - the set of decisions and consequences unique to each 
one. What does a game ask of the player? What does it punish, and 
what does it reward? What strategies and styles does the game en-
courage? Answering these questions will reveal what a game is actu-
ally about.”126
Still, while a focus on the game’s mechanics alone may provide a more ade-
quate approach to the game’s inherent meaning, a preliminary answer to the 
question ‘what is a game actually about?’, this focus does not account for the 
multitude of ways players may experience this ‘inherent meaning’; it is a focus 
solely concerned with meaning embedded in the game artifact, enabling a ‘close 
reading’ adequate to the specific nature of the media, but disregarding the vari-
ous possibilities on the players’ side to confront this meaning, to make sense of 
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and appreciate it, or to give it a twist that suits or challenges their own desires, 
assumptions, values and beliefs.
In the following, I will try to approach games with a focus on player experience: 
taking the player’s perspective into account, it is not only the fictional layer or 
the designed structure of the game that accounts for the ways a player is in-
volved in the game. As argued in the last chapter, the experience of playing a 
game is a result of these possibilities of action and decision enabling the player 
to confront a topic as a participant, the game’s requirements thereby confront-
ing the player’s wishes and desires, her fears, hopes, assumptions and supposi-
tions. 
In digital games, the player can make use of the game as an occasion to test her 
values and beliefs against an unbribable framework of fixed relations of action 
and consequence by re-arranging familiar strategies, developing new ones and 
maybe even being forced to challenge her hitherto beliefs127 - a challenge that is 
more easily accepted in games than in real life, as the experience is framed as 
being “only a game”. 
Nonetheless - and here Soren Johnson’s argument must be picked up again - the 
possible values, beliefs, assumptions and strategies that a player can test and 
develop in a certain game are not arbitrary. Different game mechanics convey 
different possibilities for this kind of experience. Even if many games are seem-
ingly “about” killing monsters, the way the game is designed, the mode which 
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127 see: Mitgutsch, Konstantin: “Learning through play - a delicate matter. Experience-
based Recursive Learning in Computer Games”, in: Fromme, J.; Unger, A. (Eds.): 
“Computer Games/Players/Game Cultures: A Handbook on the State and Perspec-
tives of Digital Game Studies”, Springer, New York, N.Y., 2011.
is employed in order to diminish the entities on the screen, will decide what ac-
tual experience spaces are made possible, and which experiences are not fos-
tered by the game. And while the fictional layer of a game may not necessarily 
reflect the meaning conveyed by the game system, it seems that coherences or 
deviances between the game’s mechanics (its “meaning”) and the game’s fiction 
(it’s “theme”) may also make a difference for the accessibility of  the ‘experience 
spaces’ the game suggests and makes available for the player.
The following chapters evolve around the assumption that a player-centered 
approach to games necessitates a focus on the experiences enabled by a certain 
game, which are not solely dependent on the content provided by the game’s 
fiction or its mechanics, even if this content may expand or limit the spaces of 
experience offered to players. If the guiding question is to be “Why do people 
play computer games?” it does not suffice to look at the game products and 
their specific features alone. Instead of asking “what is this game people are 
playing?” it has to be asked “what do people get out of playing the game?”.
This kind of question cannot be answered in purely descriptive terms, and is 
prone to a certain degree of speculation: what one player “gets out of the game” 
might drastically differ from another player’s experience, while a third might 
not make sense of the game at all. However, as has been argued in a previous 
chapter, a certain game - just like a certain narrative - can suggest a contingency 
field of possible experiences, which can be traced out and - to a certain degree - 
described. 
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Experiences outside this contingency field are always possible and probable, 
and the idea that a game’s elements could prohibit any experience from arising 
does not seem viable in any way.
But if the question aims at how the game enables experiences (“what do players 
get out of playing the game?”), it can be discussed in what ways a game’s fea-
tures can specifically support certain experiences, while not backing up others.
However, as the experiences resulting from playing a game can only be argued 
as a contingency field rather than a specific experience, it seems futile to try and 
conclusively single out the experiences that may arise from a game’s features 
without finding a way to separate the experiences suggested by the game from 
those that are not actively supported.
In order to build a conclusive argument, these questions will be approached by 
means of three case studies, which will not exclusively focus on game experi-
ences.  In a first case study, which will evaluate the events of September 11th 
2001 as an example for mediated experiences, I will try to develop a definition 
of ‘experience’ that enables  a differentiation between ‘features’ which enable 
and support experiences on the one hand, and of the actual experiences which 
result from a certain approach to these features on the other. This distinction 
will be based on the seperation of what I will call “experiential set up” and “ex-
periential perspective”. The aim of this first case study is to show that, while the 
mediated events of ‘9/11’ provide an experiential set up stunningly similar to 
the experiential set up of the Hollywood movie Independence Day (20th Century 
Fox, 1996), the experiences suggested by these media events are quite different 
due to the respective experiential perspectives applied.
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The second and third case study will focus on a more fictional topos of contem-
porary western culture, namely the ‘contemporary zombie topos’. As a defi-
ciency analysis rather than a positivistic approach, these two case studies will 
evolve around the observation that - although the contemporary zombie topos 
is just as relevant to the world of computer games as the genre of roleplaying 
games is - no single example for a digital roleplaying game building upon the 
post-Romero zombie topos exists.
I will argue that this is not coincidental, but due to the very different contin-
gency fields of experience opened up by digital RPGs on one hand, and the con-
temporary zombie topos on the other: while the structure of survival horror 
games supports an experience adequate to the idea of ‘horror’, the experiences 
supported by the mechanics of RPGs call for a fictional layer that seems almost 
contrary to the ‘horror’ of a zombie outbreak molded after Romero’s take on the 
topos.
Applying the conception of experiences illustrated in the first case study, the 
second case study will therefore examine the features of the contemporary 
(post-Romero) zombie topos in order to reveal its experiential potential: it will 
be argued that the zombie topos can be seen as an epitome of ‘horror’, achiev-
ing the effects that characterize the ‘horror experience’ (which will also be more 
closely defined by discussing the idea of isolation and societal breakdown), and 
it will be shown that this effect is not achieved by narrative strategies, but by 
the experiential set up of the topos itself.
Finally, the third case study, which focusses on different ‘actions and conse-
quences‘ made possible through game design strategies,  will show how typical 
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survival horror games open up contingency fields of experience very different 
to those suggested by Roleplaying games by examining some of these games’ 
fundamental features on the level of game mechanics. It will be argued that the 
gameplay experiences enabled by survival horror games are closely related to 
the fictional experience of isolation and societal breakdown suggested by the 
modern zombie topos (and the horror experience in general), while RPGs aim at 
a very different, almost contrary experience of society and its demands - a dif-
ference which may provide an explanation for the absence of the contemporary 
zombie topos in Online Roleplaying Games.
2.1 Breaking Down Experience
In the following, I would like to break down the concept of “experience” in two 
different elements, which I will call “experiential set up” and “experiential per-
spective”. 
The term “experiential set up” aims at a level on which certain elements are 
conceived as ‘events’, and interpreted according to the way these elements are 
related, but opening up a contingency field of experiences before values and be-
liefs are applied and a perspective on events is taken. The idea of ‘experiential 
set up’ again equates the constructivist notion of ‘first order realities’ - social 
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constructions which allow for similar observations as long as an agreed upon 
mode of observation is applied 128.
In a constructivist sense, the idea of a “set up” does not imply that this set up 
does exist apart from social and individual constructions. It does, however, not 
matter whether the set up is ‘real’ or ‘taken for real’ in order to provide a con-
tingency field for later experiences.
“Experiential perspective” is designated by the application of values and beliefs 
to the experiential set up, thereby narrowing down what has been a contin-
gency field of experience to a specific experience. This concept conforms with 
the notion of ‘second order realities’ - constructions which are dependent on 
subjective concepts of values and beliefs 129.
Both aspects are necessary for the realization of experiences. Taking the combi-
nation of an experiential set up (“what do I confront?”) and an experiential per-
spective (“how do I confront it?”) into consideration, can provide a viable un-
derstanding of how players construct experiences resulting from their interac-
tions with a game’s system.
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129  see: Watzlawick, Paul: “Wirklichkeitsanpassung oder angepaßte “Wirklichkeit”? 
Konstruktivismus und Pychotherapie”, in: Gumin, Heinz / Meier, Heinrich: 
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2.1.1 Experiential set up
When the concept of experiential set up is taken into consideration, it becomes 
obvious that such a set up may be sought after in any kind of experience. While 
this is a study about computer games and their players, and not about experi-
ence in general, it is nonetheless worth taking a look at the experiential set up of 
narratives in traditional media. In an earlier chapter it has been discussed that 
many game scholars have argued the basal difference between games and nar-
ratives, and this study’s approach aligns with this notion. But when the set up 
of gaming experiences is examined, a missing link may be argued, through 
which narrative media and gaming media may relate more closely to each other 
than on the level of the media products themselves.
A zombie game may not “tell a story” about zombies, but the zombie story and 
the zombie game may both enable the confrontation with the same topics on the 
level of their experiential set up (as will be argued later in this chapter). This is 
even more important when the fictional level of games is taken into account: on 
a gameplay level, a game may be something completely different than the 
“story” that’s told through the game. But the experiential set up of the game 
may or may not be consistent with the set up of the game’s fiction. 
Before the correlation between games’ and narratives’ set up is discussed, it 
needs to be examined how the experiential set up of narratives can be grasped. 
The story of Romeo and Juliet, for example, can be considered as  the story of 
two people, a man and a woman, who fall in love with each other and - lacking 
a shared perspective for their love in life - end up killing themselves out of the 
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desire to be united in death at least. So far for the specific story of Romeo and 
Juliet. 
But the specific story is not what we care about: Romeo and Juliet are fictional 
characters, and even if they were not, they are not part of our real lifes, and 
more importantly: they are not us. Juliet’s pain is not ours, Romeo’s love is 
something we may or may not believe and understand, but it is not us who are 
in love with Juliet. Why bother?
But the experience of watching, reading or thinking about the story of Romeo 
and Juliet is not simply about these two people and their emotions. It is an oc-
casion to confront our own concepts of love, loss, desire and futility. On this 
level - the experiential set up - we are not engaged in other people’s lifes, but in 
a situation in which our own constructions about life and ourselves are chal-
lenged. “What if it happened to me” is much more than a hypothetical question, 
it is a possibility to experience my own attitude towards life and its possible pit-
falls. When an experiential set up takes the shape of a concrete narrative, this 
narrative is not just a vehicle for these experiences. The form in which the story 
is presented also determines how we approach the experiential set up, or put in 
a more basic way: how good we can take it. The elements the story is con-
structed from, the setting, the modes of narration all convey codes to frame the 
experience, most importantly by attaching it to cultural codes of interpretation, 
jostling the experience in a certain direction by connecting it to a culturally em-
bossed context. 
But even when an experiential set up has been formed into a narrative, even 
when cultural codes have been attached and the arrangement of events sug-
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gests a certain experience, a discussion of these elements alone only takes into 
account the possibilities of narrative and media. A thorough discussion of the 
construction of experience, however, cannot disregard the many ways an expe-
riential set up - even in the form of the same narrative, the same mediated event 
- can be approached by different individuals. The experiential set up presents 
mere building blocks for a later experience. The way this transformation takes 
place is dependent on what I would like to call experiential perspective. 
2.2.2 Experiential perspective
The experiential set up of marriage, for example, may be defined by matters of 
shared income, adjusting perspectives to find common goals, establishing trust 
between two partners, and generally adapting a way of life that aims at actively 
spending one’s lives together. This set up can be established as part of a social 
agreement on what marriage is supposed to be, being reflected in laws regulat-
ing the terms of marriage, in movies dealing with happy or unhappy marriages, 
and in recurring mechanisms of everyday debate. 
But agreement on the terms of marriage, the experiential set up that is socially 
defined as forming the concept of marriage, does not result in a common expe-
rience. While some may experience this set up as the most romantic and desir-
able thing possible, it is the same set up that scares or disgusts others, turning 
the idea of marriage into a ‘sword of Damokles’, threatening their idea of hap-
piness. 
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This is a difference of perspective, and this perspective is not only one of differ-
ent individuals. In the Musical My Fair Lady, streetwise Alfred P. Doolittle is 
introduced by singing about his views of life. Regarding marriage, he sings:
“The gentle sex was made for man to marry, 
To share his nest and see his food is cooked. 
The gentle sex was made for man to marry-but 
With a little bit of luck, With a little bit of luck, 
You can have it all and not get hooked.”130
Later in the musical, his perspective seems to have shifted significantly. While 
there is no notion whatsoever that Doolittle might have changed his views on 
what marriage is, and still values the pleasures of a slovenly life, celebrating his 
stag night to the fullest, he seems to be overjoyed by his upcoming marriage, 
and dedicated not to hazard his marriage plans by any means:
“I'm getting married in the morning! 
Ding dong! the bells are gonna chime. 
Feather and tar me; 
Call out the Army; But get me to the church.
(Get me to the church...)
For Gawd's sake, get me to the church on time!”131
As this is a purely fictional example, it is forgivable that the reasons for this 
shift of perspective are not elaborated on in the play132. It is still a precise illus-
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130 Lerner, A.J.; Loewe, F.: “With a little bit of luck”, from: “My Fair Lady” (Musical), 
Sony BMG Music Entertainment, 1964.
131 Lerner, A.J.; Loewe, F.: “Get Me to the Church On Time”, from: “My Fair Lady” 
(Musical), Sony BMG Music Entertainment, 1964.
132 At least not in regard to the character of Alfred P. Doolittle. The processes leading 
to a shift of perspective are closely examined in regard to the character of Henry Hig-
gins, and may even be argued to be the key focus of the play.
tration that a change of perspective, while it does in no way change the experi-
ential set up, makes a vast difference for the resulting experience.
While experience is determined by perspective and by the values and beliefs 
connected to this perspective, on the level of experiential set up certain ele-
ments are delineated and marked as an ‘event’ or, more generally, a ‘topos’. The 
elements included in this construction of elements and the way these elements 
interact already specify what kinds of experiences will be viable in dealing with 
these events, and which will probably not work in order to ‘make sense’ the 
moment we adopt a perspective and try to make the experience work according 
to our sets of values and beliefs. 
But the differentiation between experiential set up and experiential perspective 
as two elements constituting experience is not confined to the realm of what we 
have chosen to define as fiction.
 
The importance of experiential perspective may best be clarified by another ex-
ample, which already takes the concept of experiential set up into account. This 
chapter’s first case study will, therefore, examine how a shift in the experiential 
perspective may lead to a different experience of (mediated) events, even 
though the experiential set up of these events remains constant.
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2.2 First Case Study: 
Experiential set up / perspective of ‘9/11’ and ‘Inde-
pendence Day’ 
Over the past decade, ‘9/11’ has become a commonplace code in the United 
States and in what we call “the western world” in general. With the multitude 
of contexts ‘9/11’ has become a standalone symbolical framework for, and the 
connotations that have accumulated around the events and consequences of ‘9/
11’, it seems almost absurd to go back and talk about the initial events occuring 
at September 11th 2001 that gave rise to this prominence of two simple numbers 
that now play a significant part in cultural and political debates in a large part 
of the world.
Still, as this example will focus on the (mediated) experience of events and their 
framing, it is the events themselves that have to be highlighted once more in 
order to specify what is to be exemplified; or, to be more specific, the media 
events that constitute the narrative program executed seemingly anytime the 
numbers ‘9/11’ come up.
So, what is the basic setup this mediated experience consists of?
It is safe to say that when on September 11th 2001 two planes crashed into the 
towers of the world trade center in New York City, a wave of shock swept over 
the western world. It is obvious that this is not only due to the loss of lifes re-
sulting from these events, as we seem to have developed stategies to cope with 
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or put aside reports of disasters and fatalities of much greater scales in daily 
news. Nor does the acknowledged media coverage alone - live feeds showing 
pictures of the towers the moment they collapsed, seemingly capturing the hor-
ror and fear of victims and witnesses as they occured - account for the incisive 
impact the reports on 9/11 have had on our perspective of the world at the be-
ginning of a new millenium. 
Even when it is sometimes argued that 9/11 has been exploited as a legitima-
tion for political decisions like the patriot act, the second war in iraq or the 
“coalition of the willing”, and taking into account that the importance of 9/11 
as a legitimation for a distinctive shift in world politics might in retrospect have 
intensified the omnipresence and leverage of 9/11 as a cultural narrative, the 
question remains: what are the elements that constitute 9/11 as an event that 
can give rise to debates of legitimization and exploitation on such a large scale 
in the first place?
What is this media event, this narrative, made of, and why does it seem to 
touch so many people in such a dramatic way that - while there are many dif-
ferent opinions on the reactions following the initial events - 9/11 itself is not 
only an undebatably terrifying event, but seems to have become a synonym for 
terror itself? 
2.2.1 Conception of the United States before 9/11
One thing that distinguishes the media events of 9/11 from our relative accep-
tance of other man-made catastrophes may be the disparity between common 
conceptions of the U.S. before 9/11 and the sudden notion of vulnerability that 
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was an integral part of the way 9/11 changed our way to think of the balance of 
powers in the world. 
Before 9/11, the common conception about this balance of powers was em-
bossed by the assumption that the United States of America were the last re-
maining “superpower”. While some acknowledged the United States decisions 
in world politics, others passed criticism, but the guiding perspective did not 
question the dominant influence of the U.S. After the cold war had been de-
clared a thing of the past, the narrative framework of the world’s dependence 
upon the outcome or solution of the rivalty between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
was replaced by the question of what the U.S. would make of their responsibil-
ity as the one and only superpower. In a talk held in February 2004, Noam 
Chomsky discusses the hegemonial position the United States has had for some 
time in decisions made by the United Nations Organization (UNO): 
“There's a basic problem about the UN […] there's a fundamental 
problem, and that is: the UN can only act insofar as the great powers 
allow it to; and this means primarily the United States. So the UN 
can act if the US authorizes it and cannot act if the US blocks it”133. 
In securing their position as a superpower, the United States’ defense plans be-
tween the breakdown of the Soviet Union and 9/11 were mainly directed 
against military attacks from other nations (the most prominent example being 
the renewal of plans to establish a nationwide rocket defense system,  the “Stra-
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15th, 2004, URL: http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/182/
tegic Defense Initiative”, earlier known as the “Star War” project)134. After dec-
ades had been under the influence of the “battle of giants” idea, the dominance 
of the United States in world politics still seemed dependent on their ability to 
defend themselves against large scale military operations, and there was hardly 
another nation that seemed able to compromise the United States’ seemingly 
secure position.
2.2.2 Experiencing 9/11 as a media event: David and Goliath
When the world became witness to the Fall of the Towers in September 2001, 
the symbolic impact was undeniable: ‘the giant is going to his knees’, and it is 
not another giant who’s bringing him down. The world’s last remaining super-
power is not hit by an armada of nuclear submarines or an air fleet of high tech 
killing machines, but by less than 20 human beings who succeeded in what is 
commonly called a ‘surgical strike’135.
On a basic narrative level, this corresponds to the myth of David vs. Goliath: 
the huge, unbeatable giant is slain by a seemingly inferior adversary, and 
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Freedom of Information Act, 
see: http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/reading_room/179.pdf
135 In a symposium held in September 2002, one year after the attacks had taken place, 
Stephen W. van Evera, Associate Director of the MIT Center for International Studies, 
points out how surprised terrorism scholars were when 9/11 turned out to be: “...a 
very well-conducted, well-planned attack that showed great discipline, patience, ex-
traordinary ability to motivate and discipline cadres and keep them going in the right 
direction over a long period of time, be very patient, learn from past mistakes, it was a 
very impressive show...”. “Responses to 9-11: The United States, Europe, and the Mid-
dle East”, MIT Symposium, Sep. 9th 2002, URL: http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/31.
against all the odds, the weaker opponent does not only win the fight, he 
changes our perception of power fundamentally.
So, when on 9/11 what the world conceived to be Goliath went to its knees, the 
idea of the U.S. being the world’s huge parental figure - loved by some, hated 
by others, but acknowledged in their dominant position by all - crumbled, and 
with it the reassuring feeling that - for better or worse - the rules of future con-
flicts were known and established.
The mediated perception of the western world of this hurt Goliath was guided 
by perspective: every reaction, every news report, the whole mediated experi-
ence was guided by the fall of Goliath and its consequences, the media narra-
tives were ones of terror and insecurity and the strange feeling that prior as-
sumptions were built upon loose footing.
2.2.3 Experiential perspective(s) on 9/11
If David vs. Goliath is indeed a narrative model applicable to the events and 
myths of 9/11, it comes to mind that disappointment of the seemingly strong is 
only one perspective on this narrative. David vs. Goliath is usually discussed as 
a story about the weak conquering the strong, more as the story of David’s tri-
umph than Goliath’s fall. 
Triumph, however, was the last connotation 9/11 had in the western perception, 
and the news reports and debates in the western world were embossed by 
rather different feelings. In this version of the myth, we find ourselves witness 
of Goliath’s perspective, part of a world that was used to being more or less de-
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pendent on the fate of the United States and the responsibility with which they 
would use their power. 
But taking a step back, approaching 9/11 once again on the level of its the expe-
riential set up, it becomes obvious that the same set up can also be experienced 
from a different perspective. It does not need much argumentation to say that 
what has been etiquetted as “terrorism” in the western world, can be (and 
probably was) experienced as a war of liberation by many who sympathize, 
identify with or  even participate in undertakings like 9/11, those who experi-
enced the United States’ power not as a - desirable or problematic - comfort, but 
as a threat for their own values and beliefs. But even without speculating about 
motives or views only accessible from a cultural perspective that is not my own, 
it is safe to say that the same pictures that evoced terror and bewilderment for 
some were causing feelings of unexpected triumph for others.
In November 2001, only a few weeks after the attacks had taken place, french 
philosopher Jean Baudrillard published an article in Le Monde, which pre-
sented a very different view on 9/11. This different view, however, does not 
arise from a debate of whether 9/11 was really a terrorist act conducted by Al 
Kaida, or even the notion that the whole attack might never have taken place at 
all but might have been a hoax or conspirational deception - both being views 
that have come up shortly after 9/11 and stayed part of the 9/11 discourse until 
today136. 
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136 see Suzanne Bergers report on European discourses on 9/11 and Jeremy Presmans 
summarization of reactions in the Middle East in the same symposium cited above: 
“Responses to 9-11: The United States, Europe, and the Middle East”, MIT Symposium, 
Sep. 9th 2002, URL: http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/31. Berger specifically points out 
that the idea of 9/11 as a staged event was quite popular in the months after 9/11, at 
least in France, where Baudrillard’s article was originally published.
Baudrillard neither disregards the events themselves, nor questions that Al 
Kaida was responsible for planning and carrying out the attacks. Still, his 
evaluation is not guided by shock about Goliath’s fall, but shifts its perspective 
to the possibility of triumph about David’s victory: 
“Moral condemnation and the sacred union against terrorism are 
equal to the prodigious jubilation engendered by witnessing this 
global superpower being destroyed; better, by seeing it more or less 
self-destroying, even suiciding spectacularly.”137
The most heated dabates following Baudrillards article may be due to the fact 
that he does not simply allocate feelings of triumph to a group of fanaticist ter-
rorists, but insinuates that these feelings were almost naturally shared by eve-
ryone else - at least outside the United States:
“That we have dreamed of this event, that everybody without excep-
tion has dreamt of it, because everybody must dream of the destruc-
tion of any power hegemonic to that degree,   - this is unacceptable 
for Western moral conscience, but it is still a fact, and one which is 
justly measured by the pathetic violence of all those discourses 
which attempt to erase it.”138
While it is obvious that a far-reaching and incisive event like 9/11 can elicit a 
diversity of different feelings and opinions, the significance of the experience 
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by Rachel Bloul. URL: 
http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/the-spirit-of-terrorism/
138 Baudrillard, Jean: “The Spirit of Terrorism”, Le Monde, Nov. 2nd, 2001. Translation 
by Rachel Bloul. URL: 
http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/the-spirit-of-terrorism/
described in Baudrillard’s article for the present argument lies in the fact that - 
while it presents an experience almost opposite to that of insecurity and terror - 
it still is based on the same experiential set up, agreeing on the same initial 
combination of elements as a starting point for evaluation. 
Baudrillard’s conception about how 9/11 was experienced still perfectly correl-
lates with the myth of David vs. Goliath, the difference lies simply in a drastic 
shift of experiential perspective:  the experience becomes embossed by David’s 
success rather than Goliath’s defeat.
Both are perspectives on the same events - the strong defeated by the weak - but 
it is the perspective that decides upon the actual experience - terror or triumph. 
The contingency field opened up by 9/11 as a cultural narrative is still the same, 
but depending on perspective, very different experiences arise from it. 
2.2.4 Perspectives in western culture: the motion picture ‘Inde-
pendence Day’
But as yet, the possibility of different perspectives on the same experiential set 
up  is only argued based on assumptions about the reception of 9/11 outside 
the american culture. Even if Baudrillard’s argument represents a debate still 
anchored in what might fit the conception of “western culture”, this only shows 
that the term “western culture” is not necessarily encompassing a homogenu-
ous set of values, beliefs and, finally, experiential perspectives. To say the least, 
a french philosopher’s perspective does not necessarily have to fit the one taken 
by the north american public, mainstream U.S. media or government officials. 
The difference in perspective might still be based solely on the culture it arises 
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from, resulting from nothing more than a difference of values and beliefs that 
may distinguish what we regard as one culture from another.
If the experiential set up - the concurrence of elements that establish what is 
later circumscribed as a specific event, opening up a contingency field of mean-
ing even before values arising from perspective are applied to it - is to be exam-
ined conclusively, it may be useful to look for different experiential perspectives 
on the experiential set up that arise from the same cultural context.
Assuming that 9/11’s experiential set up is conclusively identified with the ref-
erence to the myth of David vs. Goliath, it is important to point out that this ex-
periential set up has its place in the contemporary cultural context of the west-
ern world, and is even known to the United States’ cultural arsenal specifically - 
not only from the perspective of the giant guiding the perception of 9/11, but 
also from the contrary perspective of the seemingly weaker but in the end tri-
umphant opponent.
When in the motion picture Independence Day (20th Century Fox, 1996) the world 
becomes victim of alien aggressors, the story quickly adds up to a confrontation 
between the United States and the alien invaders. While german-born director 
Roland Emmerich makes it clear that the aliens do not care about the balance of 
power on Earth, impartially covering the whole planet’s nations with their at-
tacks, the movie quickly focusses on the United States’ efforts to fight the in-
vaders tooth and nail - maybe an ironic statement on the previous U.S. centrism 
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of movie aliens, more probably a concession to a mainly american target audi-
ence139.
Uncompromisingly, the movie establishes the alien force as superior and invin-
cible. Without any effort, their spaceships annihilate one symbol of human cul-
ture after the other. Any attempt to defend against the attackers seems futile. 
Even the United States’ concerted military efforts turn out to be useless - here, 
the superpower topos is used to heighten the aliens’ superiority, as not even the 
collective U.S. war arsenal has any effect whatsoever on the alien forces 140. Ac-
cordingly, the overwhelming dominance of the invaders becomes emotionally 
tangible when their armada is presented in relation to what we are used to re-
gard as impressive examples of human achievement: even the empire state 
building looks naively fragile and small with a huge alien spaceship hovering 
over it. 
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139 When the U.S. President (Bill Pullman), converts the american independence day 
to a worldwide holiday, in celebrating the worlds independence from the alien attack-
ers, this may be regarded as a renounciation of U.S.-centric perspective on world poli-
tics. It may also be regarded as a patronising act, as it is still the american persident 
who presumes to declare a holiday not only for his country, but for the rest of the 
world. But apart from real life implications, the celebration of a new, worldwide “In-
dependence Day” implies a triumph of the opressed against a seemingly stronger 
agressor, which is the key element of an experiential set up I’ve come to describe in 
terms of “David vs. Goliath” in this text.
140 Especially for moviegoers, an enemy who turns out to be completely immune to 
this military arsenal must seem immensly powerful. Hollywood movies of the past few 
decades have made a point of the almost phantasmagorical power of the U.S. military 
arsenal, represented in the form of nuclear weapons, all-revealing satellites or mind-
controlling drugs, just to name a few. Examples include movies like Enemy of the State 
(1998), Jacob’s Ladder  (1990), The Sum of All Fears (2002), but do not solely focus on an 
arsenal directly related to military warfare: the television series C.S.I.: Crime Scene In-
vestigation, C.S.I.: Miami and C.S.I.: New York (CBS, 2000-; 2002-; 2004-), present criminal 
cases which are invariably solved through the application of a hilariously efficient ar-
senal of technological reconaissance devices.
This establishes a backdrop quite similar to the backdrop of 9/11 described 
above: a situation experienced in terms of power and helpnessness, the antago-
nism between victims and aggressors. The players have changed, the United 
States take the role of the weaker entity this time, but - again on the level of ex-
periential set up, disregarding the chosen perspective - the antagonism is the 
same, and so is the contingency field of possible outcomes: will the strong pre-
vail, or is there still a loophole for the suppressed? Only this time it is suggested 
to root for the suppressed, the tension arises from our hope for change, not from 
our clinging to the established. 
But the correlation does not end with the narrative’s backdrop. Just like 9/11, 
the myth of David vs. Goliath only comes to realization when the seemingly 
weak make their stand against their oppressor and - against the odds - the giant 
falls. After all efforts to defeat the dominant alien foe have failed, after a large-
scale military attack turns out to be just as ineffective as nuclear missiles and 
laser cannons, the tides finally turn. 
Stunningly similar to the hijacking of U.S. airplanes on 9/11, two humans seize 
control over one of the aliens’ own smaller vessels and with no hope of ever 
coming back enter the aliens’ mothership - an over-dimensioned symbol of 
power - and defeat the enemy from within by deactivating the alien fleet’s pro-
tective shields, leaving them open to attacks. The gigantic spacecraft goes 
down, and with it the armada of the alien spacefleet.
The victory is not one of power but of determination, as humankind celebrates 
its persistence against the aliens’ disdainfulness - David vs. Goliath, from the 
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perspective of the oppressed emerging victorious. And suddenly, feelings of 
triumph do not seem so far off.
The correlations between 9/11 as a cultural narrative and the motion picture 
Independence Day are obvious. They did even come natural to U.S. officials after 
the attacks and have been perpetuated by the media. But, for obvious reasons, 
this official perspective immediately tried to avoid the perspective of Goliath 
the Giant: seizing the suggestion of the 9/11 attacks as the outcome of the narra-
tive, the logical conclusion of a conflict, would automatically have suggested 
the legitimation of the attacks by putting the U.S. in the role of a violent agres-
sor, and the attackers as heroic freedom fighters - a perspective Jean Baudrillard 
chose to promote, but understandably unviable for the U.S. administration. In-
stead, the attacks of 9/11 were regarded as an initial attack, establishing a con-
flict rather than resulting from it. As Davide Girardelli points out:
“Intertextual references to Independence Day are [...] not only an as-
sociation between mere images [...], but are also functional in fram-
ing the events of 9/11 within a consistent ideological structure. This 
structure provides a definition of the problem: Bin Laden, like the 
aliens, attacked the homeland through irrational hatred; the Other is 
the enemy, we are innocent victims. It also provides the remedy: 
Through the reaffirmation of values such as patriotism and patriar-
chy the Other will be defeated; War is the right path to follow to re-
affirm these values because those who do not conform - such as the 
pacifists - will be annihilated.”141
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141 Girardelli, Davide: “‘Just Like Independence Day!’ - The Falling Towers On 9/11 
and the Hegemonic Function of Intertextuality”, conference paper presented at the an-
nual meeting of the International Communication Association, Sheraton New York, 
New York City, NY, May 25th 2009.
Contrary to Baudrillard’s perspective, Bin Laden now does not represent a 
Davidian liberation fighter, but a violent Goliath, who has yet to be defeated by 
David.  The David vs. Goliath myth culminates in the Giant’s fall as its out-
come, the colported morale of the story. Taking 9/11 as the result of previous 
events would have been a miserable interpretation for the self-conception of the 
United States. Only establishing 9/11 as the starting point for a later victory 
makes it possible to enable an experience of 9/11 that correlates with the U.S. 
public’s feelings of tragic and loss.
The reactions to 9/11 resulted from a perspective that enabled an experience on 
par with the experience of Independence Day:  in both cases, it was the U.S. who 
were attacked by powerful aggressors, and in both cases, the aggressor was to 
be finally defeated. The correlation between 9/11 and Independence Day is not 
sought in the happy ending of the movie, as 9/11 was not to be taken as the end 
of a story, leaving the U.S. in the role of a defeated oppressor represented by the 
alien starship and triumphantly defeated in Baudrillard’s sense. It is sought af-
ter in the early stages of the movie, when the Empire State building is destroyed 
by aliens, allowing the United States to be experienced as a victim, and the hor-
rible events as a prelude for things to come, as a legitimation for determined 
action. 
In a different context this would be an occasion to propose that any given con-
flict may not be solved based on a certain perspective, but that it is the taking of 
perspectives itself that establishes the conflict - therefore challenging Baudril-
lard’s argumentation and the U.S. administration’s alike for their shortfall of not 
taking the difference of perspectives into account and playing one against the 
other instead.
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In the context of this case study, however, the example may be put to better use 
as an illustration of how experiences might be approached in terms of applying 
an experiential perspective to a certain experiential set up, which again is con-
structed by defining a certain set of elements and assumptions about their inter-
relation as a specific ‘event’ or ‘topos’.
So, before moving back from experiences in general to the experience of games, 
what is the definition of experience that can be derived from the above argu-
ment?
2.2.5 Experiential set up and experiential perspective as building 
blocks of experience
According to the above argument, ‘experience’ may be regarded as a correlation 
of an experiential set up and an experiential perspective guiding confrontation 
with this set up.
The basic elements of David vs. Goliath, Independence Day, 9/11, from the per-
spective of the oppressed as well as the oppressors, all employ the topos of the 
weak battling the strong.
For the experiential set up it does not matter whether the weak defeats the 
strong or vice versa. It does not even matter whether we hope for the weak to 
persist and fear the strong might. Even before the outcome of the events is clear, 
and long before values are applied to one or the other outcome, the basic setup 
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opens up a contingency field of possibilities, thereby suggesting certain issues 
for later experience, and keeping others aloof - similar to the experience of Ro-
meo and Juliet, the narrative offers an opportunity to confront certain topics, 
regardless of the different ways this confrontation may be experienced.
In the following case studies, the differentiation between experiential set up and 
experiential perspective will be used as a starting point to assess the relation 
between a game’s fiction (it’s ‘theme’), the issues (or ‘meanings’) suggested by 
the game’s mechanics and the resulting possibility of emerging player experi-
ence. The second case study will examine the specific structure of mediated ex-
periences of ‘horror’, which will be tied to the more specific topos of the mod-
ern zombie genre, as it is prevalent in contemporary western culture. After the 
specific experiential set up of this topos has been investigated, the third case 
study will  discuss different game design strategies which can either suggest an 
according experience, or disregard it. This discussion will highlight the design 
differences between Survival Horror Games and (Massive Multiplayer) Online 
Roleplaying Games, arguing that the former suggest an ‘experience of horror’ 
by means of implemented game mechanics, while the latter, by the way they 
support quite different experiences of society and culture, render a ‘horror ex-
perience’ much more unlikely, a structural difference which may account for the 
absence of the contemporary zombie topos in Online Roleplaying Games.
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2.3 Second Case Study: 
Experiential set up of the ‘contemporary zombie 
topos’ and the ‘horror theme’
2.3.1 The traditional zombie topos
The most significant aspects of the contemporary conception about zombies be-
come apparent when compared to the traditional zombie mythology, most 
prominently found in Haitian voodoo culture. These poor creatures were seen 
less as a menace to society, than as a threat of punishment for those who didn’t 
follow societies’ rules. Usually under the spell of some kind of voodoo priest, 
serving them as slaves, they are unable to act on their own free will but con-
demned to obey their masters’ commands. 
While haitian voodoo may not be the first association in contemporary culture 
when the word “zombie” comes up, the idea of zombies as willingless victims is 
still common enough to make sense in popular culture. In a modern version of 
this traditional zombie topos, Neil Gaiman tells the story of a young man travel-
ling to New Orleans in search of cheap thrills and the secrets of voodoo:
“So he came into town with his Doors cassettes and his Crowley 
books, and his handwritten list of the secret URLs for chaos magick 
on the Web, and everything was good. He even got a few disciples, 
runaways like him, and he got his dick sucked whenever he wanted, 
and the world was good. And then he started to believe his own 
press. He thought he was the real thing. That he was the dude. He 
thought he was a big mean tiger-cat, not a little kitten. So he dug 
up...something...someone else wanted. He thought the something he 
dug up would look after him. Silly boy. And that night, he’s sitting in 
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Jackson Square, talking to the Tarot readers, telling them about Jim 
Morrison and the cabala, and someone taps him on the shoulder, and 
he turns, and someone blows powder into his face, and he breathes it 
in. Not all of it. And he is going to do something about it, when he 
realizes there’s nothing to be done, because he’s all paralyzed. 
There’s fugu fish and toad skin and ground bone and everything else 
in that powder, and he’s breathed it in. They take him down to emer-
gency, where they don’t do much for him, figuring him for a street 
rat with a drug problem, and by the next day he can move again, al-
though it’s two, three days until he can speak. Trouble is, he needs it. 
He wants it. He knows there’s some big secret in the zombie powder, 
and he was almost there. Some people say they mixed heroin with it, 
some shit like that, but they didn’t even need to do that. He wants it. 
And they told him they wouldn’t sell it to him. But if he did jobs for 
them, they’d give him a little zombie powder, to smoke, to sniff, to 
rub on his gums, to swallow. Sometimes they’d give him nasty jobs 
to do no one else wanted. Sometimes they’d just humiliate him be-
cause they could - make him eat dog shit from the gutter, maybe. Kill 
for them, maybe. Anything but die. All skin and bones. He’d do any-
thing for his zombie powder. And he still thinks, in the little bit of his 
head that’s still him, that he’s not a zombie. That he’s not dead, that 
there’s a threshold he hasn’t stepped over. But he crossed it long time 
ago.”142
Gaiman brings to the point what the traditional zombie topos evolves around: 
the zombie as a victim, punished for not playing to the rules. The young man, 
arrogantly trying to claim  the secrets of a culture not his own, crosses a border, 
and as a consequence his free will is taken from him, turning him into a mind-
less slave, and the most horrible thing about his punishment is the fact that - if 
nothing else - he’s just not really dead, that somewhere deep within, his desire 
for knowledge and power still persists, but without any chance to be fulfilled. 
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The traditional zombie is no immanent threat for others, he’s bereft of any kind 
of agency, and the scary thing about this idea of zombies is the idea that one 
might be dead and still existing, forever at the mercy of others as it’s not the 
loss of life that makes this kind of zombie, but the loss of free will. 
In haitian mythology, the possibility of transformation into a zombie has a dis-
ciplinary function, and the christian motive of hell comes to mind: behave, play 
by the rules, or else...! The disciplinary element of this kind of myth does not es-
tablish zombies as a threat to society, but saves them a place within society it-
self. These zombies do scare the living, but the scare is supposed to be an edu-
cational one, a reminder that anti-social behaviour will have consequences. 
Therefore, as Peter Dendle points out, “... the fear in Haitit is not of being 
harmed by a zombie, but of becoming one”143.
2.3.2 The contemporary zombie topos
But even if the traditional zombie topos still plays its little part in contemporary 
culture, since George A. Romero’s Night of the Living Dead (Laurel Group, 1968) 
established what I will call ‘the contemporary zombie topos’, the fear of zom-
bies is definitely of being harmed by one - or many. 
What does this contemporary zombie topos consist of, what has so drastically 
changed about the way we confront the idea of the living dead?
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“In earlier presentations, the zombie was a derivative creature, al-
ways under control of some other more intelligent being (voodoo 
master, mad scientist, vampire). Romero liberated the zombie from 
the shackles of a master, and invested his zombies not with a func-
tion (a job or task such as zombies were standardly given by voodoo 
priests), but rather a drive (eating flesh). [...] “Zombies thus become 
endowed with a highly physical, biological craving; they are no 
longer robotic machines, but gluttonous organisms demanding rep-
resentation in the food chain.”144
Contrary to the earlier, ‘traditional zombie’, which was always under (some-
body’s) control, ‘modern zombies’ are the epitome of the ‘uncontrollable force’. 
While earlier zombies were the outgrowth of a strict social rule set, they are 
now the counterpart of human society, not humans trapped in a voodoo trance, 
but “gluttonous organisms”, breaking down our cultural safety net, aiming not 
at warning us to follow the rules, but at devouring us piece by piece. 
Order, Chaos & Changing the Rules
Traditional zombies - as eerie as they may seem - have had their function in sus-
taining societal order. These new zombies evoke a very different association: 
Chaos.
But in a strange way, that’s not what these zombies are actually about. Contem-
porary zombies are not the embodiement of a world without rules. The rules 
these zombies are guided by may be simple and instinctual, but rules nonethe-
less: they are driven by the urge to feed, their sole goals being expansion and 
annihilation. They do not lack rules and the urge to follow them, but in their 
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basal, instinctual behaviour, what they do lack is social values. Whatever they 
do, they are not guided by consciousness, they do not make decisions based 
upon moral reflection. There is nothing they believe in, they simply exist.
Contrary to the rules and legitimizations any society seeks to establish, these 
modern zombies are simple biological organisms, and this is the big threat they 
pose. By sheer force, their single-mindedness threatens to (and in the movies, 
actually does) eradicate the societal frameworks humankind is so eager to es-
tablish. While in the traditional zombie topos, the idea of being turned into a 
willingless zombie functions as a societal threat - the zombie bereft of agency, 
therefore at the mercy of society - in the modern topos the zombie is a threat for 
society itself.
This is the key twist Romero gives the topos, and it becomes obvious in the way 
he uses the backdrop of a zombie outbreak in his movies. These are not movies 
about a fictional zombie outbreak, the outbreak is used as a means to create a 
situation in which society falls apart, and individuals are suddenly on their 
own. The individual insecurity Romero tries to evoke by creating a situation in 
which everything we tend to believe in proves to be wrong, and in which no 
new reassuring models of explanation are to be found, becomes especially tan-
gible about 60 minutes into Night of the Living Dead, when a group of survivors 
watches a newsreport on television. While the report constantly aims at giving 
its viewers the impression that the situation is getting under control (when the 
newsman states: “we are able to report a definite course of action. Civil defense 
machinery has been organized to provide rescue stations with food, shelter, 
medical treatment and protection by armed national guardsmen”), the report 
culminates in a supposedly reassuring official statement by members of the 
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commission assessing possible causes for the outbreak. In front of microphones 
and television cameras, the government officials and experts start to fight and 
contradict each other:
 Expert 1: 
“A very high degree of radiation...” 
Expert2: 
“...wait just a minute... I’m not sure that... that’s certain at all, I don’t 
think that that’s been...”
 Expert 3: 
“... the best explanation that we have at this time...”
When the sequence ends with the statement: “Everything is being done that can 
be done”, it is obvious that this is not much. 
The structures of society dissolve into perplexity, and it’s clear that it’s every 
man for himself for the time being. The rules have changed, but we don’t know 
the new rules, and there is no reason to believe we ever will. It’s easy to argue 
that the topic of Romero’s movies is less the immanent fright evoked by semi-
decomposed attackers going for one’s throat, but rather the more basic terror of 
being on one’s own, the fearful idea that our comforting beliefs are challenged, 
that we are no longer part of a society but must face our individual terrors 
alone.
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Horror as isolation, and society as its antidote
This does not make the modern zombie movie less of a horror tale. Rather, on a 
level that has earlier in this chapter been defined as the level of “experiential set 
up”, it makes a good example for the nature of any horror-experience.
Disregarding genre discussions and aiming rather at the “experience of horror”, 
author Stephen King defines horror not simply as the confrontation with fearful 
images or events, but as the experience of being apart from one’s fellow man, 
suddenly left on one’s own, or - according to the title of one of the earliest digi-
tal horror games - Alone in the Dark145:
“Horror, terror, fear, panic: these are the emotions which drive 
wedges between us, split us off from the crowd, and make us alone. 
It is paradoxical that feelings and emotions we associate with the 
‘mob instinct’ should do this, but crowds are lonely places to be, 
we’re told, a fellowship with no love in it. The melodies of the horror 
tale are simple and repetitive, and they are melodies of disestablish-
ment and disintegration...”146
On the level of experiential set up, this is the contingency field horror tales open 
up: the motive of being alone, cut off from “the others”, dependent on one’s 
own values and beliefs, as there is no one else around who cares. 
In Scott Edelman’s short story “Almost the Last Story by almost the Last Man”, 
this concept is not only applied as a blueprint of the narrative, it is made ex-
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plicit when the narrator tries to grasp the horrors he faces as he emerges from a 
library where he has spent the weeks after a zombie outbreak and discovers 
that he might be the last living human being on earth: 
“Isolated as I am, I can’t tell. I’ll never know. I guess that each of us, 
wherever we are, will appear to be the last to ourselves. And if we 
appear to be the last, then we are the last. But if by some miracle, I 
am not the last man telling the last story, if there are others who 
someday read these words, who have managed to restore a civiliza-
tion to this planet currently hovering between life and death, think of 
me from time to time as you go about your day. Think of us. I lived 
in a time of no hope, feeling there was no life outside my own, and 
with no new life to follow.”147
Edelman’s text not only highlights the feeling of isolation from other human be-
ings as the core concept of the ‘horror genre’, it also emphazises the isolation 
being one of ideas rather than physical solitude. Physically, the zombies offer a 
great opportunity for close contact with other beings. The narrator’s despair de-
rives from the realization that the zombies cannot share the narrator’s desire to 
formulate his ways of trying to make sense of the world. They are not interested 
in his stories, and without these stories, without the attempt to gather a com-
mon understanding of our perceptions with others, the mere concept of exis-
tence appears challenged:
“One thing I’ve been realizing, as my subconscious mind weaves life 
into art (well, let others decide if there’s any art there) is that all 
zombie stories are true. Also, no zombie stories are true. Because, 
you see, there are no zombie stories until I write them. The universe 
has no opinion of us. No matter how much we want to pretend, real 
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life does not contain the quality of story. No arcs, no morals, no 
meaning. Life is what we make of it.”148
An example for constructivist fiction on the one hand, the text confronts - on an 
anthropological level - the idea of societies as an effort to make sense of the 
world by sharing our ideas with others. Meaning is not inherent in life, it is a 
part of and a result from narrative constructions and social acts of negotiation. 
Without an audience, without society, life and our efforts to make sense of it be-
come meaningless. 
At the end of the story, the narrator seizes to exist not because he is killed, but 
because he stops writing his stories, concluding that our worlds only continue 
to exist if there’s somebody there to read about them:
“I’ve always known that fact, and the lesson it taught me is that my 
world will not continue to exist unless someone is there to read about 
it. That is why I have been creating these stories. That’s why I’ve al-
ways created stories. But I can’t do it any longer. I see that I have 
lived too long, have lived through the time of my usefulness out to 
the time beyond stories. 
I could keep trying to tell them, but what would be the point of that? 
It’s not worth remaining in a world without readers, and I doubt that 
you still exist. 
My world can survive my death. But it cannot survive yours.”149
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2.3.3 Romero’s zombies as epitome of horror
This core element of horror - the shortfall of society and the experience of being 
all alone - is the main drive behind any given horror tale. Equivalent to one of 
the most famous movie taglines: “In space, no one can hear you scream” (Alien, 
Brandywine/20th Century Fox, 1979), it’s the notion of “no one will believe you”, 
“no one will help you”, “there’s no one there to save you” that defines this feel-
ing of loneliness and isolation when it comes to the experience of horror.
In Nightmare on Elm Street (New Line Cinema, 1984), the homicidal maniac 
Freddy Krueger may be a scary figure. But it’s not his deadly ambitions that ac-
count for the horror experience. It’s the fact that, while the main character 
Nancy Thompson soon understands Krueger’s logic and is willing to take ac-
tion against his schemes, the world around her insists that she is making things 
up, and in misguided attempts to help her with her alleged mental problems, 
corrupt any of her attempts to survive Kruegers manhunt.
And, to draw on a more recent example, in the remake of The Texas Chainsaw 
Massacre (New Line Cinema, 2003), the chainsaw-wielding “Leatherface” is no 
doubt giving the protagonists a lot of trouble. But the horror arises when every 
single denizen of the small Texas town the fleeing youths approach for help 
turns out to be yet another maniac instead of offering a place of refuge. Even 
contacting the local police force turns out to be a deadly mistake, as the sheriff 
himself is no less than the killer’s father - and he supports his son’s whimsical 
urge to hunt as best he can.
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But while these tales of horror are dependent on narrative strategies, specific 
situations that arise from a series of events, the horror of Romero’s zombies 
does not lie in the narrative, but in the idea of zombies themselves: the concept 
of the Romero zombie establishes the dissolution of society long before a spe-
cific narration takes its course. 
The modern zombie as the epitome of the anti-social becomes apparent in a 
specific feature of these creatures’ constitution: the key function of the brain.
Brains as Minds, Brains as Lunch
“Night of the Living Dead’s most peculiar zombie innovation is the 
idea that zombies can be destroyed only by being shot in the head or 
by otherwise deactivating the brain core. This is consistent with the 
implied physicalism of the trilogy: however aberrent, the life force 
inhabitating the errant bodies is intrinsically connected with the 
physical brain process. Day of the Dead (1985) provides more detail: 
the brain is slowly rotting, and when the decomposition consumes 
the brain more entirely, the zombie will cease functioning.”150
The brain is the place where we tend to localize what makes us human. The 
threat of zombies may at first glance be a physical one - similar to the assaults of 
Freddy Krueger or “Leatherface” - but it is even the bigger as it explicitly arises 
from the same “black box” that we hold responsible for our idea of “being hu-
man”. It is what is commonly called “the human mind” that enables us to estab-
lish values and beliefs, thereby making sense of the world around us and - by 
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enhancing our perceptions with meaning - renders possible concepts of social 
interactions leading to what we call culture.
Unlike the brain’s function as host of ‘the mind’, the modern zombies’ drive is a 
last flicker of a decomposing brain, not a fulfilling of the functions we usually 
assign to it. It results from a malfunction, it is a reflex. Similar to the action 
tremor of dead fish or the stories of headless chicken still running, it is scary 
precisely because it cannot be explained by goals, functions or even the crea-
tures’ instinctive behaviour, but as a lifelike symptom for the absence of life - a 
lack of life not in terms of an organism’s ability to exist, survive and expand, 
but as the idea of human life as the notion of cultural existence. 
Most interestingly, Romero himself breaks down his own concept of the modern 
zombie, and he does it by re-introducing the idea of societies to the concept. In 
one of his more recent movies, Land of the Dead (Universal Pictures, 2005), he 
grants the zombies the ability to establish a society on their own. The birth of 
this ‘zombie nation’ begins the moment one of the zombies witnesses the 
slaughtering of his fellows by a group of bloodthirsty humans, and instead of 
defending himself, and contrary to what we used to believe about his species, 
experiences the humans’ sadism as cruel and unjust. Instead of acting out of re-
flexes and instincts, he makes a deliberate decision, initially defending his com-
panions, and finally making the effort of organizing the zombies in order to 
survive the humans’ cruelty. It is the moral decision of this special zombie that 
leads to the establishment of a basic society, and Romero’s statement is clear:  all 
culture starts off with values, and the moment decisions are based on values 
and beliefs, the transition from mere existence to culture has taken place.
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With this simple twist, Romero brings to the point what he has established as 
the modern zombie topos by challenging the concept with its own limits: what 
we are used to associate with the contemporary zombie is the absence of cul-
ture, the breakdown of values and beliefs mooring the individual in a context of 
societies. The moment the individual stops thinking of itself in its own terms 
only, it becomes a social being, and the duality of ‘self’ and ‘other’ becomes the 
driving force for its existence.
2.3.4 The appeal of horror: experiential set up
While the concept of a society breaking down, leaving the individual to himself, 
constitutes a horrifying  element in horror tales, it does not necessarily lead to a 
negative experience. On the level of experiential set up - the arrangement of 
elements that open up a contingency field of possible experiences before values 
and beliefs are applied and a perspective on these events is taken - it simply es-
tablishes a situation where individual actions are only legitimized by individual 
decisions, not by responsibilities for a society no longer in existence. 
When there’s no one left to tell me what to do, I’ll have to figure out my way on 
my own, and for my own good. “While the master was riding, the servants de-
cided to play”151, as the Alan Parsons Project put it, and there is undoubtedly 
some appeal in that. 
In these terms, the breakdown of societies opens up for experiences of ‘the Self’ 
- what is left of a person when they are stripped from any societal restraints, 
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dependend only upon themselves? This is well reflected on a physical level in 
zombie movies:
“A major concern of zombie movies is the stripping away of surface 
ornament, such that the insides are out, in body no less than in mind. 
The skin is unable to confine the organs, just as the cerebral cortex is 
no longer capable of controlling the reptile brain”152
And this is what Romero gets out of his staging of the modern zombie out-
break: the stripping of the individual from any social context. These are not 
tales of people trying to find their way amongst other human beings, but on a 
personal survival trip. When the world has gone crazy, there is no use for long-
term plans, any decision being a momentary reaction to imminent threats.
2.3.5 Experiential Set Up of the Modern Zombie Topos
On the level of experiential set up, the modern zombie topos disregards any 
kind of strategical thinking: any action is intended to survive the moment, as 
there is no use to plan ahead for a tomorrow that may never come. The thinking 
required in Romero’s vision of a zombie-infested world is merely tactical: stay-
ing alive is the motto of the day, and it does not matter how you do it, as long as 
you keep on living. There’s no one left who could judge you, and if you think 
too long about how your actions define yourself morally, you’ll end up dead. 
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So far to the experiential set up underlying narrative implementations of the 
contemporary zombie topos. But what about games? How can a game as a rule-
based system account for a similar experiential set up, opening up contingency 
fields of experience compatible with those promised by the modern zombie 
narrative?
Or, to put it another way, what are the elements on the level of game mechanics 
that can correlate with a fictional layer derived from the concept of (modern) 
zombies as an experience focussed on the individual, liberated from the secu-
rity and demands of society - and how can a game’s mechanics sometimes dis-
tinguish the gameplay experience from the experiential set up of the zombie to-
pos on a fictional level - the result most certainly being another experience than 
that of ‘horror’?
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2.4 Third Case Study: 
The ‘contemporary zombie topos’ in Survival Hor-
ror Games and MMORPGs 
On a fictional level - employed as a ‘theme’ - the contemporary zombie topos as 
outlined above has become a persistent motive in the genre of Survival Horror 
Games. This is not to say that there are no alternative themes the genre draws 
upon. In ObsCure (Hydravision Entertainment, 2004), a group of high school stu-
dents battles an army of mutated plants, which have escaped the school’s labo-
ratory and have developed a taste for blood; even though the game is often 
claimed to be inspired by the movie The Faculty (Los Hooligans Productions, 
1998), Robert Rodriguez’s tongue-in-cheek take on the ‘alien invasion’ motive, 
the game’s fictional backdrop actually shares the idea of ‘science gone wrong‘ 
with the contemporary zombie topos. Its experiential set up, however, is quite 
different, even though the idea of ‘horror as isolation’ is a strong motive in the 
game. In the Alone in the Dark Series (Infogrames, 1992-94), and most promi-
nently in the game Alone in the Dark: The New Nightmare (Darkworks, 2001), the 
backdrop of failed experiments gives way to mythological motives; while the 
creatures players fight in the game are again plant-like monsters, this time they 
are the offspring of ancient forces, who inhabited the world long before the 
‘dawn of man’. While the series is generally inspired by H.P. Lovecraft’s writ-
ings, The New Nightmare may also qualify as an adaptation of the ‘indian burial 
ground’ motive, which has its place in contemporary western horror culture at 
least since Tobe Hooper’s and Steven Spielberg’s movie Poltergeist (MGM, 1982). 
The underlying fictional backdrop of the game may therefore be argued as an 
180
evocation of post-colonial ‘bad consciousness’ regarding the suppression of   a 
country’s original inhabitants, and the fear of the re-emergence of a repressed 
past. In a much more introspective sense, this kind of fear also becomes a guid-
ing fictional element in the Silent Hill game-series (Konami, 1999-2004), in which 
the protagonist’s confrontation with his or her inner fears and suppressed 
memories constitutes the game’s story. Contrary to the above examples, this 
game’s fictional backdrop does not translate outward menaces into gameplay 
confrontations, it reflects the dark, subconscious spaces of the mind, from which 
the past may come back to haunt you.153
All these examples illustrate different adaptations of the ‘horror experience’ in 
the genre of Survival Horror Games. But on a fictional level, this experience is 
reflected mainly by means of narrative strategies: it is important to ‘get the 
story straight’ in order to appreciate how the experience of ‘horror’ enacted on 
a gameplay level is also reflected in the game’s fictional theme.  When it comes 
to the zombie topos, this appreciation does not have to rely on a certain struc-
ture of the ‘background story’. As has been argued above, the topos itself incor-
porates the idea of horror as isolation and societal breakdown, while the spe-
cific events taking place during the game’s unfolding narrative merely provide 
an additional consolidation of the theme.
There are of course examples of successful implementation of the zombie topos 
in digital games. These games are not successful simply because they add a fic-
tional layer of zombie fiction on otherwise straightforward action-oriented 
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153 see: Rusch, Doris C.: “Staring into the Abyss: a close reading of Silent Hill 2”, in: 
Davidson, Drew (Ed.): “Well Played 1.0 - Video Games, Value and Meaning”, ETC 
Press, 2009, p. 235-254.
gameplay possibilities. Rather, they operationalize basic elements resulting 
from the zombie topos (and the horror tale as defined above in general) as game 
mechanics, achieving a compliance between the fictional topos and the game-
play possibilities on the level of experiential set up. 
This ‘operationalization’ in form of a game’s mechanics and the resulting possi-
bilities of ‘actions and consequences’ have gradually become a key interest in 
the game studies discourse. Contrary to the idea of games as yet another form 
of narrative, relying on their fictional ‘themes’, the notion that it is the rules of a 
game, rather than it’s fictional layer, that enables the emergence of experiences 
has been acknowledged as a ‘new form’ of mediated meaning generation, as Ian 
Bogost points out:
“I call this new form procedural rhetoric, the art of persuasion through 
rule-based representations and interactions rather than the spoken 
word, writing, images, or moving pictures. This type of persuasion is 
tied to the core affordances of the computer: computers run proc-
esses, they execute calculations and rule-based symbolic 
manipulations.”154
With a focus on gameplay genres, zombie games like the classical Resident Evil 
Series (Capcom, 1996-2004)155, Dead Rising (Capcom, 2006) or Left 4 Dead (Valve 
Corporation, 2008) seem to form quite diverse examples for different game me-
chanics enabling gameplay experiences. However, focussing on the experiential 
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155 The Resident Evil games produced before 2005 are prime examples for the Survival 
Horror genre. Beginning with Resident Evil 4 (Capcom, 2005), the series has been subject 
to significant changes in the games’ mechanics, which to discuss is not the aim of this 
chapter. The reference to the series, however, specifically refers to the earlier games.
set up of these zombie games, it will be argued that each of these games con-
stitutes a different way to conform with the experiential set up of the modern 
zombie topos as defined above.
The siginficance of these strategies will be clarified in comparison to the experi-
ential set up of another game form, the genre of Role Playing Games (RPGs), or 
more specifically Massive Multiplayer Online Roleplaying Games (MMORPGs). 
While there seems to be a wide area of fictional topoi employed as backdrops 
for these kinds of games (fantasy settings like Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings or 
Star Wars, Science Fiction settings like Star Trek or The Matrix, or more general 
topoi like pirates, vampires and werewolves), there is no RPG making use of the 
modern zombie topos as a fictional backdrop (even if on a representational 
level, zombies are sometimes encountered as enemies or even playable charac-
ters in RPG’s, as in the case of World of Warcraft).
This assessment will be limited to the specific differences between Survival 
Horror Games and MMORPGs in regard to their consistency with an ‘experi-
ence of horror’, which has been discussed above, in contrast to the support of 
experiences of societal responsibility and commitment. 
Extensive studies of the ‘procedural rhetorics’ in digital games have already 
been conducted, and even the ‘procedural adaptation’ of the zombie topos in 
Survival Horror Games - with a focus on the Resident Evil and Dead Rising 
games - has been the angle of a thorough investigation156, which takes an exten-
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Resident Evil, and Dead Rising”, in: Perron, Bernard: “Horror Video Games. Essays on 
the Fusion of Fear and Play”, McFarland, Jefferson, N.C., 2009, p.238-266.
sive look on the genre and the way it re-models the experience of Romero’s 
movies as sets of possible actions and consequences.
In the third case study, which will conclude this chapter, I will therefore single 
out a very specific element which quite articulately illustrates how game design 
strategies may suggest or deny different player experiences.
It will be argued that the mechanics and design of RPG’s, by reflecting a fic-
tional backdrop that offers matters of society for debate, do not conform with 
the experiential set up of the modern zombie topos, which on the contrary 
opens up for experiencing the individual while pushing matters of society and 
its rules to the background. This ‘experience of the Self’, however, is strongly 
supported by the mechanics and design common in ‘Survival Horror Games’, 
which promote the enactment of much more self reliant strategies and behav-
iour, while eclipsing the confrontation with matters of society, responsibility 
and commitment. In order to illustrate these different implications of a game’s 
possibilities of ‘actions and consequences’, the case study will focus on the dif-
ferent uses of inventory space, which will be argued as a  distinct example for 
the distinguishing features of the different game genres.
2.4.1 Items and Inventory in Survival Horror Games: Make do 
with what you got
One of the first things that stand out when comparing Survival Horror Games 
to RPG’s is the fact that they present two very different challenges when it 
comes to item- and inventory management. Survival Horror Games usually of-
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fer players very limited inventory space. In the original Resident Evil series, 
players had to make do with 4 to 6 slots in their inventory, and this hasn’t 
changed much. In a game in which one constantly stumbles upon items that 
may be helpful and promise to be important ressources in defeating enemies 
and surviving (different kinds of weapons, ammunition, health items etc.), this 
primarily leads to one thing: sacrifice. 
In a Resident Evil game, the player might find a very powerful grenade launcher, 
which brings enemies down with one shot. But there are only three rounds of 
ammo to go with it. This means the player has to sacrifice one or even two in-
ventory slots for a weapon that guarentees an instant kill - but only for the next 
three enemies. Probably, the player will rather drop the super-weapon and stick 
with her simple handgun, which is much less powerful and unreliable, but 
contrary to the grenade launcher, carrying the gun and, say, 60 bullets, will 
leave the player prepared for a longer time and still use up only two inventory 
slots. 
In the Dead Rising (Capcom, 2006), which has already been discussed in an ear-
lier chapter, players start with only four inventory slots, which can be upgraded 
to a maximum of 12 slots during the game. While this is slightly more than 
Resident Evil players are used to, item management in Dead Rising is not only a 
challenge due to limited inventory space. The game enables the player to pick 
up a multitude of items found in the zombie infested shopping mall and use 
them to kill zombies. Many of these items are not traditional “weapons” like 
those usually found in the Resident Evil series, but household items like frying 
pans, chairs or television sets. As most of these items represent large and sturdy 
objects, they cannot be stored in the inventory like the more common objects 
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(guns, food or books, which will be discussed later). The player can pick up one 
of these items, carry it around, use it against zombies and drop it. While she is 
holding the item, however, she cannot access her inventory without dropping 
the item. 
The other limiting factor concerning items in Dead Rising is the fact that most of 
these items have limited durability. Even a steel pipe (an almost ‘traditional ‘ 
weapon in the survival horror genre) can only be used a limited time before it 
breaks - qualifying Dead Rising zombies as the most resilient in the history of 
the zombie game. 
Instead of preparing for a fight by choosing the most suitable weapon from her 
inventory, the player will often find herself surrounded by hordes of zombies, 
pick up a microwave oven and use it to bash some of the zombies until it 
breaks, then turn around and pick up a cash register to continue - using every 
item as long as possible before it breaks.
This is where books come into play. Just like food and weapons, the player can 
find a variety of books in different bookstores located around the mall. The 
purpose of these books is to provide bonuses to certain skills, the most impor-
tant bonus regarding items being the ability to use certain items three times 
longer before they break. There is, however, no book that provides a bonus for 
all kinds of weapons; specific kinds of books also provide durability bonusses 
for specific kinds of items. The “hobby” book for example (presumably advi-
sory literature on how to spend your leisure time), provides a durability bonus 
for “toys” like a boomerang, a toy bear or a toy laser sword (which actually can 
be used to kill zombies). The “sports” book provides a durability bonus for 
sports equipment like baseball bats, dumbbells or bowling balls, while the “en-
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tertainment” book expands the durability of items like television sets or musical 
instruments.
Some items benefit from more than one book, multiplying the durability of the 
item. The small chainsaw, for example, can get the durability bonus from 3 dif-
ferent books (“entertainment”, “engineering” and “criminal biography”), boost-
ing its durability to last 27 times longer than usual. While this makes the small 
chainsaw one of the most powerful weapons in the game, it also significantly 
limits inventory space: to get the full bonus, the player must carry the chainsaw 
and each of the three books, thereby sacrificing 4 precious inventory slots for 
one powerful item.
In the game Left 4 Dead (Valve Corporation, 2008), the game design goes even a 
bit further in suggesting a short-term, tactical playstyle when it comes to inven-
tory.  In different scenarios players can form groups of four via the internet to 
try and escape a zombie infested city through the streets, the city’s suburbs, its 
airport and the surrounding woodlands. More in the tradition of cooperative 
ego-shooters than classical survival horror games, there is no inventory at all. 
Apart from pistols, which provide a weak, if reliable backup weapon, players 
can carry one firearm, one grenade type weapon and one health item at a time. 
Every time a weapon is picked up, the previous weapon has to be dropped, and 
the player has to stick with the decision until another weapon can be found. But 
the choice of a single weapon is not the only element favoring short-term tacti-
cal over long-term strategical thinking: contrary to most survival horror games, 
ammunition is not a seperate item which has to be managed in addition to 
weapons. Every time a weapon is picked up, it automatically comes with full 
ammo, and switching a weapon for another one and immediately switching 
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back also restores the previous weapons full ammunition. Even the limited stra-
tegical consideration whether to choose a weapon because I already carry 
around plenty of ammunition for this specific weapon becomes obsolete. This 
does not mean that the game provides unlimited ammo at all times, as the 
switching of weapons can only take place at designated weapon stashes located 
at certain spots in the game (which also vary every time the game is played). If 
a player runs out of ammo at some point, she will have to try and reach the next 
weapon stash before she can reload, having to rely on her much less potent 
handgun for the time.  
The linking of supplies to a fragmentation of the gameplay course constitutes a 
persuasive implementation of an experiential set up suggesting a short-term 
tactical playstyle, enabling an experience of ‘every man for himself’ even more 
convincingly than the limitation of supplies in more ‘conventional’ survival 
horror games.
At the beginning of a mission, players don’t have to focus on the longer-term 
goal of reaching the end of the level, but just on getting to the next weapon 
stash alive, where everybody can gear up again, pick up new weapons and 
ammunition, grab a first aid kit and make a fresh start into the next section of 
the map.
While the limitation of supplies and inventory, as in the Resident Evil series, still 
calls for a fair amount of strategy, even if one cannot plan ahead for a long pe-
riod of time, the linking of supplies to a string of supply stashes throughout the 
game map strongly supports a ‘step by step’ gameplay.
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In all three examples, the limitation or absence of inventory space, the restricted 
availability of supplies or the fragility of items lead to very short-term, tactical 
decisions: the ‘I have to make do with what I got’ effect. Will I take the grenade 
launcher with me because there seems to be a very strong opponent coming up, 
or do I leave this powerful weapon behind, because at this moment, the hand-
gun makes more sense? Do I run for cover, or do I pick up the television set to 
bash a few zombies out of the way? Will the pumpgun be my best choice to get 
around the next corner alive, or will the sniper rifle get me further?
2.4.2 Inventory Space in (MMO)RPGs: Pick your battles (several 
answers possible)
In RPGs, the challenge concerning item and inventory management is very dif-
ferent. Contrary to the limitation of available items and scarce inventory space 
common in survival horror games, RPGs offer a huge amount of items accessi-
ble to the player, and inventory management is not challenging due to a restric-
tion of available space, but due to the magnitude of inventories.
A Level 80 character in Everquest 2 (Sony Online Entertainment, 2004), for exam-
ple, has to manage almost 900 inventory slots (my Assassin Kendrick currently 
owns twenty 36-slot boxes and six 28-slot bags, which adds up to a total of 880 
inventory slots). This is not counting alternate characters (“alts”) or guild inven-
tory. As certain items can be “stacked” in amounts of up to 100 pieces of the 
same item per slot, this amounts to a vast number of items a player has to man-
age.
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And in the popular MMORPG World of Warcraft (Blizzard Entertainment, 2004), 
inventory seems a challenge due to its limitation only in the early stages of the 
game. The initial inventory space of 44 slots (the character’s basic 16-slot bag 
and 28 additional slots in the bank vault) seems to call for item sacrifice. As 
characters advance, however, inventory space grows immensely. By equipping 
the highest-level bags in the game, by expanding the bank vault and by forming 
a guild, which grants access to an expandable guild bank, inventory space can 
be increased to up to 874 inventory slots. 
The fact that most RPGs offer only limited inventory space in the beginning of 
the game might partly be due to the fact that designers try to give players a 
chance to grow accustomed to inventory management before challenging them 
with huge numbers of items and inventory slots. But the gradual expansion of 
inventory space may also be argued to establish the value of inventory space in 
the game, as most players will first meet the limits of their current inventory be-
fore deciding that larger bags or more complex strategies to manage their items 
might be a worthwhile sub-goal at the current stage of the game.
Still, due to the complexity of the game and the huge number of different items 
acquired throughout and useful in the game, players very often meet the limits 
of their seemingly huge inventories. Many players create a number of alternate 
characters specifically in order to make use of additional bags and bank vaults, 
thereby multiplying inventory space. To keep track of these enormous number 
of items they have to manage, some players make use of specific “add-ons”, 
small programs that can be intergrated into the game offering additional inter-
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face options. One example is Altoholic157, an add-on that lets players keep track 
of all the items scattered between their different characters’ inventories. Alto-
holic also lets players see all the items that have been sent via in-game mail 
from one character to another and are being intermediately stored in the 
recipient-character’s mailbox, a strategy which bypasses inventory restrictions 
and provides virtually unlimited inventory space.
The challenge RPGs present to players in regard to inventory management does 
not call for sacrifice. The question here is not which item to disregard in favor of 
another one, but which item to place in which bag, how to arrange the inven-
tory so items can be found again when needed, and how to develop and keep 
track of complex inventory management systems: which items will be useful for 
the next tasks in the game, which items might be needed later, which items 
should be set aside for another character? This calls for long-term strategical 
thinking, and for always keeping in mind that everything found in the game, 
while useless at the moment, might be useful later. 
Contrary to the short-term tactical thinking required in Survival Horror Games, 
this conforms much more to the idea of societies and culture: current actions 
will have consequences much later in the game, one has to keep different fac-
tors and needs in mind as one aims to plan ahead and provide for the future. 
This becomes even more apparent when different characters are involved:
For instance, playing an assassin-class character, a player might stumble upon 
an item that can only be used by a conjurer-class character, therefore being 
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completely useless to the character and the current gameplay. Still, the player 
might decide to keep the item instead of discarding or selling it, as she is plan-
ning on creating a conjurer-character at a later date, and the item might be a 
great start for this different game. 
This might well resembles the idea of progeny and heritage: in the role of one 
character, players aim their actions not only at this character’s personal well-
being, but keep in mind that they might want to provide a ‘secure footing’ for 
their ‘descendants’: just like saving up my money so ‘the kids will have a better 
start in life than I myself had’.
2.5 Summary: constructing experiences
The affordances of (MMO)RPGs in regard to item and inventory management 
have proven to be quite different to those of Survival Horror Games. It has been 
argued how this difference also supports very different experiences for players. 
As the experiential set up of Survival Horror Games highlights matters of indi-
vidual success, self-dependency and, finally, isolation (thereby modeling a 
clear-cut ‘experience of horror’, as it has been defined above), they enable  ex-
periences of the self, of short-term tactical thinking and personal moment-to-
moment survival in a world where society’s rules and demands have broken 
down. 
Contrary to this, the much more complex challenge of item- and inventory 
management in Online Roleplaying Games have been shown to support long-
term strategical thinking, integrating the idea of sacrifice for one’s peers (even if 
they are simply the player’s own alternate characters) into the gameplay, and 
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require careful planning and deliberate, sustainable decisions. Accordingly, 
these games open up issues of commitment and responsibility, of using one’s 
part in life not only for short-term success, but also as a way to provide for the 
future, keeping in mind that one has to plan ahead for tomorrow. These issues, 
which have been shown to be strongly suggested by the game’s mechanics, en-
able experiences that resemble matters of the individual embedded in society, 
supporting the negotiation of personal desires within a societal framework, and 
thereby disregarding an ‘experience of the Self’ which is so central to Survival 
Horror Games.
This difference may well account for the lack of the ‘contemporary zombie to-
pos’ in the realm of Online Roleplaying Games. The experiential set up of this 
topos, which has been examined in the second case study, stands in direct op-
position to the experiential set up of Online Roleplaying Games, while being 
consistent with the set up common in Survival Horror Games. The deficiency 
analysis, however, has also shown how a differentiation between experiential 
set up and experiential perspective, as it has been argued in the first case study, 
can provide a fruitful perspective on the construction of experiences. While the 
concept of ‘experiential set up’ can highlight the elements and relations of a 
specific topic or event, which provide the ‘building blocks’ of subsequent expe-
riences, it is the ‘experiential perspective’ which, through the application of 
specific ‘values and beliefs’, determines the actual experience.
This idea of an ‘experiential set up’, however, does not imply a realist notion of 
‘topics and events’; these, too, must be considered as results of construction 
processes, which single out a certain set of elements and relations as a specific 
topic or event. The ‘experiential set up’, therefore, complies with the notion of 
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‘first order realities’, while the application of values and beliefs constitutes a 
level of ‘second order realities’, on which an ‘experiential perspective’ may be 
applied. As a manifestation of ‘first order realities’, the ‘experiential set up’ does 
not constitute an objective factuality, but is again a result of social and cultural 
negotiations and agreements; this constructedness is reflected in the second case 
study’s examination of various examples of cultural production, which may all 
have played their part in establishing the ‘contemporary zombie topos’ as a 
constant in western culture.
While the distinction between ‘experiential set up’ and ‘experiential perspec-
tive’ can therefore serve as a viable approach for addressing the transition be-
tween mediated events and the experiences they may support or neglect, it only 
goes so far as a theoretical and methodical tool for the assessment of play expe-
riences: if even the set up of experiences, which constitutes what is experienced, 
is a result of cognitive construction processes, how can these basic processes of 
construction be assessed in an adequate way?
The next chapter will address this problem by digging even deeper than a dif-
ferentiation between ‘experiential set up’ and ‘experiential perspective’ allows 
for. In the aim to answer the underlying question of this thesis - ‘Why do people 
play games?’ - the focus of this chapter will be on the cognitive processes un-
derlying the organization of experiences, and by highlighting the emergence of 
pleasure and satisfaction, it will be attempted to develop a viable model of hu-
man experience which may shed a light on the guiding issue of this thesis: the 
‘play experience’.
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Part 3: 
The Play Experience
"The eternal problem of the human being 
is how to structure his waking hours."
(Eric Berne)158
3.1 Play, Satisfaction and Anthropology
In the previous chapter it has been argued that a focus on player experiences 
may heighten our understanding of games and game-related phenomena. 
A distinction between the ‘experiential set up’ on a level of first order realities 
and the ‘experiential perspective’ arising from the application of values and be-
liefs as the construction of realities of second order has been suggested in order 
to make the emergence of experiences from (mediated) events and, finally, 
games more tangible.
Still, at this point the distinction between these two levels constituting experi-
encse is no more than a useful methodical assumption, a way to approach cer-
tain questions in order to reach more satisfying conclusions, a viable tool at 
best.
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In the following chapter the assessment of play experiences will be expanded to 
address one of the more basic questions of digital games research, a question 
which Simon Egenfeldt Nielsen has labeled as one of the “larger questions” de-
fining the field of computer game studies:
“Another question central to game studies is this: “Why are there 
games?” Why do we, biological entities capable of creating poetry, 
climbing mountains, and splitting the atom, spend so much time 
playing games - especially when playing these games often conflict 
[sic] with our basic human needs: to sleep, to feed ourselves, to 
communicate with our spouses? We don’t know. Or rather, the ques-
tion has sparked surprisingly little interest and no consensus exists. 
However, some answers have been proposed, and, not unreasonably, 
they tend to be rooted in biology. They usually go something like 
this: the ability to play allows organisms to simulate reallife situa-
tions. Through these simulations, the organism can practice impor-
tant skills in relative safety. The individual with a disposition to-
wards play then has an adaptive advantage over those lacking this 
disposition; natural selection takes care of the rest. The individual 
who practices throwing his spear in his spare time stands a better 
chance of survival when a sabre-tooth tiger attacks. Such an answer, 
though sensible, is not comprehensive. While evolutionary biology, 
for instance, may explain why there are games, it does not explain 
very clearly why our games look the way they do. Nor does it ex-
plain why people like different games and display such an enormous 
range of attitudes about the very act of playing games.”159
So, why do people play games? In the context of this thesis, I will refrain from 
approaching this question from a viewpoint “rooted in biology”. The reason for 
this is simple. The biological approach towards play and games contains a sim-
ple, yet far-reaching safeguard against the problems this question bears for the 
discipline of games studies: the utilitarian explanatory models for the human 
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affinity towards play Egenfeldt Nielsen mentions employ (or, at least, imply) a 
definition of play and games that is different from the definitions that underly 
the field of game studies. The terms “play” and “game” are applied in both 
cases, but they are used to define different phenomena. 
3.1.1 Who defines “games” ?
Following the idea that any academic discipline presents a “small universe”160 
which defines itself by first defining and negotiating its object of research and 
the strategies adequate for conducting this research, the discipline of game 
studies, as broad as it may be, is constituted by a set of assumptions about what 
criteria have to be met by something before it meets the requirements of “play” 
and “games” in the context of game studies. 
When game designer Will Wright talks about the emerging of game studies as 
an academic discipline, slowly but assertively laying claim to what has hitherto 
been considered as a craft at best, he rightly employs metaphors of building 
bridges and developing a language rather than the finding of absolute truths:
“The bridges between the game industry and the academics that 
want to study and teach games are slowly beginning to form. A 
shared language is developing, allowing both sides to speak about 
games and helping developers to more easily share their experiences 
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with one another. It is in this language that the students of tomorrow 
will be taught.”161
This shared language, this negotiation of defininitions, is not only beneficial as 
it helps to internally structure a discipline and makes it possible to exchange 
ideas based on mutual assumptions, it also delineates game studies from other 
disciplines, which define an object of research in their own specific way.
Hence, the question is not simply: “what is a game?” but rather: “what is de-
fined as a game in the context of game studies?”. One central factor by which 
the discipline of game studies defines its object of research is the assumption 
that games ‘do not have a function’, meaning that playing a game - while it 
provides certain benefits, or the game wouldn’t be played - does not serve a 
purpose which lies outside of the game world. It is this idea of ‘games being 
without purpose’ that contradicts the assumptions underlying the biological 
approach mentioned by Egenfeldt Nielsen, which seeks to understand play 
through its function to allow organisms to ‘simulate real life simulations’, 
aimed at an ‘adaptive advantage’, and thereby relies on understanding play 
through its function, its ‘purpose’.
In the game studies discourse, however, the notion of ‘games being without 
purpose’ is a central and persistent argument. Historical theories of play and 
games clearly emphasize the absence of purpose in their definitions. While it 
has been argued in an earlier chapter that Johan Huizinga implicitly contradicts 
this notion in his study on ‘the play element in culture’, his initial definition ex-
200
161 Wright, Will, in: Koster, Raph: A Theory of Fun for Game Design”, Paraglyph Press, 
Scottsdale, Az., 2005, p. viii.
plicitly includes the idea that “play is superfluous”162 and thereby without pur-
pose, while Roger Caillois’ definition is even more to the point by stating that 
play is simply “unproductive”163. 
While the pitfalls of delineating conceptions in regard to the idea of ‘play’ have 
been discussed in an earlier chapter, the notion of ‘games’ as rule-based systems 
which have no apparent ‘purpose’ can be argued as a basic assumption defining 
the game studies discourse. This assumption, however, may still be a bit mis-
leading. Of course, any ‘positive effect’ that is perceived as part of playing a 
game within the play activity can also effect the player’s life outside the game. 
But what leads game scholars to the agreement upon the constituting nature of 
the ‘purposelessness of games’ is the perception that these positive effects are 
just that: they are effects of, not reasons for playing the game. 
While theoretical - and definitory - discussions about the criteria constituting 
“games” and “play” have led to a wide range of different conceptions - and 
even the ‘purposelessness of games’ is increasingly challenged when it comes to 
‘serious ‘or ‘persuasive games’164, the notion that desired positive effects might 
be an explanation why games are played is simply not viable in the context of 
game studies as an academic discipline. Even though games might be designed 
for a specific purpose, the desire to instill a productive purpose in games can 
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only be ascribed to the game’s producers, not its players; the notion that games 
might serve a purpose may explain why specific games are made, not why they 
are played. The moment players engage in a game because they expect a produc-
tive outcome outside of the game world, the experience disqualifies itself as a 
manifestation of play as it is defined and employed in the game studies dis-
course. 
But if playing games by definition does not provide a productive benefit for 
their players, what else can be the reason people willingly, regularly and even 
joyfully engage in this activity? An obvious answer might be the idea that 
games are ‘fun’. But while playing games can at some times certainly be fun, 
this concept provides only a limited explanation for humans’ desire to play. 
Players who spend hours organizing their inventory in MMORPGs may do this 
with a joyful and dedicated attitude, but it is doubtful that this experience is 
adequately being described as ‘fun’; and when a challenging sequence of an ac-
tion game is attempted over and over again until players finally succeed and 
can move on to the next level, the experience of constantly being on the verge of 
frustration puts the idea of ‘fun’ in even greater distance.
A possible alternative to the idea of ‘fun’ suggests itself in Raph Koster’s at-
tempt to assess the seductive power of games. While Koster explicitly names 
this attempt ‘A Theory of Fun’, in the course of his argument a much more en-
compassing concept seems to emerge:
“Fun is all about our brains feeling good - the release of endorphins 
into our systems. The various cocktails of chemicals released in dif-
ferent ways are basically all the same. Science has shown that the 
pleasurable chills that we get down the spine after exceptionally 
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powerful music or a really great book are caused by the same sort of 
chemicals we get when we have cocaine, an orgasm, or chocolate. 
One of the subtlest releases of chemicals is at the moment of triumph 
when we learn something or master a task. [...] Fun from games 
arises out of mastery. It arises out of comprehension. It is the act of 
solving puzzles that makes games fun.”165
Contrary to the explicit use of the term ‘fun’, Koster implicitly describes what 
may better be expressed in terms of ‘pleasure’ and ‘satisfaction’. Koster’s argu-
ment, which is based on the assumption that the human mind’s primary func-
tion is that of ‘pattern recognition’, emphasizes the satisfying experience of 
‘things falling into place’, of succeeding in making sense of our perceptions of 
the world. Contrary to the idea of ‘fun’, which is a very specific manifestation of 
pleasurable experiences, pleasure and satisfaction seem to provide much more 
extensive concepts for the assessment of play as a seductive experience.
But while Koster’s argument draws the attention to pleasure and satisfaction, 
these concepts again require a closer examination before they can provide vi-
able explanations for the seductive power of play. What is needed is a model of 
human experience that accounts for both, the emergence of pleasure and satis-
faction, and the specific nature of play experiences. Again, Koster’s reference to 
chemical processes only goes so far. The production of endorphins may provide 
a neurobiological basis for the feeling of pleasure166, but in order to make the 
question ‘Why do people play games?’ tangible, an adequate model for this as-
sessment must incorporate the construction of experiences as a prerequisite for 
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the emergence of pleasure and satisfaction, while at the same time providing a 
conclusive model of ‘play’. 
Before an according model will be developed, however, it seems noteworthy 
that experiences of pleasure and satisfaction have already emerged as an issue 
relevant to constructivist debates, and the way these concepts are discussed al-
ready hints at a connection between ‘pleasure’ and ‘satisfaction’ on the one 
hand, and the specific qualities of ‘play’.
3.1.2 Levels of satisfaction: Ernst von Glasersfeld and ‘curiosity’
After holding a talk about constructivist perspectives on learning167  in the 
autumn of 2009, Ernst von Glasersfeld was asked how he would explain the 
idea of ‘curiosity’, or more specifically: ‘how to explain the apparent human de-
sire for learning’. Glasersfeld chose to give two answers to that question: the 
first answer draws on Jean Piaget’s theory of learning, and highlights the as-
sumption that humans are motivated by the desire to overcome obstacles and, 
more generally, avoid unpleasant experiences. Learning promises to provide 
strategies that enable this ‘successful behaviour’. Similar to the biological con-
ception of ‘play’, this explanation is based on the idea that learning is acknowl-
edged as purposeful and, therefore, regarded as a desirable experience. 
In regard to the pleasurable and satisfying experience of play, Glasersfeld’s sec-
ond answer is far more significant: by stating that it is simply satisfying to solve 
problems, Glasersfeld picks up on one of three ‘types of learning’ that he dis-
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cussed earlier in his talk: ‘learning by abduction’. According to this concept, 
when people are confronted with new problems, they intuitively imagine ‘simi-
lar’ problems, and test different hypotheses against these imaginary problems 
in order to reach viable solutions for the problem at hand. According to Glasers-
feld, it is this process of problem solving which is deeply satisfying, regardless 
of the problem’s actual significance as a limitation of pleasure.  The idea that 
this process of solving ‘virtual problems’ may in itself be a satisfying experi-
ence, even if no ‘actual problem’ is solved, hints at a possible relation between 
pleasure and satisfaction on the one hand, and experiences of play and games 
on the other. Contrary to the notion of overcoming obstacles as an attempt to 
avoid unpleasant experiences, this focus on problem solving as an inherently 
satisfying experience addresses one of the key issues when it comes to ques-
tions of games and play: why are players so eager to play games in order to 
solve problems that wouldn’t pose themselves if the game wasn’t played in the 
first place? ‘Game problems’ do not present obstacles for a successful and 
pleasant life, they are hypothetical problems, taking the form of artificial puz-
zles or challenges, which seem to be solved for the sake of problem solving 
alone.
But why is it pleasant and satisfying to solve problems one doesn’t really have?
An attempt to address this question needs to consider both of Glasersfeld’s an-
swers. Given that it is desirable to solve what we experience as problems, and 
to overcome what we regard as obstacles to our well-being, this desire calls for 
strategies or ‘tools’ which enable this ‘successful behaviour’. And it is obvious 
that the successful application of these tools provides pleasure and satisfaction, 
simply because this success consists in the avoidance of unpleasurable experi-
Nikolaus König:  The Play Experience
205
ences - hence, in regard to ‘actual problems’, Glasersfeld’s first, pragmatic an-
swer seems sufficient.
But pleasure does not only emerge from the successful elimination of ‘actual 
problems’, problems which threaten to endanger our well-being . By applying 
certain tools and strategies to a problem, these tools and strategies can them-
selves be tested, expanded or re-assessed. Even in the case of a ‘virtual prob-
lem’, the attempt to solve the problem serves as an opportunity to experience 
one’s abilities, capacities and skills, regardless of the significance of the problem at 
hand. 
Experiences of pleasure and satisfaction can, therefore, be identified at three dif-
ferent levels:
(1) Pleasure and satisfaction on the level of specific problems: it can certainly be 
pleasurable and satisfying to use a hammer to drive a nail in the wall, from which 
I might intend to hang my coat. If it is deemed unpleasant to carry my coat 
around, or to drop it to the floor, the nail in the wall might actually help to 
avoid an unpleasant experience.
(2) Pleasure and satisfaction on the level of specific strategies: even if I don’t 
need to hang my coat from the nail, it can be pleasurable and satisfying to see 
that I can make deliberate use of a hammer, a skill which might come in handy at a 
later time, when a respective problem arises.
(3) Pleasure and satisfaction on the level of meta-strategies: even if using a 
hammer might not seem an outstanding accomplishment in itself, it can pro-
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vide pleasure and satisfaction to experience that I am able to choose adequate 
strategies when confronted with a problem, and that I am capable of applying 
and mastering these strategies to a point where the solving of problems is ren-
dered possible. Even if the specific strategy I employ does not have an apparent 
use, its successful application nonetheless enables a sense of mastery.
It is this third level of pleasure and satisfaction which seems the most signifi-
cant when it comes to the ‘virtual problems’ that are presented in computer 
games. In a game, the pleasure does not emerge from the pragmatic benefits de-
rived from solving a problem, as the ‘nail in the wall’ is merely virtual, and I 
won’t be able to hang my coat from it. Nor can the success of applying the spe-
cific strategy be accounted for the emergence of pleasure and satisfaction, as the 
game doesn’t enable the actual ‘use of a hammer’, but merely presents an ab-
stracted version of the simulated skill, a skill which doesn’t tell me much about 
my capabilities to cope with an actual nail which might in another context need 
to be driven in a wall in order to avoid the unpleasant experience of having to 
carry around my coat all day long. The third level of satisfaction, however, is 
very well provided by computer games, as even the confrontation with a virtual 
problem, and the application of abstracted and simulated skills, presents an op-
portunity to experience my capabilities to assess a problem, to identify strate-
gies adequate to this problem, and to master these strategies in order to suc-
ceed.
It is this third level of satisfaction on which a possible answer to the guiding 
question of this thesis may be found: ‘Why do people play games?’. The notion 
of virtual problems and simulated strategies as sources of pleasure and satisfac-
tion allows to shift the perspective from the pragmatic benefits arising from the 
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solving of ‘actual’ problems to the pleasure of problem solving for its own sake. 
From this perspective, pleasure and satisfaction are not simply ‘nature’s incen-
tive’ for successful adaptation, but experiential categories in their own right, 
therefore permitting to assess the cognitive processes underlying these experi-
ences.
In order to do so, the next chapters will attempt to develop a model of human 
experience which takes into account the pleasure and satisfaction inherent to an 
experience of play. The aim to highlight ‘play’ as an experiential category,  con-
stituting a player-centered rather than a game-centered approach, suggests an 
anthropological perspective, a perspective which must still prove consistent 
with the constructivist approach underlying this project. Hence, the close rela-
tion between constructivist theory and anthropological approaches will be dis-
cussed, before the attempt to develop a constructivist-anthropological model of 
human experience is commenced.
3.1.3 Constructivist anthropology
While ‘anthropology’ denominates an established academic discipline, and 
therefore implies  specific traditions of theory and practice, of concepts, meth-
ods and cognitive interests, I use the term ‘anthropological’ as a distinctive for-
mula in regard to the most general implications of the term: the distinctive ele-
ment of an ‘anthropological approach’ lies in the attempt to seek certain human 
traits which are common to all human beings alike, while at the same time be-
ing exclusive to the human race.
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Any suggestion of such traits is a delicate matter, as this approach contains an 
amount of generalization that can easily be mistaken for the pretentious claim 
for absoluteness, and can therefore not be made without certain limitations.
In order to avoid the pitfalls of assuming general truths, these limitations can be 
derived from two different angles: they can either be limitations in regard to the 
generality of the statement, or limitations in regard to the assertion of truth.
limiting generality 
Limiting the generality of a statement is a common and necessary strategy 
when the argument derives from objectivist epistemology. Based on the as-
sumption that ontological reality does not only exist, but that the correspon-
dance with this reality determines the quality of the statement, the possibility of 
a ‘true statement’ can hardly be given up. Instead, it is the general demand that 
is relinquished. Examples for this strategy include any kind of purely descrip-
tive research, which insists on the ‘truth value’ of any single observation, but 
does not aim at establishing a general statement. The favoring of the ‘true’ over 
the ‘general’ can be argued as a common strategy throughout different aca-
demic disciplines including social sciences and the humanities168. 
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Limiting the generality of a statement is a legitimate strategy when cognitive 
interest is aimed at specific phenomena which can be treated as singular events, 
or when it is sufficient to limit the validity of the statement to specific condi-
tions. It does not, however, meet the requirements of what has been called the 
‘anthropological approach’ defined above, as this approach explicitly seeks for 
‘general human traits’.  
limiting the assertion of truth
While the strategy of limiting generality can be summed up as: “It is true, but it 
is not necessarily a general statement”, the complemental strategy of limiting 
the assertion of truth can be described as: “It is a general statement, but it is not 
necessarily true”. This is the basic limitation of radical constructivist theory, 
which will be the base for the anthropological model to be developed. The radi-
cal constructivist assumption that the quality of a statement cannot be deter-
mined in terms of truth but in terms of viability allows for the generalization of 
the statement, as the statement does not have to be ontologically ‘true’ in order 
to be valid, as long as it provides a useful ‘tool’ to address what is experienced 
as a problem and to develop strategies to reach what is experienced as solu-
tions.
Constructivism as anthropology
It is precisely this notion of ‘it is not necessarily true’ that makes it possible to 
base an ‘anthropological argument’ on constructivist theory. Without this limi-
tation, it may seem contradictory to make an anthropological statement, assum-
ing a ‘logic of man’, while at the same time referring to constructivist theory, 
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which seems to question any kind of ‘logic’ as an explanatory model by refer-
ring to the constructedness of all human insight. 
But in limiting the claim for ontological truth, constructivist theory is not only 
reconcilable with the anthropological argument. In its insistence on its episte-
mological alignment, constructivist theory discusses the capabilities of human 
cognition and its limitations, and while these capabilities and limitations are not 
applicable to all species alike, they are assumed to apply to all human beings in 
general. 
In other words: the constructivist argument is in itself an anthropological 
statement. 
But even the most basic constructivist models do not stop at the sceptical argu-
ment of the unreliability of sensual perception. Constructivism does not exhaust 
itself in the notion that all humans experience is just a result of cognitive proc-
esses of construction. 
What is more important is the question - if the realities we experience are con-
structions resulting from our minds’ work - under what terms and conditions these 
realities are constructed, and how our mind gives shape to these constructions by 
which our perceptions are organized? How do humans shape their own experi-
ences? 
In Glasersfeld’s remarks on “the radical constructivist position”, this implica-
tion of constructivist theory is not only treated as an option, but as an obliga-
tion:
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"If one adapts a constructivist orientation, one is obliged to go be-
yond the mere proclamation that the world we experience is a world 
we construct. At least one must try to show how what we call 
'knowledge' - that is, our successful ways and means of managing 
our lives and conceptual structures - could be built up; and if one 
claims to be a radical constructivist, one must also show that this ex-
periential world can be built up without reference to a supposedly 
'existing' world."169
This assessment of the ‘terms and conditions’ of constructing an experiential 
world leads to the presupposition of certain mental characteristics which may 
give shape to these human processes of construction; the ‘rules’ which enable 
the emergence of all kinds of human experience. Glasersfeld’s concept of viabil-
ity and the favoring of the ‘operative’ over the ‘truthful’, Watzlawick’s notion of 
the unevitability of cause-and-effect thinking, or Foerster’s discussion of the 
biological conditions enabling (and limiting) experiential ‘computation’ consti-
tute different conceptual elements of the notion of ‘human cognition’.
While these multifaceted examinations form a discourse circumscribing a con-
cept of the functionality of the ‘human mind’, at no point these concepts are 
consolidated into an explicit ‘logic’ of human experience. Implicitly, however, 
these different concepts form the base of a bigger, comprehensive undertaking, 
fulfilling the demands of what I would define as ‘constructivist anthropology’: a 
logic of man devised in constructivist terms.
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In the following, I will attempt to argue the notion of a certain ‘distinctive hu-
man trait’, which may help to find a viable definition of the idea of ‘pleasure’ 
and ‘satisfaction’ and its possible relation to the experience of ‘play’. Following 
the idea of devising a general statement by means of limiting the assertion of 
ontological truth, the argument aims to measure up to the demands of what has 
been defined as ‘constructivist anthropology’. 
3.2 System Experience
In a previous chapter, it has been shown how Johan Huizinga’s attempt to ex-
amine the “play-element of culture”, while he keeps recurring to ethnological 
and etymological observations, aimed at uncovering a logic in diversity, still 
ends up with a distinctly anthropological conclusion: “All peoples play, and 
play remarkably alike”170.
I will not claim that the “distincly human trait” the anthropological model I aim 
at is based upon can simply and conventiently be grasped with the idea of 
“playing games”. This would not qualify for a general model simply because 
definitions of “play” and “games” vary widely, as has been shown in a previous 
chapter, when Sutton-Smith’s argument on “the ambiguity of play” has been 
discussed.
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A distinctive human trait
I will, however, claim that a ‘distinctive human trait’ can be argued which gives 
rise to the phenomena leading to Huizinga’s observation, and can even shed a 
light on why his cross-reading of the sphere of declared play and spheres of cul-
tural organization labeled as “serious” has proved so yielding. This trait derives 
from constructivist theory, it is limited by the ontological non-commitment 
which constructivist theory highlights, and it makes explicit the implicit an-
thropological character of constructivist theory.
I will label this trait “system experience”, and I would describe this trait as fol-
lows:
Human beings experience their perceptions of the world as systems. 
3.2.1 System Experience and established systems theories
The systems paradigm
At the beginning of the 21th century, the term “system” is anything but an un-
assigned term.  The idea of systems as a productive concept to describe, assert 
and utilize a wide range of phenomena has become a formative paradigm in the 
philosophy of science, leaving its mark not only in natural sciences, but on so-
ciological, psychological and cultural studies alike. When in the midst of the 
20th century, western society encountered increasing problems in organizing 
the implications of technological development, the performance of natural sci-
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ences, the claim for global political perspectives and even the  notion of social 
change experienced in terms of “revolutions”, explanatory models that prom-
ised to account for this experience of increasing complexity were in high de-
mand. 
One especially promising notion was that of “system thinking”. The proposi-
tion of systems theorists is as simple as it is seductive: contrary to the well es-
tablished analytical paradigm, which aims at understanding a phenomenon by 
understanding the seperate parts it is made of, systems theory aims at consider-
ing not only the individual parts of an “entity”, but takes into account the inter-
relations between these parts. Slogans like “the whole is more than a sum of its 
parts” reflect the notion that it is not only the seperate parts of an “entity” that 
need to be assessed in order to understand this entity, but that these parts are 
related and interact with each other, and that it is this interplay that needs to be 
accounted for in order to cope with the complexity of the phenomenon:
“Application of the analytical procedure depends on two conditions. 
The first is that interactions between ‘parts’ be non-existent or weak 
enough to be neglected for certain research purposes. Only under 
this condition, [sic] can the parts be ‘worked out’, actually, logically, 
and mathematically, and then be ‘put together’. The second condi-
tion is that the relationship describing the behaviour of parts be lin-
ear; only then is the condition of summativity given, i.e. an equation 
describing the behaviour of the total is of the same form as the equa-
tions describing the behaviour of the parts; partial processes can be 
superimposed to obtain the total process, etc. 
These conditions are not fulfilled in the entities called ‘systems’, i.e. 
consisting of parts ‘in interaction’. The prototype of their description 
is a set of simultaneous differental equations [...], which are nonlinear 
in the general case. A system or ‘organized complexity’ [...] may be 
circumscribed by the existence of ‘strong interactions’ [...] or interac-
tions which are ‘nontrivial’ [...], i.e., [sic] nonlinear. The methodologi-
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cal problem of systems theory, therefore, is to provide for problems 
which, compared with the analytical-summative ones of classical sci-
ence, are of a more general nature.”171
It is this idea of interplay between an entity’s elements that constitutes the con-
cept of ‘systems’, and there is hardly an area of examination that seems to have 
completely eluded the implications of this concept; when Ludwig von Ber-
talanffy chooses the title for his introduction to general systems theory, it seems 
almost a battle call: “Systems Everywhere” 172.
While a thorough discussion of systems theories in different disciplines would 
both go beyond the scope of this thesis and fall short of its objective, it seems 
appropriate to clarify how a constructivist-anthropological model of system ex-
perience deviates from established concepts of systems, and in which aspects it 
shares or adapts similar notions. 
System experience vs. the systems paradigm in established systems theories
a) the deliberate assumption of ‘real systems’
If one is to follow the idea of ‘systems everywhere’, the crucial question to be 
asked may be: ‘why?’. Where do these systems come from? Are they a charac-
teristic of an ontic world, or are they just a way to organize our perceptions? 
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This question leads to the basic problem underlying constructivist theory, which 
Heinz von Foerster has formulated as the question:
"Is the world the primary cause and my experience the consequence, 
or is my experience the primary cause and the world the conse-
quence?"173
In regard to the systems paradigm, this question becomes especially notewor-
thy when constructivist issues flare up at the core of systems theory; in his ex-
amination of ‘social systems’, Niklas Luhmann addresses the question whether 
systems are ‘real’ or whether the systems paradigm presents a certain way to 
perceive reality. His answer is quite definitive:
“The following considerations assume that there are systems. Thus 
they do not begin with epistemological doubt. They also do not ad-
vocate a ‘purely analytical relevance’ for systems theory. The most 
narrow interpretation of systems theory as a mere method of analyz-
ing reality is deliberately avoided. Of course, one must never confuse 
statements with their objects; one must realize that statements are 
only statements and that scientific statements are only scientific 
statements. But, at least in systems theory, they refer to the real 
world. Thus the concept of system refers to something that is in real-
ity a system and thereby incurs the responsibility of testing its state-
ments against reality.”174
It is at this point noteworthy how statements like ‘systems are real’ or the ‘test-
ing of statements against reality’ may at first glance seem like a deliberate di-
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gression from constructivist theory and a provocant disregard of the sceptical 
argument of empirical doubt, which is at the core of radical constructivist the-
ory. Luhmann has discussed the epistemological problem of the constructed-
ness of cognition elsewhere, and has pointed out the necessity to deliberately 
make distinctions and thereby assume a perspective in order to make observa-
tions, as these distinctions are part of the observation rather than being con-
tained in the thing observed:
"Cognition is different from the environment, because the environ-
ment does not contain any distinctions, but rather is as it is. [...] Thus, 
there is nothing in the environment which equates cognition; because 
everything that equates cognition is dependent on distinctions, 
within which it denominates something as this and not that. There 
are neither things nor events in the environment, if this term [sic] 
means that that which is to be denominated is different than some-
thing else. There is not even environment in the environment, as this 
term only denominates something by distinction, i.e. necessitates to 
specify for what system the environment is an environment. And no 
more are there, apart from cognition, systems. (Therefore we have 
above said that there are systems)."175 
Luhmann’s assumption that ‘there are systems’ is therefore not a naive accep-
tance of perceptions as reality, but an attempt to account for the necessity to set 
a cognitive focus by deliberately assuming a perspective before any observation 
can be made resulting from this assumed perspective. 
It can further be argued that in his definition of systems Luhmann deals with 
the sceptical argument by drawing the pragmatic conclusion Glasersfeld has 
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suggested176: if our perceptions are the closest we get to an assumed reality, 
then we have to deal with perceived problems in order to reach what we per-
ceive as solutions, or in other words: what we perceive is ‘as real as it gets’. 
From this perspective, the possibility of ‘testing a statement against reality’ is 
consistent with the notion of viability rather than the idea of a depictable onto-
logical reality, and the ‘assumption’ that ‘there are systems’ is rather a limitation 
than a claim. While it is formulated in quite startling terms, Luhmann’s state-
ment is in downright accordance with constructivist epistemology.
What is more important at this point, however, is Luhmann’s deliberate deci-
sion to treat these systems as if they were ‘natural systems’, and to try and ob-
serve them as if the observer could be excluded from these systems. Again, this 
is a pragmatic and deliberate decision, and while this methodical exclusion has 
lead to discussions about the limitations of his approach177, it reflects the basic 
perspective of his systems theory: contrary to his epistemological examinations, 
in his theory of social systems Luhmann is simply not interested in the terms 
and conditions of human cognition and experience, but in the nature of social 
systems - be they ‘real’ or not. 
While in the case of Luhmann’s ‘social systems’, constructivist epistemology 
can be argued as the basis for a deliberate assumption of systems in the ‘real 
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world’, the result is not much different from approaches that assume the same 
perspective without incorporating the deliberate nature of this assumption. 
When Talcott Parsons devises his “Theory of Action”, it is made clear that the 
systems to be observed are conceived of as rooted ‘in the physical world’:
"In order to place in context what I consider the relevant problems of 
a sociology of knowledge, I should like first to sketch a framework 
for the analysis of all human action conceived as a system. Action, so 
conceived, is an ordered system of components that root in the 
physical world and the living organism and that are controlled by 
cultural patterns and symbols.”178
This is the first and foremost instance in which the model of system experience I 
am about to suggest deviates from established systems theories: contrary to ap-
proaches focussing on an assessment of the nature of assumed systems, system 
experience focusses on the systemic terms and conditions of human experience.
b) The systems paradigm as a deliberate perspective
The difference between a focus on the characteristics of systems and the charac-
teristics of experience is only one aspect in which established systems theories 
and a constructivist-anthropological model of system experience diverge. 
Luhmann’s rejection of ‘systems theory as a mere method of analyzing reality’ 
is a clear demarcation of his systems theory against propositions to use the sys-
tems paradigm as a methodological framework to organize perceptions, as a 
tool of ‘purely analytical relevance’. It is a demarcation against a recurring sug-
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gestion in systems theories, which Bertalanffy has promoted as a contribution of 
the systems paradigm to scienctific reflection in general: 
“Against reductionism and theories declaring that reality is ‘nothing 
but’ a heap of physical particles, genes, reflexes, drives or whatever 
the case may be, we see science as one of the ‘perspectives’ that man, 
with his biological, cultural and linguistic endowment and bondage, 
has created to deal with the universe he is ‘thrown into’, or rather to 
which he is adapted owing to evolution and history.”179
The suggestion that the ‘systems paradigm’ may be an especially useful ‘per-
spective’ is not just another new approach; its application is regarded as an 
emancipatory strategy in the systems discourse, promising not only to ‘liberate’ 
scientific examination and theorization from reductionist tendencies; when ap-
plied to the understanding and manipulation of social systems, it is promoted 
as a conceptional tool which may help to improve social interaction through the 
purposeful ‘design of social systems’:
"By studying and working with social systems in the course of the 
last several decades, we developed an increasing realization of the 
inquiry power we can gain from systems theory and systems phi-
losophy and their application through systems methodologies. We 
have liberated ourselves from the constraints and limitations of the 
analytically oriented and reductionist inquiry mode of traditional 
science. Systems inquiry enables us to orchestrate the findings of 
various scientific disciplines within the framework of systems think-
ing and to develop and apply systems approaches, models, and 
methods in working with social systems."180
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This ‘perspectivist approach’ puts systems theory in close proximity to con-
structivist epistemology. In regard to the ontological status of ‘systems’, Ba-
nathy states 
“[...] that there is no such thing as a system out there. Systems exist 
as mental pictures in our minds. Saying this another way, systems 
thinking structures thinking about whatever entity or phenomenon 
we become aware of and assign meaning to."181 
But while this approach is much closer to the idea of system experience, as it 
relocates the systems paradigm from the ‘natural world’ into the realm of hu-
man cognition, it regards the systems paradigm as a conscious strategy. The 
more systems theorists promote the use of the systems paradigm as a useful 
framework for assessing and organizing perceptions, the more it becomes an 
optional tool to be chosen deliberately, or to be dismissed at will: 
"Systems thinking is a property of the thinker, who organizes inter-
nalized systems ideas, systems concepts, and principles into an in-
ternally consistent arrangement, using a systems way of viewing and 
understanding, in order to establish a frame of thinking. As we ob-
serve what is 'out there', this frame of thinking enables us to reflect 
upon what we experience; thus we construct our own meaning.”182
Systems thinking as a conscious tool, enabling us ‘to reflect upon what we expe-
rience’ implies that the systems paradigm only becomes important when it 
comes to the conscious assessment of experiences. While this ‘frame of thinking’ 
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is promoted not only as a methodical tool for scientific examination but as a 
means to re-think our ways to make sense of and interact with ‘real world phe-
nomena’ on a much broader scale, it is presented as a consciously applied or-
ganizing principle; the accomplishment of systems theory is seen as the devel-
opment of a method of reflection which can be devised, taught and employed in 
order to gain a better understanding of a broad range of complex phenomena.
By contrast, the model of system experience which I am about to suggest is in-
tended as a viable model of understanding for human experience, and is not 
limited to human cognition on a conscious level. It is important to note that the 
model is intentionally labeled “system experience”, not “system thinking”. If 
this model can claim any general quality, it has to be made clear that it does not 
only apply to rational, conscious thought. This is the second aspect in which 
experiential systems have to be distinguished from ideas of systems common in 
established system theories.
c) Human Cognition, perceived as a system
A reformulation of the systems paradigm to relocate it from ‘the ontic world’ to 
the realm of human cognition, in combination with the notion that conscious 
reflection may only be a specific form in which human cognition is connected to 
the idea of systems, are two relevant aspects of a model of system experience. 
But there is a third instance in which the concept of system experience needs to 
clarified to avoid confusion with approaches common in established systems 
theories. Even when the systems paradigm is used to focus on human cogni-
tion, and even when this focus is general enough to allow for conscious and un-
conscious acts of cognition alike, it has repeatedly been employed in a way that 
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is very different from the idea of system experience: the notion that human cog-
nition may itself best be examined as a system. 
When Laszlo brings to the point his theory of cognitive systems, this notion of a 
systemic nature of human cognition becomes apparent:
" 'Cognitive System': a system constituted by mind-events, including 
perceptions, sensations, feelings, volitions, dispositions, thoughts, 
memories and imagination - i.e. anything 'present in the mind'."183
This definition does not only emphasize an explicit focus on cognition as the 
object of investigation, it also refrains from limiting this system to conscious 
processes of reflection. But in this conception, the concept of ‘systems’ is not 
only rooted in the terms and conditions of human cognition, cognition itself be-
comes just another system. 
This is the third instance in which a constructivist-anthropological model of sys-
tem experience deviates from the use of the systems paradigm in established 
system theories: even if the focus of system experience is on the terms and con-
ditions of human experience, this focus does not necessarily result in a concep-
tion of human cognition as a system, even if the terms and conditions of human 
cognition are assumed to produce systems. 
Even if the assumption that human cognition will always produce systems in 
order to organize its perceptions seems to leave no other option than also as-
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sessing cognition itself as a system, there is a crucial difference between these 
two assumptions.
This difference between a systemically organized mind and a systemically organ-
izing mind, however, is not simply a matter of defining a specific perspective. If 
human cognition does - and does always - organize whatever it perceives in 
systemic terms, how else can human cognition become the object of observation 
if not as a system itself?
This delicate ambiguity forms a constructivist key problem, and a closer look at 
the implications of this problem and the significance of a systemic conception of 
the human mind and its disintegration in constructivist epistemology may help 
clarify the focus of a constructivist-anthropological model of system experience.
Heinz von Foerster and the systemic ‘assembly’ of human cogni-
tion
In his attempt to discredit a realist world view by examining the biological pre-
conditions of sensual perception, Heinz von Foerster commences with the no-
tion of human cognition being organized as a system. While this is the same no-
tion that has been argued to be a common concept in established system theo-
ries, Foerster uses this idea to form the base of a very different argument. 
The initial step of this argument is derived from neurophysiological enquiries 
and lies in the observation that whatever stimulus is transmitted from our sen-
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sual perceptors to our brain, it can only be perceived in terms of quantity, not 
quality. : 
“The response of a nerve cell does not encode the physical nature of 
the agents that caused its response. Encoded is only ‘how much’ at 
this point on my body, but not ‘what’. “184
Foerster’s argument is based on the physiological setup of the mamallian cen-
tral nervous system. While the sensomotory units of protozoa and metazoa - 
very ‘simple’ biological entities when compare to humans and other mammals - 
react to sensory change  very ‘unmediated’ by simply changing their spatial po-
sition (which again leads to sensory change, as the sensory units themselves 
change their position in relation to the environment), the evolution of the 
mammalian central nervous system has lead to the appearance of so called ‘in-
ternuncial neurons’ - units which are placed between the sensory units and the 
motor units. Whatever input is received by the sensory units, so Foerster’s ar-
gument, is not directly transmitted to the motor units, but is ‘translated’ by the 
internuncial neurons. And no matter whether the sensory input is received 
visually, auditively, olifactory or in any other way we usually conceive as ‘sen-
sually specific’, the internuncial neurons translate it into one kind of informa-
tion: electrical activity. Internuncial neurons, therefore, constitute a perceptive 
‘filter’ which does not allow for simple models of perception based on the idea 
of analogous representation. 
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Therefore, Foerster argues, the quality of sensual perception (i.e. visual, acousti-
cal) can only be grasped as a result of cognitive computations, not a characteris-
tic of an external impulse; thus, human cognition constructs realities through 
processes of computation:
“The nervous system is organized (or organizes itself) so that it com-
putes a stable reality.”185
It has to be noted that, in his argument on the systemic organisation of human 
cognition as a base for the constructedness of realities, Foerster treats the sys-
temic nature of biological organisms as if it presented an objective reality, which 
in result could ‘prove’ the constructedness of cognitive realities. On the one 
hand, this can be seen as a ‘tactical move’ aimed at building a convincing ar-
gument even for those audiences who are attached to a realist world view: even 
if one complies with a positivist idea of measurement in assessing physical (in 
this case, neurological) phenomena, and even if the resulting observations are 
regarded as if they constituted objective data on a physical reality, the outcome 
of the observation still results in the finding that ‘objective perception of reality’ 
is simply not a viable possibility. Foerster reduces realist epistemology to ab-
surdity by employing its own means. 
On the other hand it can be argued that such an assumptive basis is the only 
possible way any observation can be commenced, which leads back to the prob-
lem addressed in regard to Luhmann’s deliberate assumptions:
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"We begin with the assumption that all cognitive systems are real 
systems, in a real environment, in other words: that they exist. It is 
often objected that this is naive. But how else than naive can one be-
gin? A reflection of the beginning can not be carried out from the be-
ginning, but can only be based on a theory that has already built up 
sufficient complexity."186
Foerster chooses a positivist examination of biological structures to ‘begin’ his 
reflections, assessing the nature of human cognition in systemic terms. But not 
only does he use this positivist examination to simultaneously discredit the vi-
ability of positivist epistemology; even within the seemingly positivist deriva-
tion of the autopoietic terms and conditions of human cognition, Foerster 
eliminates the prospect of predictability which may arise from the idea that the 
human mind can be compared to a system, to a ‘machine’ which receives input, 
computes it by means of its own, inherent ‘algorithms’ and produces a certain 
‘output’. The base for this elimination is the distinction between two concepts: 
trivial and non-trivial machines. 
What both concepts have in common is that a ‘machine’ is a system which can 
(1) receive input, (2) compute this input according to its own, inherent algo-
rithms, or ‘functions’ and (3) does in turn produce output. 
The difference between the concepts of trivial and non-trivial machines lies in 
the nature of the machines’ ‘functions’, its internal organizing principles.
In the case of trivial machines, the functions determining the computation and, 
thereby, the output is static, i.e. the machine will always use the same functions 
to decide which output a certain input results in. The observation of a trivial 
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machines will therefore show that a specific input will always produce the same 
output. Consequently, the observation of the machine’s output following a spe-
cific input allows for ‘reverse engineering’ of the machine’s internal organizing 
principle. Hence, trivial machines are analytically determinable and, once the 
organizing principle is identified, predictable. 
This is not true in the case of non-trivial machines, as these machines’ internal 
organizing principle is not static, but changes dynamically: it incorporates pre-
viously made computations and the resulting outputs into its algorithms. In 
other words: a machine that encounters input A for the first time may behave and 
compute this input differently than a machine that has already computed input 
A before.  As non-trivial machines will not always produce the same output fol-
lowing the same input, the principle of reproducibility does not apply, which 
makes these machines analytically indeterminable and, as there is no way to 
reverse-engineer their internal organizing principle, unpredictable187. 
Obviously, Foerster uses the concept of non-trivial machines as a model for the 
human mind, extracting human cognition from the sphere of positivist exami-
nation. His epistemological argument is at this point still rooted in the applica-
tion of positivist methdology; but it takes a purely constructivist turn when the 
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concept of non-trivial machines is not only used to describe an object of obser-
vation, but is employed as a model applicable to the observing cognitive sys-
tem. The model of non-trivial machines is expanded to include the observer of 
another non-trivial machine, who must now be seen as a non-trivial machine 
herself, both forming an interacting system of non-trivial machines. The result 
can be conceived of as another, larger non-trivial machine:
"The foundation for the vast expansion of this interest and activities 
[in studies of interaction rather than action] is the demonstration of 
the operational equivalence of an arbitrary large number of interact-
ing non-trivial machines with a single, non-trivial machine recur-
sively operating on itself [...], and the demonstration that under this 
condition these systems approach dynamic equilibria that go today 
under various names: fixed points, Eigen-values, Eigen-behaviors, 
attractors, strange attractors, and so on, which account for the stabil-
ity of things observed or created, be they objects, concepts, lan-
guages, customs, rituals, cultures or whatever."188
The implication that an interacting ‘network’ of non-trivially organized cogni-
tive systems may behave like a single non-trivial machine anticipates the com-
mon positivist objection to constructivist epistemology, namely, the apparent 
reproducibility of empirical observations. This objection is rooted in the experi-
ence that different people come to similar conclusions about the things they 
perceive: 
“One of the standard objections to constructivism, particularly radical 
constructivism, runs somewhat like this: ‘There’s a book in front of 
you on the table; you know it’s a book, I know it’s a book, and any-
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one who looks at it would recognize it as a book - why do you keep 
telling us that the book is not really there?”189
By expanding the systemic assessment of human cognition to a network of cog-
nitive systems, Foerster accounts for the ‘computation of a stable reality’ on a 
larger scale: the construction of stable realities on a social level becomes con-
trolled not only by the terms and conditions of a single cognitive system, but by 
the terms and conditions of social interaction. By this ‘turn’, realist conceptions 
are no longer only reduced to absurdity by their own means, they appear as the 
result of construction processes on a level of social interaction. 
Foerster, therefore, does not simply employ a conception of human cognition as 
a system to argue the constructedness of human experience. He succeeds in tak-
ing an argument originally rooted in positivistic epistemology to not only dis-
credit a positivist position, but to provide a constructivist explanation for the 
emergence of what is easily taken as ‘objective reality’. 
By taking this turn, Foerster shifts the perspective to the intersubjective terms 
and conditions of constructing realities and assesses even the observing organ-
ism as embedded in a larger system which organizes itself ‘so that it computes a 
stable reality’. The initial ‘first distinction’ - the assumption of human cognition 
as a system whose assembly can be approached positivistically - is thereby em-
bedded in a theoretical framework accounting for the constructedness and con-
ditionality of this initial assumption. 
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Hence, the introduction of a new perspective implies the occurence of a new 
‘first distinction’ which results in an observation that is fit to include the former 
distinction, a further ‘stepping back’ which makes apparent the conditionality 
of the original distinction - shifting the ‘blind spot’ underlying the observation 
which Luhmann has addressed by stating:
“[...] that the disctinction which a cognitive system uses to make its 
particular observation is its 'blind spot' or its latent structure. Be-
cause this distinction itself cannot be distinguished; otherwise some 
other - exactly this - distinction would be used as a guiding distinc-
tion, and this, again, blindly. And it means the same when one says 
that all observation calls for and necessitates a demarcation, a cutting 
through the world, a breach of the 'unmarked space'."190
By carrying out this shifting of his ‘first distinction’, Foerster reconciles his ar-
gument with the constructivist claim - and lays the base for a constructivist-
anthropological model of system experience; while his initial ‘demarcation’ - 
the assumption of a systemic nature of human cognition - does not comply with 
the basic assumption of system experience, the shift of perspective resulting 
from his conclusion opens up a field of observation which also reflects the cog-
nitive interest of system experience: the terms and conditions of human cogni-
tion, under which everything takes the form of a system - even if the observa-
tion is focussed on the idea of cognition itself. 
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The focus of System Experience
In established systems theories, the systems paradigm is sometimes assumed as 
a characteristic of an assumed ‘ontic world’; sometimes it is proposed as a pos-
sible and deliberate way to organize perceptions in systemic terms; sometimes 
it is even drawn upon to understand human cognition itself as a system. The 
constructivist-anthropological model of system experience I am suggesting is 
focussed on the terms and conditions of human experience; but instead of aim-
ing at an understanding of human experience as a system, it is focussed on how 
human experience produces systems, and, to sharpen the point, implies that hu-
mans do not sometimes experience the world by organizing their perceptions in 
systemic terms, but that the production of systems is a constituting feature of 
human experience. As a result of these assumptions, system experience does 
not ask for any kind of specific system, not even a ‘system of human experi-
ence’, but for the way systems are produced in the human mind as an intuitive 
way to organize our experiences.
The cognitive interest underlying this model, and setting it apart from other 
theories employing different ideas of ‘systems’, can be summarized as follows:
(1) System experience is a model of human experience, not a model of systems. 
It does not deal with the experience of systems, as no assumption about the exis-
tence or non-existence of systems in the ‘world’ is made. Neither does it suggest 
to approach human cognition as a system. Instead, system experience is based 
on the assumption that human experience gives rise to the systems paradigm; 
human cognition is understood as the terms and conditions leading to the sys-
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temic organization of perceptions: perceptions are organized as if they were per-
ceptions of systems or parts of systems.
(2) System experience is regarded as a general condition of human cognition. It 
is not restricted to conscious thought or reflection. System Experience argues 
that human experience is based on the intuitive assumption that the world is 
organized in systems, and that every perception is intuitively assumed to be 
part of a system; this intuitive assumption is not confined to conscious reflec-
tion. 
(3) System Experience, therefore, is assumed to be a general human trait. It does 
not promote the systems paradigm as a tool to be applied to methodical exami-
nation at will or implicate that it can be dismissed deliberately. From this per-
spective, methodical approaches explicitly employing the systems paradigm 
(e.g. ‘systems thinking’) are not regarded as unique because they are organized 
in systemic terms, but because they make the terms of conditions leading to the 
systemic organization of any cognitive endeavour explicit. 
 3.2.2 System Experience Everywhere
The assumption that system experience - the organization of perceptions in sys-
temic terms as a general human trait - can be regarded as a precondition for 
cognitive processes of all kind suggests that virtually any domain of human ex-
perience can be employed as an example for the application of system experi-
ence. The basic notion of system experience does not suggest system experience 
as an optional way to organize experiences, but implies that system experience 
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serves as a general organizing principle, thereby giving Bertalanffy’s claim of 
‘systems everywhere’ a more cognitive focus by implying that there is ‘system 
experience everywhere’. When in the following, specific examples serve to illus-
trate the emergence of system experience, the choice of examples is therefore 
not intended to show in which specific cases system experience applies, but 
rather guided by the aim to show the ease and inevitability of system experi-
ence as a general human trait.
The idea of ‘conclusive arguments’ as an application of ‘system experience’
When I tried to assess the development of the term “system” and the field of 
“systems theory” earlier, this is as good an example as any for the inevitable 
application of system experience: assuming that there is a ‘system’ of scientific 
knowledge, I have chosen a set of concepts and summarized them as ‘systemic’. 
(which I was helped by theorists who have conveniently labeled these concepts 
with the ‘systems’-term; there may or may not be numerous concepts that are 
similarly suitable to ‘populate’ my ‘system of concepts’, but do not offer them-
selves as conveniently). I have assumed boundaries, delineating the ‘field’ of sys-
tems theory from other possible fields. I have considered these concepts and 
their authors, such as Bertalanffy, Laszlo, Luhmann and their ideas, as elements 
being part of this system, implying that the interrelations between these authors 
and their ideas are relevant for a broader concept of ‘systems theory’. I have 
implied a hierarchical structuring of these elements, mainly in terms of chro-
nolgy, assuming that there are earlier notions of systems theory which enabled 
further evolution by later theorists. In this chronological hierarchy, I have im-
plied strategies between elements, assuming that the first notion of systems the-
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ory was a premise for later theories, finally culminating at the point where I 
myself ‘arrive’ at a preliminary goal by arguing a concept of ‘system experience’.
And ultimately, I have even assumed that this system of “systems theory” is it-
self an element in another, encompassing system of systems, referring to 20th cen-
tury technology and natural sciences, and to certain aspects of 20th century 
politics and societal change - evoking allusions to the development of computa-
tion, genetics, globalization and civil rights movements, which can all be as-
sessed as constructed concepts, even though they are so broadly defined that 
they may qualify as social constructions on the level of first order realities. 
Finally, this assumption of “systems theory” as a system was made to present 
me with an operative system, enabling me to legitimate my view of “system ex-
perience” by presenting a relatively clear background from which to set apart 
my approach to the application of the systems model - by presenting my own 
views as elements of a system. 
By doing this as part of this chapter, I did not only try to sketch a ‘systemic ar-
gument’, but I did this to present an argument that is fit to convince others who 
might read it. This does not necessarily mean that these others will agree on the 
content and implications of this ‘system’, but it derives from the hope that they 
will find the argument conclusive - based on the assumption that these others, 
too, will experience the presented argument in systemic terms, thereby reaching 
the conclusion that the argument presented implies a conclusive system, that it 
‘makes sense’. 
Taking an academic argumentation as an example for the application of system 
experience, however, is a little delicate for two reasons. First, the processing of 
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concepts in a systemic manner and the organization of possible relations be-
tween single observations and broader theoretical assumptions (which already 
suggests a basic systemic approach) might simply be a constituting element of 
academic practice; at this point, what I call ‘systemic’ could still be regarded as 
an established ‘tool’ to be applied in an academic context. 
Second, the example of academic practice strongly emphasizes the rational and 
deliberate application of systemic procedures, which does not necessarily 
equate the notion of system experience. As a general human trait, system expe-
rience is assumed to emerge on an intuitive level, even before rational reflection 
takes place. 
In order to cover the notion that system experience may be a viable model to 
grasp the way humans experience the world as a general human trait, measur-
ing up to the claim of an anthropological approach, it is therefore important to 
discuss the application of system experience in cases where the conscious intent 
to establish a ‘system’ is not as self-evident as in academic practice. And as in 
the academic example, it may be countered that the systems discourse in the 
20th century may indeed present a discoursive ‘system’, and that the systemic 
organization of these elements is therefore not an effect of human cognitive 
processes, but an effect of the ‘factual’ discourse, a conclusive example must be 
found that exposes an application of system experience in a case where a ‘fac-
tual’ systemic organization is not plausible.
What is needed is a case in which elements are offered for peception, which are 
deliberately designed to contradict the idea of systemic organization. If the per-
ceptions of these elements still lead to a systemically organized experience, it 
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may seem viable to assume that this systemic organization emerges from cogni-
tive computation rather than from a ‘factual’ systemic organization of the ele-
ments perceived. 
Kuleshov revisited
The Kuleshov effect, usually harnessed in regard to montage in film and the 
contextualization of perception, also clearly illustrates the emergence of system 
experience - especially as this emergence is not rationally reflected upon as part 
of the experiment and thereby not dismissable as easily as in the previous ex-
ample.
The basic experiment is as simple as it is famous:
“In order to prove the impact of editing on the significance of shots, 
[Kuleshov] inserted one and the same shot of Mosjukhin’s otherwise 
noncommittal face in different story contexts; the result was that the 
actor’s face appeared to express grief on a sad occasion and smiling 
satisfaction in a pleasant environment.”191
As far as this is possible, the arrangement of shots creates an artificial assembly 
of elements that are not inherently related: they simply present a ‘set’ of differ-
ent elements, which may at the most ‘belong together’ because they are pre-
sented one after the other. Whatever relation is stated by the audience, it is 
clearly a result of cognitive computations, not a reflection of ‘factual’ relations. 
The way these elements still are conceived of as related, however, suggests an 
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intuitive employment of system experience, incorporating every aspect neces-
sary to ‘sketch’ experiences as if they were systems. While these aspects are 
sometimes only employed by implication, they can all be argued to be essential 
for the meaningful construction of a functional experiential system: the experi-
ence arising from the simple setup of the experiment is dependent on the as-
sumption of borders - what is part of the system, what is not. When the shot of 
Moshjukin’s face is contrasted with shots of a bowl of soup, a dead woman or a 
child, these shots are the only elements which are contained within these bor-
ders. Other possible elements are excluded. While the actual ‘contents’ of the 
shots can only be assumed, in the reports there is no mention of the man’s 
clothes, or of the design of the soup bowl. Does he feel hot, because he’s wear-
ing a coat indoors? Does he feel snug because he’s sitting at a table in a secure 
home? These possible elements are excluded from the experience, as the simple 
setup of the experiment does not seem to allow for a very complex system. The 
only ‘additional’ element may be considered to be the coffin in which the 
woman is lying, but this coffin is actually part of a single element: it is a dead 
woman that is seen in the shot, which is not an additional information about the 
woman, but constitutes the element in principle.
This very confined system, containing very few, specific elements, allows for an 
accordingly small range of possible relations. The base for these relations is the 
assumption of needs and desires, leading to strategies which may or may not be 
fulfilled: the man is assumed to have positive feelings for the dead woman, im-
plying a desire to share a life with her as an unreachable goal, and it is the im-
possibility to fulfill this desire that leads to the assumption that he may be grief-
ing. Likewise, his desire for the soup is only assumed, just as is the the notion 
that the soup, while presenting a context for interpreting his feelings, is just 
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outside his reach: he may see the soup, he does not engage in eating it. The 
emotion assumed could just as well be joy, if the assumption is made that a 
waiter is finally serving his food, but there are no elements which point in that 
direction, there is no waiter and no hint at the fictional setting of a restaurant. 
The desire for the soup may lead to joy when he gets it, and to frustration if he 
doesn’t; in the simple setup of the two shots, it just results in an assumption of 
hunger: ‘if you hear hoofes, think horses, not zebras’. 
A shot of a waiter would probably alter the experience instantly, just as would a 
shot of a flask of poison or, in the case of the dead woman, the suggestion that 
the man is, in fact, a vampire hunter. These alterations would suggest another 
system, in which different elements are related in a different way, leading to the 
assumption of different desires, goals and strategies. 
For an assessment of the application of system experience, it seems notable that 
the single elements of this experiential system are regarded as ambiguous: the 
system is not based on a specific goal, which might lead to the assessment of the 
single elements significance in regard to the goal. On the contrary, it is the mere 
presence of the elements which in turn leads to the assumption that there must 
be some kind of goal, or the elements can not be put in a functional relation.
Within the assumed border of the system, the arbitrary elements immediately 
raise the question which goal needs to be assumed in order to relate the con-
tained elements so that they seem to present a system in the first place. In regard 
to system experience, this is the significant finding of the Kuleshov experiment.
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It has to be noted, however, that the widespread accounts of the original ex-
periment may  be imprecise in an essential aspect. A later ‘recreation’ of the ex-
periment - motivated by scepticism regarding methodological shortcomings 
and possible ideologic bias of the original experiment - has shown that the re-
ported effect did not occur when the reported circumstances were accurately 
followed. It was, however, suggested that the deviance may be due to an im-
proper evaluation of the ‘neutral’ expression on the actor’s face. The recreated 
sequence did not call forth anything close to the expected Kuleshov effect when 
the shots of the actor’s face were perceived as expressionless. When these shots, 
however, were substituted by others which - by a control group, which was pre-
sented these shots without the context of the counter shots (soup, woman, 
child) - were rated as showing an ambiguous emotion rather than none at all, 
the test audience suddenly started to assume the expected relations:
“The ambiguous expression seemed to offer a stronger interpretative 
cue for the viewer than did the expressionless face. If Kuleshovian 
montage may not be capable of making an expressionless face emo-
tive, it may very well do this with an ambiguous expression, since 
the objects (soup, coffin, child) provide a context for resolving the 
ambiguity.”192
This difference between the perceiced absence of emotion and the perception 
that some kind of emotion seems to be expressed, but that it cannot be distinctly 
determined is another important observation in regard to system experience: 
only when the perception is made that there is something there, cognitive proc-
esses aimed at ‘making sense’ of this perception will take place. In the failed 
Kuleshov recreation, there is no reason to establish a relation between the 
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counter shots and the actor’s emotion, as there is no sign of emotion perceived, 
and therefore no reason to establish a system which accounts for an emotional 
response of the actor.
When Alfred Hitchcock illustrates the effect on the example of one of his mov-
ies (Rear Window, Paramount Pictures, 1954), it is therefore not coincidental that 
there is no mention of an ‘expressionless face’. Instead, Hitchcock’s example 
makes use of a highly ambiguous expression - a smile:
“In the same way, let’s take a close-up of [James] Stewart looking out 
of the window at a little dog that’s being lowered in a basket. Back to 
Stewart, who has a kindly smile. But if in the place of the little dog 
you show a half-naked girl exercising in front of her open window, 
and you go back to a smiling Stewart again, this time he’s seen as a 
dirty old man!”193
Only when the perception is made that there seems to be some kind of emotion (in 
this example, revealed by the smile), there is reason to ask: what emotion is ist? 
As a smile seems to be able to convey a wide range of emotions, the specific 
emotion cannot be deduced from the smile alone. In order to determine the un-
derlying emotion more clearly, an obvious question may be: what is the smile 
caused by?
This question, again, is answered by relating the different shots: through the as-
sumption of a cause-effect relationship, the emotion of the smiling man is now 
regarded as the effect of what he supposedly encounters: either the dog, or the 
young woman. While the shot of the dog may imply a state of fond amusement, 
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the shot of the young woman will better serve the function of providing a cause 
for his emotion when the emotion is interpreted as libidinal excitement. 
The different elements of the assumed system (a smiling man, and an object he 
seems to be watching) are dynamically arranged in order to relate them in a 
functional way, guided by cause-effect relations, leading to a conclusive inter-
play of these elements. This dynamic character of the process does not aim at 
establishing fixed interpretations of the single elements, but at the sketching of 
a conclusive system: when the counter shot is changed, the interpretation of the 
smile changes with it, simply because the prior interpretation of the smile does 
not make sense if experienced as a causal effect of the new shot, and would 
thereby threaten the experience of a conclusive system: if the shot of the dog 
seems to be the cause for the man’s libidinal excitement, there is clearly an ele-
ment of the system not regarded for, which could establish a causal relation be-
tween the dog and what has before been determined as the man’s lustful smile - 
and as this missing element can not be determined, the interpretation of the 
emotion underlying the smile is intuitively changed.
System experience as an anthropological constant
The Kuleshov effect may serve as an example for the application of system ex-
perience on an intuitive level. But even if an intuitive application of system ex-
perience can be argued, this still does not constitute system experience as a gen-
eral human trait: system experience may still present a cultural technique, one 
so commonly applied that it manifests itself on an intuitive level, even before it 
is rationally assessed. 
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The assumption that system experience may be a model for human experience 
on a general level also requires a viable explanation for its emergence inde-
pendently of cultural habits. If system experience is not to be regarded as a re-
sult of cultural influences, where then does it derive from? 
Some may argue that the ways humans experience the world are ‘hardwired’ to 
the brain194, that the biological infrastructure of the human mind is built in a 
way that allows for certain kinds of mental processing, while we are simply not 
‘designed’ to employ others. 
But while this basic assumption is most certainly true - whatever the human 
mind accomplishes must obviously be within the range of what it is physiologi-
cally able to accomplish - neurophysiological data simply does not aim at pro-
viding an ‘inside view’ of cognitive processes, but at the physiological precon-
ditions of these processes. 
Developmental psychology, on the other hand, argues that mental strategies re-
sult from learning processes in the earliest stages of human development195 - 
raising the question where the ability to ‘learn’ does derive from in the first 
place. But Dieter Wyss makes a convincing argument when he traces back the 
structure of human experience to a set of “basic experiences”, which fulfill the 
anthropological claim of applying to any human being alike. According to 
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Wyss, the newborn child traverses a serious of experiences, which build the 
‘vocabulary’ for the emergence of experiential patterns. These patterns in turn 
determine the organization of later experiences. Through the experience of a 
parent’s presence, for instance, children become aware that time and space do 
not constitute steady agglomerations of events, but that they are (or can be) 
structured around the notion of ‘presence’ and ‘absence’, and as events that are 
either occuring at a present time, or that have occured or may occur at an-
other196. In the same way, concepts like effort and goals, the difference between 
the self and the environment, cause and effect or value and beliefs are similar 
constructions resulting from the child’s early experiences.
In this conception, the ‘structuring’ of experiences is not a ‘hardwired phe-
nomenon’, but results from continuous processes of action and orientation, in 
which the idea of ‘viability’ once again becomes a key concept. While 
development-psychological models are at the core of radical constructivist theo-
ry197 - and also allude the idea of ‘things becoming real through use’, which is a 
key concept of interactivity and computer games198 -, the experiential categories 
Wyss describes are also consistent with the idea of system experience: even if he 
mostly uses a different terminology, his argument may be regarded as a descrip-
tion of the emergence of borders, elements, relations or goals as experiential 
categories, therefore providing a suggestion of possible ‘origins’ of the catego-
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ries constituting system experience, the ‘tools’ needed to experience our per-
ceptions ‘as systems’.
Relations between ‘System Experience’, media and narrative
As an explanatory framework for the cognitive organization of human percep-
tions, ‘system experience’ is only one of various efforts that share a similar 
claim. As the examples for the ubiquituous nature of ‘system experience’ also 
kept touching on issues of narrative (and narratological approaches keep flaring 
up in discussions of games and play), it seems especially relevant to point out 
the relation between system experience and “narrative comprehension theory” 
which also claims to provide a general, ubiquitous framework accounting for 
the terms and conditions of human experience:
“Today narrative is increasingly viewed as a distinctive strategy for 
organizing data about the world, for making sense and significance. 
As the features of narrative came to be specified more precisely, it 
was detected in a bewildering number of places: not just in artworks, 
but in our ordinary life and in the work of historians, psychologists, 
educators, journalists, attorneys, and others. It became clear that nar-
rative was nothing less than one of the fundamental ways used by 
human beings to think about the world, and could not be confined to 
the merely ‘fictional’.” 199
“Narrative comprehension theory” - the idea that humans organize their expe-
riences as if they were narratives (or, as fantasy author Terry Pratchett puts it, 
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that “humans think in stories”200) - is certainly different from the notion that 
humans organize their experiences as if they were systems or parts of systems. 
However, ‘system experience’ does not render ‘narrative comprehension the-
ory’ obsolete, but provides a more encompassing framework, which can draw 
on the notion of ‘narrative comprehension’ to make specific implications of ‘sys-
tem experience’ tangible. 
While the proposition of ‘system experience’ certainly challenges the notion of 
narrative organization as a way to think about the world, i.e. as a framework ac-
counting for the organization of experience, narrative organization may still be 
closely related to the idea of system experience.
Assumed that ‘system experience’ - the organization of perceptions in systemic 
terms - is indeed a viable framework for the terms and conditions of human ex-
perience, then it can also be assumed that the contingent nature of experiential 
systems - while at the core of cognitive processes - is in its complexity ill suited 
for social negotiations without the means to make the contingencies arising 
from the dynamic nature of these experiential systems tangible. Systemic simu-
lations or, more specifically, digital games provide such a means to put experi-
ential systems ‘on record’, as it is in digital games that the complex nature of 
systemic assumptions can not only be experienced, but expressed and offered 
for negotiation - maybe one of the most significant attractions of games as a 
media201. The use of game design as a means of expression, however, does not 
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qualify as an everyday principle, not only because the creation of digital simu-
lations is much more cumbersome and laborious than verbal expression, but 
mainly because the involvement in playing a game again evokes individual ex-
periences rather than mutual negotiation, even if the systemic statements of-
fered by the game form the base of these negotiations.
While it is a viable assumption that intersubjective negotiations rely on narra-
tive strategies to foster mutual comprehension, the idea of ‘narrative’ is not 
simply an alternative to ‘system experience’. Without the means to make an as-
sumed experiential system and its dynamic and contingent character tangible in 
its complexities and contingencies, intersubjective negotiations require a way to 
communicate these assumptions in a more comprehensible way, and narrative 
devices provide the necessary articulateness to achieve this task.
Contrary to the dynamic nature of experiential systems, narrations describe a 
specific manifestation of these systems by depicting one of many possible varia-
tions of one of the same system; any narration refers to an underlying experien-
tial system, but while any single narration can only portray one specific course 
of events that may arise from this system, it is the accumulation of different nar-
rations and their variations that gradually unravel the contingent character of 
the system. 
While the narrative account of “an ambitious businessman being successful in 
the world of commerce” might simply state the possibility of success in an as-
sumed economic system, a second narrative about a “lazy businessman being 
unsuccessful in the world of commerce” might add the relevance of ambition to 
the assumed system’s elements; a third narrative about “an ambitious busi-
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nessman being unsuccessful in the world of commerce”, however, might ex-
pand the contingencies of the system by indicating that ambition alone does not 
determine success in this assumed system of economics, gradually adding to 
the elaboration of a more and more complex and contingent system. 
From a perspective of system experience, therefore, narrations appear not only 
as a means to express systemic assumptions by providing exemplary ‘freeze-
frames’ of an experiential system’s contingencies, it is the idea of different nar-
rations adding to an experiential system which hints at the gradual develop-
ment of systemic assumptions: in order to accomodate increasingly diverging 
narrations within already established experiential systems, the assumptions 
about this system must either gradually become more complex, or the estab-
lished assumptions must be put into question, if the respective narrative is to be 
consolidated with the system.
Without the relation to the underlying assumption of experiential systems, 
however, the notion of ‘narrative comprehension’ as “one of the fundamental 
ways used by human beings to think about the world” does not seem viable: 
while the idea of narratives may account for the ways humans express how they 
think about the world, an assessment of cognitive processes underlying the 
construction of realities must go further. While narratives may be the basic 
principle underlying the negotiation and exchange of ideas and assumptions 
about ‘how things work’, narratives can only provide specific manifestations of 
these ‘systemic assumptions’; in order to ‘make sense’ of these exemplary ‘re-
sults’ of assumed systemic relations, any given narrative must be related to the 
assumption of an underlying experiential system, and either lead to the experi-
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ence of ‘making sense’ if the narrative can be reconciled with these systemic as-
sumptions, or disregarded as ‘not making sense’. 
Without this relation to ‘system experience’, the idea of ‘narratives’ as an under-
lying cognitive principle can not account for the emergence of narratives, as the 
lack of contingency within any given narrative does not allow for the emer-
gence of new ones. It is the idea of contingent, dynamic relations of an experien-
tial system which allows the assumption, exploration and expression of alter-
nate possibilities, which may consequently make use of narrative devices and 
lead to the emergence of new narratives.
Contrary to narratives, experiential systems bear the contingent potential to ac-
commodate a multitude of different manifestations; this potential, however, 
also highlights one of the basic aspects of experiential systems, which distin-
guishes the concept not only from the idea of narratives, but also from concep-
tions of objective or physical systems: experiential systems are characterized by 
their indetermination. It is this indetermination which will initiate the next 
chapter’s discussion of the basic aspects of experiential systems, in which a 
model of ‘system experience’ is grounded.
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3.2.3 A Model of System Experience
Based on the assumption that the terms and conditions of human cognition lead 
to an organization of perceptions in systemic terms, it is necessary to find a way 
to also assume a specific form these ‘experiential systems’ may take. This defini-
tion of a possible ‘form’, however, can not aim at an exhaustive set of criteria 
covering all possible variations of actual experiences. In order to suggest system 
experience as a ‘general human trait’, the challenge lies in finding definitions 
for these criteria that are broad enough to account for the seemingly infinite 
scale of human experience, while at the same time providing a viable tool for 
the assessment of experiential systems. 
First and foremost, as it is not assumed that these systems are ‘real’ systems, or 
even physical systems, but that they are merely assumptions themselves, a 
definition of these systems must account for the indetermination of these as-
sumed systems. 
functional (in-)completeness
This indetermination leads to a conception of systems which may to some de-
gree employ aspects similar to those constituting models of ‘real’ systems; the 
relation of these aspects, however, does not result in the same notion of func-
tionality which constitutes the idea of ‘real systems’.
The main difference between these conceptions lies in the idea of functional 
completeness: the assumption of ‘real’ systems necessitates models which allow 
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for a functional relation of their elements, enabling not only an identification of 
the assembly of the system, but also accounting for its self-contained behavior. 
A model of a ‘real’ system is not complete if it does not account for the func-
tional behavior of the system. 
If, for example, a clockwork is assessed as a system, and its functionality de-
fined by physical transmission of power from a spring to an assembly of cog-
wheels resulting in a movement of the clock’s hands at a certain speed, it is nec-
essary to account for a continuous connection between the spring, the cog-
wheels and the arms. If at some point the cogwheels are not physically con-
nected, the model of the clockwork as a physical system of power transmission 
does not account for a movement of the hands. 
The same is true for less physical ‘real’ systems, as it is the application of the 
systems paradigm that demands for functional completeness, not the physical 
quality of the object assessed. Models of economic systems, for instance, will 
not account for functional completeness if they only consider instances of sup-
ply and demand; in order to provide viable explanations of the system’s func-
tionality, they have to factor in a conclusive relation of these elements, for ex-
ample through economical goods and ways of distribution.
Models employing the idea of ‘real’ systems demand a completeness that ac-
counts for the system’s functionality; they meet their limitations when certain 
functional aspect of the system are not accounted for.
By contrast, when focussing on human experience instead of the assumption of 
‘real’ systems, the idea of functional completeness has to be given up. Based on 
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the assumption that under the terms and conditions of human cognition, expe-
riential systems are themselves only assumed systems, they can not be disre-
garded for their lack of functionality. The assumption that human cognition or-
ganizes perceptions by assuming that they are systems or parts of systems does 
in no way imply that these systems really exist, and much less can their func-
tionality be a criterion for their assessment. Contrary to the assumption of ‘real’ 
systems, experiential systems may not even constitute ‘complete’ systems at 
any given time, they may only consist in a single aspect which is assumed to be 
part of a system - constituting the ‘missing elements’ only by implication. 
Indetermination
This ambiguity and indetermination is a common problem when dealing with 
the idea of human experience. When Erving Goffman proposes his concept of 
‘framing’ as a model applicable to the assessment of human experience, he en-
counters the same level of volatility - and the ease with which humans deal 
with this indistinctness:
"Primary frameworks vary in degree of organization. Some are 
neatly presentable as a system of entities, postulates, and rules; oth-
ers - indeed, most others - appear to have no apparent articulated 
shape, providing only a lore of understanding, an approach, a per-
spective. Whatever the degree of organization, however, each pri-
mary framework allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label 
a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its 
terms. He is likely to be unaware of such organized features as the 
framework has and unable to describe the framework with any com-
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pleteness if asked, yet these handicaps are no bar to his easily and 
fully applying it."202
While system experience proposes a slightly different model to be applied to 
human experience than Goffman’s concept of framing, the problem of ambigu-
ity is the same. Both models are confronted with the same inaccuracy arising 
from the indetermination underlying human experience and the ease with 
which it takes place.
This ease of application in spite of the indetermination of the processes applied 
does not allow for a conception of experiential systems which aims at assessing 
the systems themselves, implying that they could be treated in the same way 
the assumption of ‘real’ systems suggests. Experiential systems can at no point 
be envisioned as ‘whole’, working systems, and accordingly be tested and ob-
served. 
One way to picture this ease of application in spite of the indetermination of the 
process applied is the idea of a gardener building a garden-fence - continuously 
driving fence posts into the ground along a straight line. But instead of using a 
whole batch of fence posts, the gardener always uses the same one: every time 
she gets down to driving the ‘next’ post into the ground, she absent-mindedly 
reaches back, plugs the last post from the earth and drives it in the next desig-
nated spot. The gardener is at every given moment engaged in the act of build-
ing a fence, but at the same time never actually building it. There is no fence, 
only the act of building, and the assumption that the current post is the link be-
tween a previous post and the next one - and as long as the gardener holds on 
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to this assumption, the act of ‘building’ the fence may seem a meaningful activ-
ity. 
The idea of a ‘fence’ is therefore only assumed by the gardener; she assumes 
that the current post is connected to the previous one, just as she assumes that it 
will connect to the next post at a later time. For an outside observer, any as-
sessment of this process focussing on the ‘fence’ will fail, as there is and will 
never be a ‘fence’ - only by assessing the assumption of the fence as the base for 
the gardener’s current actions will the gardener’s experience of ‘building a 
fence’ be made tangible. 
Any attempt to assess human cognition and the experiences emerging from its 
terms and conditions must account for this indetermination. Accordingly, a 
definition of possible aspects of experiential systems can not imply a functional 
completeness of these systems, but must account for its experiential focus by 
incorporating the assumptive nature of these aspects. 
Only by taking this assumptive nature into account can a definition of experien-
tial systems succeed in providing a viable perspective on the terms and condi-
tions of human cognition; the following ‘aspects’ of experiential systems are 
therefore intended as possible assumptions in the process of organizing percep-
tions rather than a list of mandatory characteristics aiming at functional com-
pleteness.
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Aspects of Experiential Systems
In order to make the characteristics of experiential systems tangible, I suggest 
the following aspects as a preliminary framework for the assessment of system 
experience:
-) distinctive permeable borders, which define the system and delineate it from 
aspects that are not part of the system
-) elements which are part of the system
-) a hierarchical structuring of these elements
-) relations between these elements
-) strategies, enabled by the paths resulting from the elements’ relations
-) partial goals (on the level of the elements’ relations)
-) goals (on the level of the system)
It has to be noted that this ‘list’ of systemic aspects seems rather banale when 
employed in regard to assumed ‘real’, physical systems, as they do not provide 
any new insight into this idea of systems. It is for just this reason that I will re-
peatedly employ examples of physical systems to clarify these aspects before 
they are applied to the indetermination of experiential systems. In order to illus-
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trate the manifestation of these aspects in the form of play experiences, these 
aspects will further be discussed in regard to the experience of digital game-
worlds and, more specifically: the MMORPG World of Warcraft. 
borders and distinctions
The idea of a ‘system’ (experiential or ‘natural’) necessitates a delineation of 
what is considered part of the system, and what is not. To fulfill the require-
ments of (or simply experience) a system, and account for the qualities enabling 
for the system’s (assumed) functionality, any concept of ‘systems’ requires the 
idea of a delineating characteristic, a ‘border’.
In the case of the clockwork mentioned above, this border will most likely be 
some kind of metal or plastic casing, which contains all the parts necessary to 
make the clockwork ‘work’. This border, of course, is in no way impermeable. 
While it is most likely designed in a fashion that will prohibit the parts to fall 
out of the casing, and if designed efficiently will even hold the parts in position, 
it does not provide an ‘absolute’ border: the casing might not prevent tempera-
ture to pass through its hull and it will most likely allow the clock’s ticking 
noise to escape. Though most wristwatches today provide ‘water resistance’ up 
to a certain pressure, this is not a feature deemed necessary for the system’s 
primary function, and in the case of high-class collector’s watches, the casing 
might even be equipped with a transparent crystal back to allow visual obser-
vation of the clockwork’s operations. All the casing does is provide a border for 
the forces regarded as ‘functional’ for the system to operate: mechanical parts 
are to form an ‘enclosed’ system, and the exchange of mechanical energy pro-
viding the clock’s functionality must be sufficiently contained within the system 
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for the clock to work more or less reliably. The border, therefore, provides im-
permeability in regard to very specific qualities.
In digital games, the concept of borders is rather obvious, and in the form of 
Huizinga’s ‘magic circle’ is a key concept of the game studies discourse. Even if 
the ‘magic circle’ implies a strict delineation between the inside and the outside 
of a game world, this absoluteness is put into question when Ian Bogost points 
out:
“[...] that the magic circle of the game world ruptures into the mate-
rial world, but yet it does not disappear entirely. Such an under-
standing of the magic circle disrupts the notion that play space pos-
sesses a stable interiority and exteriority. The idea that 'you're either 
playing a game or you're not' or that games offer an 'artificial space' 
that contrasts sharply with the material world needs to be revised in 
light of this new understanding of the magic circle.”203
In the case of digital games, it may seem that the game world is strictly discon-
nected from the ‘outside world’: the avatar the player takes control of and the 
characters she interacts with, the challenges and the means to overcome them, 
the quests and the fictional events behind them, they only exist within the 
gameworld, and they cease to exist when the game ends. But this separation be-
tween the ‘game world’ and the ‘world outside the game’ is far from absolute. 
The most obvious link between the game world and its surroundings is the 
player itself, as without the player’s willingness to make decisions and interact 
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with the game’s rules there would not be a game. In a game there is nothing like 
a ‘fourth wall’ which - in theory - might be closed down and still leave the vir-
tual events behind it intact; it is the idea of ‘interaction’ itself that implies that 
there must be a transfer between the game and its surroundings, that the very 
nature of the game necessitates openings which enable the constant crossing of 
the game’s borders. Apart from the necessity of interaction, however, the per-
meability of the game’s borders is also a prerequisite for the player’s efforts to 
care for the events and conflicts presented by the game world, which has been 
discussed earlier in this thesis204. The experience of the game’s events as rele-
vant and guiding factors for player decisions again requires a transfer between 
her values and beliefs and the demands of the game world; while this transfer is 
a general premise of digital games, it gains additional significance when a 
number of players shares the same game world. In MMORPGs like World of 
Warcraft, the interactions constituting gameplay events and their meaning are 
not limited to a transfer between a single player and the game, the game world 
can become a space for the negotiation between myself and an assumed com-
munity of players, be it a group of ‘friends’, a players’ guild or the more general 
‘players’ public’. While the game most certainly promises the freedom to ex-
plore an alternate world which is not equal to the world outside of the game, this 
world is still connected to this outside world, excluding some of its aspects and 
obligations, but allowing others to permeate its borders and even inviting them 
to do so.
This relative impermeability of an assumed border is obvious in the idea of the 
‘adiabatic’ in thermodynamics; the classification of a thermic system’s border as 
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‘adiabatic’ means that this border delineates the system by specifically prohib-
iting the transfer of heat, while the transfer of other kinds of energy may or may 
not be possible205. This nature of specifying the quality of what is prohibited to 
pass through a border is often neglected in the theoretical assessment of sys-
tems, but it is a necessary prerequisite for the validity of these assessments.206
While the border constitutes a ‘distinctive function’ in determining what is part 
of the system and what is not, it is this ‘qualitative alignment’ of the border 
which defines the system’s ‘universe’ even before it is delineated: the ‘first dis-
tinction’ therefore does not lie in the demarcation of a system from its environ-
ment, but in the decision under which terms the delineation will take place:
"This first distinction, as I have frequently said, is analogous to the 
one the artist makes with the first few lines on a sheet of paper, lines 
that determine what is going to be 'figure' and what 'ground'. For the 
point of view I have adopted, the most important thing about that 
distinction is not what is being distinguished, but that the artist 
makes the distinction within the sheet, the canvas, or whatever he 
happens to be drawing on. Both figure and ground are parts of one 
and the same sheet.”207
In Glasersfeld’s example, the ‘universe’ within which the distinction between 
system and environment takes place is determined by two-dimensional, visual 
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delineations - even before it is decided whether the distinctive lines to be drawn 
will form a line, a square or a circle, and whether they will be drawn in the 
middle of the sheet or in one of the corners. The decision to make a visual dis-
tinction by drawing on a sheet (maybe aimed at representing an abstract idea) al-
ready excludes the qualities of mechanical power, water pressure or heat trans-
fer as defining characteristics of the distinction.
Only if this limitation is kept in mind can the idea of ‘perfect continence’ be 
held up, which George Spencer-Brown chooses as the basic definition of his 
‘Laws of Form’:
“Distinction is perfect continence.
That is to say, a distinction is drawn by arranging a boundary with 
separate sides so that a point on one side cannot reach the other side 
without crossing the boundary. For example, in a plane space a circle 
draws a distinction.”208
While a border certainly constitutes a ‘distinction’ in seperating elements on 
one side of the border from elements on the other side, the nature of the border 
itself already constitutes a distinction by defining the nature of the delineation. 
In other words: the nature of the border is itself dependent on the nature of 
elements to be separated, and the ‘purpose’ this separation serves.
In regard to experiential systems, it is this defining character of setting the bor-
der which pre-determines what kinds of experiences can emerge. It makes a 
huge difference whether the daily rising of the sun is assessed as a cosmological 
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or a mythological event; while the assumption of a cosmological system might 
include the idea of planets which behave according to physical laws, the as-
sumption of a mythological system might include very different elements, pos-
sibly deities or mythological figures being responsible for the sun’s perceived 
movement209, or maybe the sun itself being a deity, whose behavior provides 
explanations for the otherwise bewildering observation of solar events210. 
elements 
“Once a distinction is drawn, the spaces, states, or contents on each 
side of the boundary, being distinct, can be indicated.“211
Establishing a border enclosing a system at the same time defines a set of ele-
ments which are part of the system, delineating them from other elements 
which are not. 
For the clockwork, the constituting elements may include the spring, the bolts 
transmitting movement to the hands and a certain number of cogwheels. And 
World of Warcraft does not simply contain ‘digital entities’, but distinct avatars, 
NPCs, locations or items with their specific abilities, functionalities, opportuni-
ties and “stats”.
These elements need to be ‘different’ from each other; even if the clockwork was 
to be assembled from a number of identical cogwheels, the single cogwheels 
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need to be different entities to enable functional behavior of the system. If there 
is only one single element contained within the border, the border does not con-
stitute a system showing functional behavior, but exactly this single element. A 
single World of Warcraft avatar, or a single item, does not constitute a game 
world, but an allusion to a potential game at best; in the case of the clockwork, a 
single cogwheel may not be regarded as a system, as it shows no functional be-
havior on its own (as long as the distinctive quality remains the transmission of 
mechanical energy).
On the other hand, the nature of a system’s elements may allow to regard them 
as seperate systems themselves: in the case of a personal computer, incorporat-
ing a processor, a graphics card and a harddrive, it is obvious how single ele-
ments which serve as functional elements in a larger system might also be re-
garded as seperate systems with their own functional behaviors. This would, 
however, require a different distinction, delineating exactly these former ele-
ments as systems of their own. Under the terms of the current system - be it the 
personal computer, the clockwork or a digital game - the elements have to be 
indicated as functional elements of this system. 
hierarchies
The quality of ‘difference’ between a system’s elements is not exhaustively as-
sessed by the notion that these elements constitute seperate parts of a system 
enabling the system’s functionality. It is of importance which specific element is 
effective at a specific ‘location’ within the system, i.e. at a specific point of the 
system’s operation. The different elements of a system are not in principle inter-
changeable. In a clockwork, the arrangement of the cogwheels can not be 
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changed at will without changing (or even jeopardizing) the function of the 
clockwork. 
This arrangement of elements is meticulously employed in the design of digital 
games: in World of Warcraft, players may start with items adequate to the chal-
lenges posed to a new player, and use them to gradually acquire higher-quality 
items and overcome more demanding obstacles; and while a certain ‘enemy’ 
may pose a challenging opponent at a certain character level, the same enemy 
may be unconquerable at an earlier level, or become trivial later in the game. 
The delicate functionality of the game can only be maintained by the appropri-
ate arrangement of its elements.
This dependence of function and arrangement points to a hierarchical structure 
of the elements. ‘Hierarchical’ in this regard does not mark an organization in 
terms of absolute values; the specific characteristics of the elements, however, 
induce that a certain element may be integral at one point of the system, while 
being superfluous or even obstructive at another; conversely, at a certain point 
of a system a certain element may be vital for the functioning of the system, 
while another may be needless or impedimental. 
relations
The mere presence of elements within a border does not comply with the idea 
of a system, even if a hierarchical structure of these elements is taken into ac-
count. In order for the system to develop functional behavior, its elements must 
be in some way related to each other. In the case of the clockwork, the cog-
wheels must physically connect if movement is to be transmitted. A set of cog-
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wheels turning in a casing without touching each other will not result in any 
behavior of the system, but will be restricted to the behavior of its parts. The 
functional completeness of a personal computer necessitates that the graphics 
card is plugged into the mainboard, not simply lying on top of the harddrive. 
And quite obviously, the value of a new weapon in World of Warcraft is not de-
termined by its “statistics” alone (e.g. damage per second), but by the relation of 
these “stats” to those of challenging foes (e.g. their hitpoints).
This does not mean that the relation between elements must necessarily lead to 
perceivable action. The functional behavior of a system might just as well be de-
termined by stasis rather than perceivable change. The clockwork may not only 
contain parts that are related in a way that allows for the transmission of power, 
some parts may be related so that they restrict this transmission in a specific 
way. 
Accordingly, in the case of experiential systems, it is not the absence of relations 
that provides explanations for the non-occurence of events. When during the 
cold war the idea of nuclear deterrence was used to pacify a public terrified of a 
nuclear holocaust212, the whole concept was based on the assumed relation be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union; the non-occurence of a nuclear 
strike was perceived as the result of each state’s awareness of the other’s nuclear 
capabilities, not as the result of a lack of relations.  
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Even in digital games, which seem to grant action a much greater role than in-
action, the idea of deterrence through assumed relations can become significant. 
Though obstacles and encounters that are too hard for players of a certain level 
are sometimes obstructed by technical means, e.g. when players of World of 
Warcraft are simply denied access to a raid instance if they try to enter it with-
out an adequate number of fellow players, deterrence through assumed rela-
tions is a common and effective means of game design: the discovery of an 
oversized ‘mob’ with a red nametag and a skull instead of a level designation 
(indicating the enemy as a ‘raid mob’ or ‘epic encounter’) does not prompt to 
engage in a fight, but to flee or evade the enemy. The assumption of the enemy’s 
strength and endurance suggests instant player-death as a certainty, which is 
related to the inconvenience of losing time and to the damaging of player 
equipment, which again is related to item repair costs and the spending of in-
game money, which again is related to the efforts necessary to obtain this 
money in the first place. The assumed relations between the game’s elements, 
therefore, are not only a more immersive means to prevent her from taking cer-
tain actions than the mere technical prohibition of the action, they also evoke 
the whole scope of system experience, prompting players to make (obvious) de-
cisions guided by the relation of the system’s elements.
strategies and ressources
Relations between a system’s elements are a prerequisite if they are to be res-
sources (or obstacles) for the functionality of the system. The functional behav-
ior is dependent on one question: can the operation of one element influence the 
operation of another? 
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The idea of elements which are related to each other while at the same time be-
ing of hierarchical relevance for the systems functionality allows for the as-
sumption of ‘strategies’ applicable to the elements’ relations. As the system’s 
functionality is dependent on specific relations between specific elements at a 
certain point within the system, the connections made between these elements 
become of strategic importance. The assembly of a clockwork’s elements is 
guided by strategic decisions: will the connection between cogwheel A and 
cogwheel B lead to a translation of mechanical power desirable for the clock-
work’s functionality, or is a connection between cogwheel A and cogwheel C 
more consistent with the system’s desired functionality? This may seem banale 
in the mechanical example, but it is this assumption of strategic relations which 
is a constituting factor of experiential systems.
As experiential systems are assumed to be a device of cognitive organization, 
the general ‘goal’ of these systems lies in the meaningful interpretation of per-
ceptions. While the aspect of ‘goals’ will be discussed at a later point, it may be 
anticipated that the assumed relation between elements enables their strategic 
assessment in regard to an attainable goal: single elements are not simply expe-
rienced as unrelated components of a system, but the hierarchical structure and 
relation between these elements implies that it is desirable to ‘get’ from one 
element to another in a certain way. 
This idea of ‘getting to one point from another’ enables to experience a system’s 
elements as ‘ressources’, as they may not themselves constitute the system’s 
goals, but can be ‘converted’ into something else in order to make the goal more 
likely to be attained. 
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An experiential system of ‘owning a yacht’ may be functionally completed by 
paying a certain amount of money to buy the yacht. If I don’t own the ressource 
‘a certain amount of money’, the ressource of ‘I am a certified accountant’ may 
be experienced as convertible into a professional occupation providing income, 
which in turn may be converted into ‘a certain amount of money’, making the 
goal of ‘owning a yacht’ attainable.
And in digital games, it is the strategies of converting ressources that determine 
the gameplay possibilities per se. In World of Warcraft, the ‘core’ of the game 
may be seen in the efforts to convert available ressources into those not yet 
available. The ressource of time might be converted into completed quests, 
gathered materials or successful bargains in the auction house, which convert 
into the acquisition of money or items, ressources which again may be con-
verted into better chances to defeat enemies or craft better items. The different 
possibilities to convert one ressource into another may constitute the most sig-
nificant aspect for gameplay decisions, determining or at least suggesting play-
ers’ strategies of action.
It may seem short-sighted to imply that experiential systems are always aimed 
at providing strategies of action. But the idea of ‘action’ in this regard does not 
necessarily comply with Parsons’ notion of observable behavior, rooted “in the 
physical world and the living organism”213. Following the idea that experiential 
systems provide models for organizing perceptions in a meaningful way, ‘ac-
tion’ may consist in the intuitive decision to relate certain elements in a certain 
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way: if the goal of a mythological system is to provide a satisfactory explana-
tion of the sun’s movement across the sky, relating mythological entities in a 
way that accounts for this perceived phenomenon can be considered as action, 
strategically aimed at achieving this goal. 
More important, however, is the notion that strategies of action do not necessar-
ily result in performing an activity. As means of providing conclusive explana-
tory models, experiential systems do not in principle call for necessary actions, 
but more often than not will lead to the (intuitive) assessment that no action is 
required at all. The assumption that system experience is a general trait apply-
ing to the entirety of human experience implies that in most cases the systems 
we assume are primarily means to provide legitimation for refraining from de-
liberate activity in terms of a change of behavior: just like the assumption of a 
mythological (or cosmological) system accounting for the sun’s movement 
across the sky provides an explanation consistent enough not to call for imme-
diate action, it can be assumed that experiential systems generally allow for un-
hindered operation rather than constant behavioral change in everyday life. 
partial goals
‘Assembling’ a system by relating its elements in a strategic way does not mean 
that there is only one specific succession of strategies that will achieve the sys-
tem’s functionality. Every time a strategy is employed to ‘utilize’ the assumed 
relations of one element to another, the successive element is determined as a 
‘partial goal’ within the system. If alternate ‘partial goals’ both are regarded as 
compliant with the system’s functionality, the decision which strategy to follow 
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can not solely be guided by the demands determined by the system’s function-
ality.
If gps navigational systems and route planners can be trusted, the scenic route 
will get me to the same destination as the fastest route, which again may not be 
the most fuel efficient route leading to the same destination. The software may 
suggest all of these routes, as they all comply with the affordance of ‘reaching a 
destination’. As the different routes present contingent strategies to reach the 
same destination, the software cannot choose the optimal route for me, as long 
as I do not specify the criteria defining what I consider ‘optimal’ - a specifica-
tion which does not arise from the functional demands incorporated in a navi-
gational system, but from the likes and dislikes of the person using it. The sys-
tem itself only connects elements of a transportanion network in a way that 
links my current position with a future destination. I have to decide myself 
whether in reaching this destination I want to spend a minimum amount of 
time, whether I want to save as much fuel as possible or whether I want to visit 
the most interesting locations on the way to my goal. 
In the case of experiential systems, it is this aspect of ‘partial goals’ which (be-
side the goal of the system itself) provides the most obvious connection to the 
system’s ‘environment’. Due to the assumptive nature of these systems, this 
‘environment’ can be experienced as the person making the assumption, or may 
take the form of another, encompassing system, as will be shown later. 
Even when achieving the system’s goal is deemed necessary, the possibility to 
choose different strategies and setting different partial goals can enable a certain 
degree of agency. An experiential system arranging the means to ‘get into col-
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lege’ might present different viable options to achieve this goal. One of these 
options might be the aspiration of a football scholarship, which may be an ‘op-
timal’ strategy for those who enjoy doing sports and experience the challenge of 
physical training as a tempting concept, presenting a partial goal of satisfying 
physical accomplishment. For others, a strategy employing hard study and get-
ting good grades may be more tempting, as this strategy, while probably neces-
sitating long nights of mental strain at the library, minimizes the risk of getting 
bruises, and presents a partial goal of philosophic joy. And for those who favor 
risk over effort, it may even seem a viable option to kidnap the dean and 
blackmail the college into admission, establishing the thrill of notorious conduct 
as a partial goal. 
This example, though admittedly overstretched, illustrates several notable 
characteristics of experiential systems:
(1) First, the setting of specific strategies and the respective partial goals deter-
mines the nature of emerging experiences, even if the system’s functional goal 
does not change. Any of the proposed strategies in the ‘college’ example aim at 
enabling college admission as the system’s functional goal, but each strategy 
presents very different partial goals as the steps toward this goal, leading to dif-
ferent anticipations. The assumption that athletic achievements are a means to 
the desired end forms a different experience than the assumption that intellec-
tual accomplishment is the way to go. The setting of specific partial goals may 
be regarded as the main criterion in determining the character of the experience. 
(2) Secondly, this leads to the relevance of contingent strategies for the experi-
ence of agency within an assumed system. If, for some reason, the football 
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scholarship is regarded as the only way to get into college, there is no way to en-
gage in the process of shaping the experience of the system according to one’s 
personal preferences. While those with an affinity towards physical exercise 
may still experience the mandatory strategy as persuasive, those who don’t will 
find it disagreeable, and might even consider renouncing the initial goal. None 
of them, however, will experience themselves as engaged in the process of shap-
ing the system, as the strategies enabling the system’s functionality seem pre-
determined and do therefore not support an experience of agency.
(3) Thirdly, as the setting of different partial goals does not necessarily change 
the goal of the system, experiential systems may superficially seem alike even if 
the specific strategies employed lead to a very different character of the system. 
Different people may share the same goal in regard to the system, while at the 
same time experiencing the system in very different ways, depending on their 
decisions regarding its partial goals. However, this does not determine how 
these different experiences are dealt with. The initial impression of a shared ex-
perience can be scrutinized when the football scholar realizes that the grade-
grubbing student experiences the way to college in completely different terms. 
Then again, the shared goal can serve as a unifying element, when the kidnap-
per and the football scholar realize that in spite of their very different conduct, 
they both share a common goal. It is this friction between shared and divergent 
goals and strategies that is subject to processes of negotiation, resulting in the 
social construction of second order realities.
(4) Fourthly, due to the indetermination of experiential systems, the difference 
between a system’s functional goals and the partial goals within the system can 
not be ultimately determined. While the assumption that ‘admission to college’ 
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is the system’s functional goal may serve to embed the partial goal of a football 
scholarship in an according functional system, the same elements may simulta-
neously present a system employing ‘playing football’ as its functional goal, 
consequently appointing the aspect of ‘admission to college’ as a partial goal 
within the system. It can be assumed that these different systems do not emerge 
exclusionary, but that many overlapping experiential systems may apply simul-
taneously. The assessment of experiential systems can therefore not assume a 
consistent nature of these systems. Instead, the ‘sketchy character’ of system 
experience calls for incorporating the idea of indetermination by not only giv-
ing up the notion of functional completeness, but by also accounting for the er-
ratic application of experiential systems. 
goals 
It has already been pointed out that - in the case of experiential systems - the 
difference between the system’s functional goals and the partial goals within 
the system can not objectively and ultimately be determined. But even the 
seemingly objective functional goals of physical systems are subject to the same 
level of indetermination, when it is granted that the respective ‘purpose’ of 
physical systems arises from assumptive experiential systems.
In the case of the clockwork, it has only been assumed that the functional goal of 
the system is the movement of the hands at a certain speed - a viable assump-
tion as long as the clockwork is assessed as a tool to be used to measure time. If 
the specific clockwork is, for example, part of an experimental setup aimed at 
measuring the accuracy of a specific mode of assembly, or at testing the durabil-
ity of a new alloy used for the cogwheels, it is this measurement which becomes 
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the functional goal of the system. The movement of the hands may now be a 
means to control if and up to which point the assembly provides accurate 
transmission, or whether the alloy can bear the strain, becoming a partial goal 
aiming at fulfilling the system’s functional goal.
This indetermination may not be obvious in the case of digital games in general, 
as the goal-oriented character of games is often regarded as self-evident, and 
the ‘goal’ of the game seems to congruent with beating and, therefore, ending 
the game. This conception, however, does not account for the experiential as-
pects of playing a game, which are not sufficiently explained with the desire to 
‘get it over and done with’. The indetermination of a game’s goals and the par-
tial goals that constitute its course again become apparent in the case of 
MMORPGs, games in which a designated ‘end’ is not provided. While an ex-
ternal observation might, for example, content itself with the idea that these 
games’ goal is reaching the highest character level, this notion is contradicted 
by the fact that this highest level is only a prerequisite to engage in the game’s 
‘high level content’, a ‘partial goal’ required to explore its more challenging and 
exciting aspects. And while the acquiration of a specific item might be pointed 
out as a partial goal, enabling success against more demanding foes, this item 
might present itself as the functional goal for a player’s efforts for long stretches 
of time, temporarily constituting the single aim of her efforts before, through its 
acquisition, it regains its status as a partial goal and new ambitions are sought 
after. 
The assessment of experiential systems can therefore not rely on a definite con-
ception of the system’s functional goal. What serves as a partial goal within an 
experiential system can effortlessly take the place of its functional goal, drag-
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ging along with it what previously constituted the system’s function and ap-
pointing it the role of a partial goal.
Correspondingly, a mythological system may on the one hand follow the strat-
egy of employing social relations as an explanation for cosmological events, the 
consistent explanation being the functional goal, while the comprehensiveness 
of social relations serves as a partial goal to achieve this function. At the same 
time, the consistency of the explanatory model may be a partial goal, serving as 
a strategy in legitimating the terms of social relations 214: the observation that 
the sun actually moves across the sky - through the linking of cosmological 
event and social relations - becomes evidence that the social relations used as a 
base for the explanation are eligible.
With this ambivalent character of the indetermination of their functional goals, 
the assessment of experiential systems’ potential aspects comes full circle and 
returns to the initial aspect of setting a border by making a first distinction. Just 
as this first distinction is the ‘blind spot’ of any experience and pre-determines 
the distinctive qualities of the experiential system, the difference between the 
system’s functional goals and its partial goals enabling this functionality is not 
necessarily deliberate, but is subject to the indeterminate character of experien-
tial systems.
For the assessment of experiential systems, this does not only mean that there is 
no way to ultimately single out a specific functional goal of any assumed expe-
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riential system. It also means that these systems can be constituted by different 
functional goals simultaneously. But the indetermination of experiential sys-
tems also challenges the idea of an ultimately delineated, closed system: if one 
system is experienced as an element of another, more encompassing system, the 
system’s functional goal now serves as a partial goal in a larger context. 
But how does this difference between an experience of discrete, closed systems 
and an experience of systems embedded in and dependent upon other systems 
account for the emergence or absence of an experience of play, pleasure and sat-
isfaction? In order to address this relation, it seems appropriate to examine the 
conditions under which experiential systems can be experienced as either dis-
crete or interrelated systems, and how this difference may serve as a useful 
category for the assessment of play experiences. This examination, however, re-
quires a closer look at the terms and conditions that guide the experience of sys-
tems as either discrete or embedded in other systems.
Systems within systems: Agency, Passivity and Mortification
According to the observation that a system’s elements can in some cases them-
selves be singled out and experienced as discrete, closed systems, any experien-
tial system can correspondingly be experienced as an element of another, more 
encompassing system. The former system’s functional goal becomes a partial 
goal supporting the newly established system’s function. 
In order to serve the purpose of a partial goal, however, the former system has 
to be experienced as a non-operative system, as its specific operations and ef-
fects are now pre-determined by their contribution to the encompassing sys-
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tem’s functionality. Strategies which seemed functionally equivalent and could 
be chosen ‘at will’ when the system was experienced discretely - and therefore 
enabled operational choices - may be evaluated very differently under the terms 
of the encompassing system, as the system itself now seems to serve a ‘higher 
purpose’.
In the example of a systemic experience of ‘college admission’, this system can 
be experienced as one element in an encompassing system of ‘advancing a pro-
fessional career’, thereby providing a partial goal in a bigger set of strategies. 
Contrary to the discrete experience of the different ways to get into college, the 
experience of demands deriving from the ‘larger’ system of pursuing a profes-
sional career may now determine which of the possible strategies conform with 
the encompassing system’s functionality, and which don’t. When professional 
expertise is assumed to be a key factor of successfully pursuing a professional 
career, the strategy of studying hard and getting good grades will become more 
than an optional strategy; it may be experienced as necessary to employ this 
specific strategy in order to fulfill the encompassing system’s functionality. If 
the experience of the ‘career system’ emphasizes competition or a multifaceted 
resumé, however, the focus on sports activities may present a viable or even 
necessary strategy. 
This is not to say that the experience of how one experiential system influences 
another is determined by rational assessments; as system experience is based on 
the idea of intuitive assumptions, which may or may not give rise to rational 
reflection, there is no reason to assume that the factors guiding the interplay of 
what is experienced as different systems necessarily arises from rational evalua-
tion. What counts is the intuitive assumption, the feeling, that decisions within 
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the system have consequences which are relevant outside the system’s borders, 
even if this feeling does not hold up to rational assessment. 
The difference between an experience of discrete systems and systems as ele-
ments of a bigger, encompassing system imposing its functional demands on 
the encompassed system may be decisive in determining whether the system 
can provide pleasurable, satisfying experiences, and may even equate to the 
question whether the experience is one of ‘play’.
Before the ‘pleasure’ of discrete systems and the ‘promise of satisfaction’ ena-
bling an idea of ‘play’ can be assessed, however, it is necessary to examine the 
contrary experience of non-discrete systems, and the different ways in which 
this experience may hinder the emergence of play, pleasure and satisfaction. As 
the ideas of ‘operationality’ and ‘choice’ are at the core of this difference, it may 
seem obvious to relate it with the idea of ‘agency’ - even if a closer look at the 
concept of ‘agency’ reveals that it can not simply be equated to pleasure and 
satisfaction.
different concepts of agency
When a system is experienced as a discrete system, and the decisions made 
within the system are experienced as having consequences only within the sys-
tem, different strategies can be employed, tested or disregarded, based on per-
sonal likes and dislikes, interests or whim. 
This ‘freedom of choice’ seems to constitute an experience of ‘agency’, as it al-
lows for a deliberate exploration of the system through making different deci-
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sions and exploring the outcome, thereby unraveling the contingency space of 
the system and gaining increasing competence in operating within the system. 
In regard to the assessment of pleasure, satisfaction and play, a premature an-
swer may suggest itself: if agency is pleasurable and satisfying, then the experi-
ence of agency may be the key to satisfying experiences. From a perspective of 
system experience, however, this is not a viable suggestion. 
Most notably, an experience of agency does not necessarily comply with a con-
cept of ‘factual’ agency as it is generally employed in the context of game stud-
ies. This notion of agency prevalent in game studies does not differentiate be-
tween the ‘actual’ possibility of choice within the game system and the experi-
ence of this freedom: when Janet Murray defines agency as "[...] the satisfying 
power to take meaningful action and see the results of our decisions and 
choices."215, this definition does not account for possible discrepancies between 
the factual possibility to choose different strategies within the system, and the 
experience that these different strategies are at one’s disposal.
In this conception, agency arises from the interplay of two factors: (1) the ‘fac-
tual’ availability of different strategies within the system and (2) the exploration 
of the resulting possibility spaces through action. For Murray, the experience of 
agency reflects a factual agency within the game system, which is made accessi-
ble by interacting with the system: “When the things we do bring tangible re-
sults, we experience [...] - the sense of agency.”216
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While this is a useful approach when it comes to the assessment of games and 
interactive media as artifacts, highlighting their specific characteristics in com-
parison to non-interactive media, which do not provide the same kind of ‘fac-
tual agency’, a focus on experiential systems requires a more exact differentia-
tion between ‘factual’ agency and the experience of agency. 
the experience of agency
As has been pointed out, system experience does not focus on the experience of 
systems (which can be argued as the base for Murray’s notion of agency), but 
on the organization of perceptions as systems or parts of systems.
Due to the assumptive character of experiential systems, the experience of 
agency does not necessarily reflect a ‘factual agency’ which can be explored 
through action. As a smoker, I may be convinced that ‘I can quit anytime I 
want’, thereby experiencing agency in regard to the assumed system, not be-
cause quitting will actually be this easy, but because I assume that the strategy of 
‘quitting’ can be chosen at will. Even if this assumption does not withstand the 
terms of my ‘actual’ addiction, it can be kept up as long as and because there is 
no action taken by which the assumption might be verified or disproved. An 
experience of agency is not necessarily dependent on ‘factual agency’ provided 
by the assumed system and verified through explorative interaction.
Conversely, the factual possibility of employing different strategies does not 
necessarily result in an experience of agency. A lack of experienced agency does 
in no way mean that taking action aimed at exploring different strategies would 
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result in failure or disappointment; it may simply mean that these different 
strategies are not experienced as viable possibilities and therefore not tested in 
the first place. In a psychotherapeutical context, the negotiation between a pre-
dominant and seemingly unavoidable strategy (equatable with an experience of 
non-agency) and the suggestion of viable alternatives (suggesting ‘factual’ 
agency as a possibility) is often regarded as a guiding therapeutic principle:
“Psychotherapy is effective whenever, through the joint efforts of the 
therapist and the patient, it brings to light a new meaning, one of the 
many possible meanings, from the patient’s story, and the new mean-
ing makes the symptom unnecessary. [...] Through this process of 
joint construction, a transformation occurs in the dominat [sic] stories 
of the patient/family, which allows for the inclusion of new experi-
ences, meanings, and (inter)actions.”217
This notion of psychotherapy as a loosening up of experiential ‘deadlocks’ is 
based on two assumptions: the assumption that (1) the patient’s suffering arises 
from her clinging to specific interpretations (resulting, in terms of system expe-
rience, in specific and unavoidable strategies), which seem inevitable to the pa-
tient; and the complementary assumption that (2) alternative interpretations 
(resulting in alternative strategies) are not only possible, but can be made acces-
sible to the patient, hence resolving the experiential deadlock. 
The suggestion of alternate ‘reality constructions’ as a means to enable an expe-
rience of agency necessary to enact alternative solutions is clearly favored by 
psychotherapeutical approaches rooted in constructivist theory, as it dissents 
with the realist notion predominant in “[...] the long tradition of psychotherapy, 
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from Freud to contemporary cognitive therapists, who construe psychotherapy 
as an authoritative procedure for improving a client's degree of 'reality 
contact’.”218. The relinquishing of a realist viewpoint shifts the perspective from 
‘faulty’ interpretations to the question of experienced agency in regard to alter-
nate options: problems may not simply arise because the current interpretation 
or strategy is objectively ‘wrong’, but because it has proved useful in the past219 
- therefore presenting itself not only as a (delusive) solution, but at the same 
time prohibiting the exploration of alternate strategies in the present situa-
tion220.
From this viewpoint, the respective ‘problem’ does not lie in a ‘factual’ lack of 
alternate strategies, but in a self-induced constraint, which does not allow to 
give up the current strategy, even if it is not (or no longer) viable, or in other 
words: even though ‘factual’ agency may be possible, it is not enacted because 
action is prohibited by a lacking experience of agency.
It can therefore be argued that the notion of an experience of agency being de-
pendent on ‘factual’ agency which is explored through action is not viable in 
regard to the assessment of experiential systems. An experience of agency can 
arise in regard to a system which does not allow for alternate strategies, as long 
as no action is taken to contradict the assumption. Conversely, the possibility of 
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alternate strategies does not necessarily lead to an experience of agency; in-
stead, an experience of non-agency may prohibit the exploration of these alter-
natives. 
‘Factual agency’ and ‘experienced agency’, therefore, present two very different 
concepts, which may at some times, but not necessarily conjoin. However, while 
the ‘causes’ for an experience of agency may not easily be determined, it is this 
experience of agency which presents one of the possible conditions for an expe-
rience of play. But it is not the only one. While play can consist in the experience 
of available strategies of action, there are examples which suggest that even the 
converse experience of ‘non-agency’ may enable an experience of play.
Passivity
The idea of ‘agency’ as it is conceived of in the game studies discourse is fo-
cussed on the experience of choice of actions. Guided by the specific nature of 
interactive media, it is obvious that activity is the focus of attention. But it does 
not suffice to limit the idea of pleasurable play to the notion of active engage-
ment. In the case of sexual games of submission and dominance, it is obvious 
that for the person taking the submissive role, activity and choice are not the 
appealing aspects of the game, but the idea of passivity and submission. Still, as 
long as the activities (and passivities) are conducted in form of a game, the idea 
is to provide pleasure and satisfaction for both partners.
While for the dominant partner, the idea of agency is clearly present, it is not 
the prospect of activity and deliberate decisions that accounts for this pleasure 
for the submissive partner, but the relinquishing of independence and auton-
Nikolaus König:  The Play Experience
283
omy. The role of the submissive consists of doing what one is told to do, and 
enduring whatever ‘torment’ the dominant partner conceives of. How can this 
experience of being at some other person’s mercy, of sometimes literally being 
‘flat on one’s back’ be consistent with the idea of pleasurable play? Experienc-
ing oneself as a helpless victim is commonly not conceived of as a desirable ex-
perience, just as the experience of oneself as a sadistic oppressor is rather nega-
tively connotated in daily life.
From the perspective of system experience, the answer is once again the experi-
ence of discrete systems. For the submission/dominance game to be a pleasur-
able experience of play, the prerequisite is the mutual understanding that the 
playful acts within the system are not related to the system’s environment. 
Maybe even more than in other games, the discrete nature of the experience is 
emphasized not only by a clear negotiation of the game’s beginning and end 
and the establishment of a clearly ‘fictional’ setup (be it an adequate ‘decora-
tion‘ of the play-space, or simply by addressing the partner with a fictional 
name or appellation).  It is also expressed by the stipulation of ‘safe words’, and 
the facilitation of reassuring security measures - safeguards that are not only 
important to guarantee physical safety, but also to provide a feeling of mutual 
trust. In regard to the playful experience of the discrete system, this trust con-
sists in one crucial agreement: the consent that the actions within this system 
are play actions, that they have no consequences for the world ‘outside the 
game’, and that they are not dependent on this outside world’s conditions.
Without this agreement, the setup would not be ‘play’, and the experience 
would not provide pleasure and satisfaction. If the roles enacted within the 
game were considered as reflections of more general attitudes, as manifestations 
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of the participants’ ‘real’ characters and their relationship, the playful experi-
ence would give way to the more serious negotiation of these personal attrib-
utes and their implications in real life. 
Conforming with the idea of a ‘magic circle’, the game is clearly confined to 
boundaries of space and time and, more importantly, it is declared that the acts 
within the game’s confines have no consequences outside these confines. The 
allocation of roles in the game does not reflect the character of the partners out-
side the game, nor is it conceived of as a manifestation of an imbalanced power 
structure in real life. As long as the experience of the game as a discrete system 
holds up, the submissive doesn’t need to worry ‘am I really a passive, obedient 
person?’, just as the dominant partner doesn’t need to ask ‘am I really a sadistic 
control freak?’. The discrete experience of the game rejects the conditions of the 
encompassing environment, the ‘real world’, as its guiding terms, just as it con-
fines the implications of its events to the system itself. This discrete experience 
allows for a mutual exploration of roles and activities, without regarding these 
events as relevant for or dependent on the evaluation of the bigger, encompass-
ing systems that are assumed to constitute ‘real life’. 
If agency were the sole criterion for the emergence of pleasurable play and sat-
isfaction, submission/dominance games could provide this experience for the 
active partner at best. But it has to be assumed that neither agency nor the sur-
render to passivity itself constitutes this experience. Rather, it is the notion that 
whatever action is taken or omitted within the game, the consequences are lim-
ited to the system, and can be explored without leaving the system’s bounda-
ries. 
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From a perspective of system experience, Bateson’s notion of ‘play-actions’, 
which are “similar to, but not the same as”221 the ‘serious actions’ they resemble 
can be expanded to include not only actions, but also inactions that take place 
within the game system’s boundaries: no matter what decisions are made 
within the system, as long as the discretion of the system is maintained, it is the 
consequences of activities and passivities alike which do not become ‘serious’ as 
they stay within the system’s well-defined borders.
This exploration of consequences within a system also hints at the idea of satis-
faction: the discrete system promises to not only allow for a range of possible 
actions to be explored either by enacting or omitting these actions, it also prom-
ises that the consequences of these acts will become obvious within the system 
itself, instead of being effective only in another system, at a later time. The ex-
perience of consequences comes full circle with the actions and omissions re-
lated to these consequences within the system, enabling a satisfying experience.
Mortification
This idea of satisfaction as the exploration of consequences within a discrete 
system becomes obvious when opposed to the experience of systems as being 
not discrete, but dependent and related to other, encompassing systems. While 
this experience might also allow for a broad range of actions or an attitude of 
passivity, choices of action or inaction seem dependent on the consequences 
these choices might have for other experiential systems, and it might not even 
be certain how these encompassing systems can be delineated. When a system’s 
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borders are experienced as permeable or only vaguely specified, the risk of un-
calculable consequences can therefore become great enough to limit the pleas-
ure of exploring the possibilities within the system and experience the conse-
quences of these explorations in a satisfying way. 
The limitations arising from the experience of a system as dependent upon 
larger, encompassing systems do not consist in the absence of possible actions, 
nor in the impossibility to refrain from action. But the choices guiding what ac-
tions to take or to omit are not guided by the system’s functionality alone, but 
by the demands of other, less ‘manageable’ system. The consequences within 
the system alone are not the only conditions under which decisions and explo-
rations take place, as the experience of a ‘higher purpose’ limits the range of 
what seems viable within the system. In order to denote this phenomenon, 
which opposes the idea of ‘pleasurable, satisfying play’, I suggest the term 
‘mortification’, which Erving Goffman222 has used to describe the surrender of 
inmates to ‘total institutions’ in terms of the limitation of individualist tenden-
cies in favor of the totality of the institution’s demands: the term ‘mortification’ 
does not simply imply the absence of alternate possibilities of action or inaction, 
but the limitation of options by the assumption of consequences that are not re-
stricted to the system itself, but dependent on larger, encompassing and seem-
ingly more important systems. 
Mortification is the surrender to limitations in favor of the demands of systems 
of ‘higher order’, in favor of a ‘higher purpose’. The options within the system 
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are not explored in a pleasurable, satisfying way, not because these options do 
not seem available, but even though they do. 
The concept of ‘mortification’ is directly related to the idea of ‘seriousness’ as an 
opposite of play. An experience of overwhelming complex interrelations be-
tween experiential systems, experienced as embedded in larger, more encom-
passing systems doesn’t provide manageable spaces of experience which can 
safely be explored and approached as ‘operative systems’. When everything is 
experienced as potentially related to everything else, if any action may have un-
foreseen consequences that go far beyond the current experience, there is hardly 
any room to safely explore different actions and strategies; instead of enabling 
the exploration of contingent possibilities and alternatives, it may seem un-
avoidable to follow well-trodden paths, to accept things ‘they way they are’, 
and seek out the ‘right course of action’ instead of exploring contingent possi-
bilities. 
This is not to say that ‘the world we’re living in’ is ‘more complex than ever’. 
Such an argument would for one imply a ‘world’ whose complexity can be as-
sessed objectively. Furthermore, it can be assumed that ‘the world’ always 
seems a little more complex than any available mental concept designed to 
make sense of it. What can be argued, however, is that the idea of growing 
complexity is a prevailing element in the experience of an “information age”. 
For this experience of complexity, questions of how information is assesed, how 
it is distributed and how it is organized in the media are of secondary impor-
tance. What is important is that the demand for instant and comprehensive in-
formation on the one hand, and the growing distrust of the value of specific in-
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formation on the other clearly promotes an experience of increasing complexity 
that hardly invites an unencumbered attitude of playful exploration. 
Instead of this explorative attitude, which enables the application of a multitude 
of different strategies and evaluate the outcome, certain strategies which have 
already proven to be ‘successful’ may be promoted as the ‘right and necessary’ 
course of action. These strategies take the place of a formerly contingent system, 
and instead of allowing this system to be experienced by exploring a multitude 
of different strategies, a single ‘path’ through the system is emphasized and 
presented as obligatory. The system becomes a ‘black box’, truncated to a static 
form instead of being experienced as a dynamic, contingent system, and instead 
of providing the pleasure of exploration, it suggests a single and obligatory 
course of action. 
This mortification in favor of a ‘higher purpose’ is obvious in everyday, real life 
activities; for instance, deliberately not paying my electricity bills might provide 
interesting insights in the functionality of banking, debt collection and the elec-
tricity business. But as the paying of my electricity bill seems related to my per-
sonal financial management, my quality of life and, finally, more existential 
needs like illuminating my home and cooking my meals, I don’t deliberately 
take the risk. Usually, the consequences of not paying my bills only become ob-
vious when I don’t have the money to do so, and at that point, I will probably 
not experience these consequences in a playful and explorative mood, but again 
as an unavoidable and, therefore, unpleasant mishap.
But even the engagement in what is readily called a ‘game’ can easily become 
less pleasurable and more ‘serious’ if this engagement is not experienced as the 
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exploration of a discrete system, but if the ‘borders’ of the system seem to dis-
solve: if World of Warcraft is used as a platform to gain the respect of other play-
ers, or my skills in Sim City are experienced as a measure of my chances of suc-
cess in real life, the tolerance towards failure can become very small indeed. In-
stead, it becomes increasingly important to succeed, and in order to do so, the 
need to employ the ‘right’ strategies becomes more important than the pleasure 
of the game itself; the idea of a ‘higher purpose’ favors the mortification of the 
experienced system over an emergence of ‘play’.
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3.3 Play as Pleasure and Satisfaction within discrete 
systems
There is an old saying: “Quidquid agis, prudenter agas, et respice finem” 
(“Whatever you do, do it wisely, and mind the outcome”). If the world is expe-
rienced as a complex arrangement of interdependent systems, there is a pretty 
threatening aftertaste to this dictum. When the consequences of my actions or 
inactions are unclear, the demand to ‘mind’ these consequences can become a 
serious burden. But an experience of overburdening responsibilities will hardly 
leave any room for playful exploration. Even if there is a notion of alternate 
possibilities, the necessity to operate ‘successfully’ within the system in order to 
guarantee a certain outcome seems to call for strategies and assumptions which 
have already proven successful in the past (or are supposed to have done so), 
and favors a careful and deliberate approach over the casual and playful, but 
potentially risky exploration of possibilities whose outcome is uncertain. 
In contrast to this ‘mortification’ - the self-induced abstinence from alternate 
(and possibly more rewarding) possibilities in favor of the ‘higher purpose’ of 
ensuring successful operation - the idea of play as the experience of discrete 
systems enables an explorative attitude, in which alternate possiblities can be 
‘played with’, tried out, pursued and rejected freely and confidently; as the con-
sequences of actions or inactions are experienced as limited to the system, the 
system can safely be assessed and re-assessed, its contingencies allowed to ‘un-
ravel’, instead of truncating the system to the predetermined function within a 
larger system.
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System experience, which has been argued as a basic ‘feature’ of the human 
mind, becomes limited or even contradicted when mortification leads to the 
truncating of experiential systems as ‘black boxes’ with a predetermined func-
tion. As has been argued, the organization of experiences in systemic terms is 
inherently guided by the dynamic nature of these systems, and as a basic hu-
man trait, it unfurls only in the idea of explorative operation and the unraveling 
of contingencies. 
This notion of ‘operative systems’ finally leads back to Ernst von Glasersfeld’s 
remarks on ‘curiosity’: it is indeed a pleasurable experience to ‘learn’, but this 
pleasure does not arise from the mere acquisition of knowledge, from the fact 
that some kind of information is gained. It is the way this information is ac-
quired that provides satisfying experiences. Adopting a present understanding - 
an understanding which is being ‘taught and accepted’ as approved knowledge 
- is not pleasurable in itself, as it provides a static conception of knowledge in-
stead of an experience of dynamic and contingent systems. While this appro-
priation of ‘approved’ information and strategies is often promoted as efficient 
and necessary, it also requires this ‘allusion to the inevitable’ in order to account 
for its lack of inherent pleasure. 
Given that ‘system experience’ is indeed a general human trait, and that the ex-
plorative inquiry of experiences organized as dynamic, operative and contin-
gent systems is a basic mode of mental operation, this ‘inquisitive approach’ - 
the living out of Glasersfeld’s notion of ‘curiosity’ - is denied when a specific 
attitude, interpretation or action is enforced through the idea of inevitability; 
even if alternate possibilities seem present, they are relinquished in favor of the 
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‘higher purpose’ of success, and the experiential system becomes truncated and 
static, giving way to an experience of mortification.
In order to provide the emergence of pleasure and satisfaction, the experience of 
systems as discrete and delineated is a necessary prerequisite. Contrary to an 
experience of mortification, the experience of discrete systems allows to give up 
the imperative of success in favor of an explorative and ultimately playful atti-
tude, an attitude which is consistent with the intuitive assumption of dynamic, 
operative and contingent systems; this attitude is constituted by the unhindered 
application - the ‘living out’ - of what has been argued as the basic human trait 
of ‘system experience’.
3.3.1 ‘Why do people play games?’
The assumption that pleasure and satisfaction arise from the experience of dis-
crete and thereby operational systems, in which consequences are regarded as 
limited to the system itself and can therefore be tried out without the risk of un-
foreseen ramifications, provides a possible answer to the question posed at the 
beginning of this chapter and this thesis’ guiding question: ‘Why do people 
play games?’.
While a playful attitude, which allows an explorative approach and dynamic 
operation in regard to an experienced system, is possible in any given situation, 
it is the idea of games’ that makes the suggestion of such an attitude explicit; be 
it Huizinga’s conception of a ‘magic circle’, Caillois’ notion of ‘unproductivity’ 
and ‘voluntariness’, or Bateson’s idea of play actions being ‘similar to, but not 
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the same as’ the real actions they represent - conceptions of ‘games’ are inher-
ently guided by a prevailing principle: they describe experiences which are re-
garded as isolated events, as realms of action (or passivity) in which decisions 
do not influence the ‘outside world’, as ‘safe spaces’ enabling risk-free explora-
tion. The notion of ‘games’ is equal to the idea of discrete systems.
This conception of ‘games’ does in no way constitute a definition of games in a 
realist sense. From a perspective of system experience, which suggests a model 
of mental organization in systemic terms rather than the experience of systems, 
the idea of ‘games’ must accordingly be regarded as an experiential category. 
The notion of ‘games’ is in itself a social construction, an agreement to regard 
certain experiences as inconsequential for the ‘rest of life’. Labelling an experi-
ence as a ‘game’ constitutes a ‘carte blanche’ for a playful and explorative atti-
tude, giving free rein to the enactment of system experience, and eliminating 
any idea of necessity or inevitability. Societal demands are precluded from the 
notion of ‘games’, as it is the societal agreement of insignificance itself that de-
nies the idea of a ‘higher purpose’, and renders an experience of mortification 
unnecessary.
Games, therefore, describe nothing less but experiences which are considered 
insignificant and, therefore, available for explorative inquiry without the need 
to guarantee successful operation. This is, of course, not a statement about the 
actual significance of these experiences. This question is not part of the present 
examination and, from a constructivist perspective, it may not even be a viable 
question. In regard to the experience of play, pleasure and satisfaction, it is 
much more crucial that the notion of ‘games’ constitutes an agreement, a con-
struction, which allows certain experiences to be detached from the general idea 
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of ‘real life’, and therefore allows for an attitude of explorative operation, for the 
trying out or neglecting of multiple strategies or interpretations, a playful atti-
tude in which the intuitive application of system experience can take effect, and 
the mortifying experience of a higher purpose gives way to an experience of 
unconcerned curiosity. Games, therefore, promote a playful attitude, and 
through the label ‘this is a game’, the basic human trait of system experience 
can unravel and give rise to experiences of pleasure and satisfaction.
Friedrich Schiller’s often quoted statement that “man only plays when he is in 
the fullest sense of the word a human being, and he is only fully a human being 
when he plays”223 is far too easily simplified to a contradiction between life’s 
serious burdens and the joys of play. From a perspective of system experience, 
however, it is the notion of ‘fullness’ that gives a specific significance to his 
statement: based on the assumption that system experience is a general, intui-
tive and universal mode of human cognition, experiences can only become 
pleasant and satisfying when this mode can blithely be lived out through an 
explorative and playful attitude - an attitude which is openly invited by the 
declaration: ‘This is a game’. It is this invitation to play, the permission to give 
in to the basic human trait of system experience, which may serve as a viable 
answer to the question: ‘why do people play games?’.
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von Briefen”, Reclam, Stuttgart, 2000, p. 62f. english translation: Wilkinson, Elizabeth 
M.; Willoughby, L.A.: “Friedrich Schiller: On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a series 
of letters”, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967, p. 107.
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4 Summary, Implications & Conclu-
sion
“What if we've been looking at this all wrong? 
What if this is not about physics, but about people?”
(J.J. Abrams)224
4.1 Summary
This thesis project has been guided by two different, if complementary, perspec-
tives: on the one hand the idea that an application of constructivist concepts to 
the assessment of play and games might provide a valuable addition to the 
theoretical framework underlying the game studies discourse, expanding the 
range of viable models of understanding applicable to this field of research in a 
way that allows for a more comprehensive understanding of phenomena of 
games and play. The other perspective derived from the attempt to expand con-
structivist theory itself by applying some of its basic concepts to phenomena of 
play and games, phenomena which not only seem closely related to constructiv-
ist epistemology, but also highlight the complex and sometimes contradictory 
processes guiding the construction of realities, fantasies and make-believe, 
thereby presenting an opportunity to challenge and re-assess basic constructiv-
ist assumptions.
In order to enable this dual perspective, the thesis has focussed on the experien-
tial aspects of play rather than confining itself to an assessment of the content 
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and structure of games alone; the resulting player-centered approach, however, 
was guided by the attempt to highlight the multitude and indetermination of 
possible player experiences without losing track of the significance the game 
artifact has in constructing these experiences. The discussion of this ‘play expe-
rience’ was hinged on the assessment of a research question which is not only 
central to the game studies discourse, but also evokes the anthropological di-
mension of constructivist theory: ‘why do people play games?’
The first part of the thesis has highlighted different aspects of ‘play’ from a con-
structivist perspective. Basic constructivist concepts have been discussed as 
starting points for ‘constructivist game studies’, and the analogies between 
computer games and constructivist epistemology have been pointed out (see 
Chapter 1.1). The relation between the artificiality of games and the idea of real-
ity has been examined, and it has been argued that the possibility to satisfy ‘real 
life needs’ through playing games is highly dependent on the players’ willing-
ness to grant the game’s rules a certain reality status by accepting them as guid-
ing factors for their decisions; a willingness which, again, is dependent on the 
players’ desire to experience success and accomplishment and, therefore, hints 
at the players’ crucial role in constructing the significance of the game world, a 
significance which can be grasped by the notion of ‘realization’ rather than ‘re-
ality’. (see Chapter 1.2). Definitions of ‘play’ have been discussed, and it has 
been argued that ideas of ‘play’ predominant in the game studies discourse are 
characterized by delineating concepts, defining ‘play’ in comparison to ‘non-
play’ or ‘real life’; the limited viability of these delineating concepts has been 
shown, and an alternate conception rooted in Friedrich Schiller’s ‘play theory’ 
and the idea of mechanical play has been suggested. Different examples rele-
vant to the field of game studies have been employed in order to show the vi-
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ability and benefits of this conception of play as an intermediating force (see 
Chapter 1.3). The methodological problems posed by the contingent character 
of gameplay experiences and the seemingly infinite variations of narratives 
emerging from these experiences have been addressed, and an attempt has been 
made to open up these contingencies for methodic assessment,  taking into ac-
count the multitude and subjectivity of narrations on the players’ side, while 
still making the dependency of these constructions on interconnections with the 
game product itself tangible (see Chapter 1.4).
The second part of this thesis has temporarily shifted the focus from ‘play’ to 
the construction of experiences on a more general level. In the form of three 
case studies, it has been examined how different experiences can arise from the 
perception of ‘events’, and how these events and experiences can be assessed 
according to the idea of ‘first order’ and ‘second order’ realities. A distinction 
has been suggested between what has been termed the ‘experiential set up’, 
constituting the basic elements and their relations subsumized as a perceived 
event, and the ‘experiential perspective’ which, through application of values 
and beliefs, can give rise to very different actual experiences. On the example of 
the mediated events revolving around September 11th 2001 and the hollywood 
movie Independence Day, the first case study has illustrated how a similar expe-
riential set up can lead to very different experiences, depending on the experi-
ential perspective taken when these events are perceived and assessed, and has 
highlighted the possibility to examine mediated events in regard to their expe-
riential set up, even before the application of values and beliefs determines a 
certain interpretation (see Chapter 2.1). 
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In order to examine the significance of this ‘experiential set up’ for the construc-
tion of experiences arising from playing games and interacting with virtual 
worlds, the second and third case study have investigated the relation between 
the experiential set up of a game’s fictional backdrop and the experiences sug-
gested by the possibilities of action and decision enabled by its rules and me-
chanics. An illustration of this relation was based on the observation that the 
‘contemporary zombie topos’, even though it is a common fictional motive in 
digital games, is completely absent from the world of MMORPGs; it has been 
attempted to investigate this topos’ experiential set up and the different rules 
and mechanics through which games can either support or neglect the emer-
gence of corresponding experiences.
The second case study has therefore examined the experiential set up of the 
‘contemporary zombie topos’,  and has argued that, even before narrative de-
vices are employed, the experiential set up of the topos is a manifestation of the 
‘horror motive’, which has been shown to depend on experiences of isolation 
and, therefore, experiences of the self, detached from societal demands (see 
Chapter 2.2). In an attempt to account for the absence of this topos from 
MMORPGs, the experiential set up established by these games’ rules and me-
chanics has been examined in the third case study, and compared to the genre of 
so-called Survival Horror Games, which make frequent use of the ‘contempo-
rary zombie topos’. On a specific example it has been shown how the experien-
tial set up of MMORPGs suggests experiences of the individual embedded in 
society, contradicting the experiential possibilities of the zombie topos, while 
Survival Horror games employ strategies that are highly consistent with the 
idea of ‘horror as isolation’. Ilustrated by this example, the interplay between 
the experiential set up provided by a game’s fiction and the different gameplay 
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experiences suggested by its rules and mechanics has been argued as a key ele-
ment in the construction of gameplay experiences. However, while an assess-
ment of an event’s experiential set up as a precondition for later experiences 
might imply a certain ‘objective’ quality, it has been argued that the concept of 
‘experiential set up’ is consistent with the idea of ‘first order realities’ - construc-
tions which are based on social and cultural agreements, but constructions 
nonetheless (see Chapter 2.3).
After the first part of this thesis has outlined basic issues of the assessment of 
play and games, and its second part has discussed different aspects underlying 
the construction of experiences through games and media, the third part has 
addressed the research question more directly: ‘Why do people play games?’. 
Contrary to instrumentalist explanations, which highlight the pragmatic bene-
fits of play, it has been argued that the definitory agreements of the game stud-
ies discourse as well as the constructivist approach underlying this thesis call 
for a focus on the inherent qualities of play, and that it is the nature of the ‘play 
experience’ itself that might provide a possible answer see (Chapter 3.1.1). The 
idea of ‘fun’ as a general explanatory principle for the fascination of playing 
games has been given up in favor of the idea of ‘satisfaction’, which again has 
been traced back to the pleasure arising from the solving of problems, and ar-
gued to be independent from the significance of the problem itself, thereby 
forming a link to the construction of experiences of ‘make believe’ and, more 
specifically, the ‘play experience’ (see Chapter 3.1.2). In order to make this ‘play 
experience’ tangible, the need for an anthropological approach has been argued, 
an approach which has been shown to be consistent with the concerns underly-
ing constructivist theory (see Chapter 3.1.3). Based on the assumption that the 
organization of cognitive constructions as systems can be argued as a general 
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human trait, and therefore provides an anthropological perspective on the con-
struction of experiences, an according model of ‘system experience’ has been 
suggested (see Chapter 3.2); as the ‘systems paradigm’ is already an established 
concept, it has been clarified how a constructivist-anthropological model of 
‘system experience’ deviates from established concepts of ‘systems’, and in 
which aspects it shares similar notions (see Chapter 3.2.1). Different examples 
have been employed to show that the notion of ‘system experience’ provides a 
viable model of cognitive organization not only as a deliberate ‘tool’, but also 
on an inutitive level; that this mode of organization does in no way imply a sys-
temic organization of an assumed ontological world, but shows even in cases in 
which a systemic organization has been intentionally excluded; and that con-
siderations on early human development support the notion that ‘system expe-
rience’ may be independent from cultural conventions, but constitutes a basic 
human trait, therefore meeting the requirements of an anthropological approach 
(see Chapter 3.2.2). Based on the notion of indetermination as a distinctive fea-
ture of experiential systems, a model of system experience has been developed 
by discussing basic aspects of these systems: borders, elements, hierarchical struc-
tures, strategies, partial goals and goals have been illustrated on the example of 
physical systems, applied to the idea of experiential systems, and assessed in 
regard to the experience of digital games (see Chapter 3.2.3). Finally, the experi-
ence of these systems as discrete systems, independent from the demands of 
other experienced systems, has been pointed out as a constituting factor for the 
‘play experience’: contrary to the ‘mortification’ arising from the assumption of 
‘higher purposes’, practical constraints or societal demands, the experience of a 
system as discrete allows for an exhaustive exploration of the actions and con-
sequences within this system, enabling the unhindered application of what has 
been assumed as the general human trait of ‘system experience’. This unre-
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served probing of an experiential system’s contingencies has been argued as the 
source of experiences of pleasure and satisfaction, and as the constituting char-
acteristic of the ‘play experience’, thereby providing a viable explanation for the 
inherent satisfaction of ‘play’ and, consequently, answering the research ques-
tion ‘why do people play games?’ from a constructivist-anthropological per-
spective (see Chapter 3.3).
4.2 Implications
As the basic aim of this thesis was to measure up to the dual perspective out-
lined above - the expansion of the theoretical framework underlying the field of 
game studies by adapting constructivist considerations to its field of research, 
and the attempt to use phenomena of play and games as an opportunity to chal-
lenge and re-assess basic constructivist assumptions, this project does not seem 
complete without hinting at the possible implications its findings might have in 
regard to both, constructivist considerations and the game studies discourse. 
This discussion is in no way intended to be exhaustive, but an attempt to high-
light some of the basic aspects that may provide starting points for further ex-
amination.
4.2.1 Implications for the game studies discourse
As a contribution to the field of game studies, it is the idea of ‘play as an experi-
ential category’ and the constructivist-anthropological model of ‘system experi-
ence’ as a conceptional tool to approach this idea that promise to have the most 
profound implications for the assessment of play and games. The ‘player cen-
Nikolaus König:  The Play Experience
303
tered approach’ deriving from this idea emphasizes the importance of individ-
ual constructions on the players’ side, but - and this has been a recurring issue 
in the course of this project - it does not promote a mere alternative to the as-
sessment of game artifacts currently predominating the field, but is aimed at the 
interplay between the multitude of possible player interpretations and the con-
tingency fields of experience opened up by the game artifact itself. This ap-
proach suggests a variety of new perspectives on issues relevant for the field.
(1) Shifting the Magic Circle
A focus on the experiential aspects of ‘play’ might measure up to the decreasing 
viability of the ‘magic circle’ idea when the dissolution of a game’s borders be-
comes an objective of game design efforts. On the one hand, games are increas-
ingly integrated into other parts of life by being designed ‘for a purpose’, be it 
in the form of educational games, training and advertising games, or in the at-
tempt to apply “the mechanics of gaming to nongame activities to change peo-
ple’s behavior”225, which is the central idea of the upcoming ‘gamification 
movement’226. On the other hand, the demands of an outside world are becom-
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225 “Gamification 101: An Introduction to the Use of Game Dynamics to Influence Be-
havior”, Bunchball, Inc., 2010, www.bunchball.com/gamification/gamification101.pdf, 
p. 2. 
226 At the time this thesis is written, the ‘gamification movement’ may still content it-
self with the application of ‘gamey’ adornments and stale incentives to otherwise con-
ventional processes, and remains either unacknowledged by game scholars, or keenly 
criticized as a ‘perversion’ of the idea of gaming, e.g.: Bogost, Ian: “Persuasive Games: 
Exploitationware”, in: “Gamasutra - The Art & Business of Making Games”, May 2011, 
http://www.gamasutra.com/view/feature/6366/persuasive_games_exploitationware
.php. It might, however, not be long before the same principles that are employed in 
game design are actually inherent parts of business and commerce, and while the ‘pur-
pose’ of these efforts might differ from common notions of ‘gaming’, and even deserve 
criticism, their investigation still seems justified. 
ing more and more dominant within games, which is not only apparent on an 
abstract level when questions of ‘morals and ethics in games’ are concerned227, 
but shows in a quite pragmatic way in the growing implementation of ‘micro-
transactions’ as a source of revenue for the game industry, which makes the 
‘greater demands’ of everyday life - in the form of financial transactions - an in-
herent part of game mechanics. 
These examples let the idea of a ‘magic circle’ as a constituting factor of games 
appear unhelpful or even obsolete, and call for a shift of perspective which 
might be consistent with this thesis’ considerations. A focus on play as an expe-
riential category allows to go beyond the limitations of the structure of game 
artifacts, and suggests a closer examination of the construction processes on the 
players’ side. While the idea of ‘borders’ has been a central aspect of this thesis, 
these borders are not regarded as constituted by the game artifact, but as expe-
riential borders, which to draw is incumbent on the game’s players rather than 
its designers (see Chapter 3.2.3). Questions arising from this conception of play 
as an experiential category might include:
What can games do to support an experience of play, even if the game artifact is 
connected to real life problems, demands and obligations? Are respective ‘game 
systems’ still made accessible for free exploration if the ‘higher purpose’ of or-
ganizing real-life actions and decisions is a driving force behind this game? 
How can an experience of play emerge even if the game artifact is connected to 
our everyday problems, demands and obligations? What is the players’ contri-
bution to this emergence, and how does it change their experience of processes 
outside the game? How influential is the players’ desire to experience play 
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M.A., 2009.
when this contradiction threatens to hinder its emergence? And - drawing on 
this thesis’ considerations on play as an intermediating force - does this contra-
diction itself become subject of playful negotiation?
(2 ) Meaning Generation
Assessing the different ways games generate ‘meaning’ is one of the central 
concerns of the game studies discourse; not only has the desire to use games as 
a means of expression, education or persuasion lead to growing interest in 
games’ potential to express ideas and make complex relations tangible, the 
question how games can achieve this potential is also at the center of attention 
when it comes to assessing possible negative effects games can have on their 
players, be it the concern about virtual violence or the discussion of morals and 
ethics in games. 
All these perspectives on games’ potential to generate meaning easily lead to a 
rather onesided conception about games as a ‘cause of meaning’ and the ‘ef-
fects’ they might have on their players. While this conception allows to focus on 
a clear-cut idea of game artifacts, it seems obvious that any attempt to address 
the emergence of ‘meaning’ as a cognitive phenomenon must employ a more 
encompassing view by accounting for the players’ role in constructing this 
meaning. This view does not disregard the necessity to gain a better under-
standing of game structures as a significant part of these constructions; it does, 
however, require a closer examination of the interplay between game artifacts 
and cognitive processes on the players’ side, as the creation of meaning, while it 
may use a game’s specific terms and conditions as its starting point, is always 
incumbent on the players. This interplay may be important for an understand-
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ing of constructing meaning in traditional media, but it is even more significant 
in regard to digital games: as this thesis has tried to show, players do not simply 
enact and interpret gameplay events, it is the application of players’ values, be-
liefs and interpretations which in turn determines the form these gameplay 
events take (see Chapter 1.4). This thesis has suggested a variety of conceptional 
tool to make this interplay more tangible: 
A conception of play as an intermediating principle, enabling the negotiation 
between contradicting demands, has been suggested, and its benefits discussed 
on various examples (see Chapter 1.3). This conception brings into focus the 
space opened up between these contradictions, a space which emerges between 
the contradictory demands of the game world, and the players’ effort to make 
sense of actions and decisions possibile within the game world’s rules. One side 
of this interplay has already become an integral part of the game studies dis-
course in the notion of rule-based statements as games’ basic expressive means, 
made accessible by the idea of ‘procedural rhetorics’228. 
But the examination of a game’s rules alone does not account for the emergence 
of experiences and the construction of meaning. While it is valuable and even 
necessary to evaluate the expressive strategies of games, this evaluation will 
only illuminate one aspect of this emergence, the ‘systemic statements’ game 
designers can make by modelling their conception of certain issues and events: 
“In my opinion, this is how (violence/love/economy/injustice/a world after 
the zombie apocalypse) works.” The emergence of experiences and meaning is 
dependent on the game facilitating processes of negotiation within these state-
ments’ conditions by prompting players: “What do you make of it?”. 
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In order to get a clearer conception of the different parts of this process, this the-
sis, guided by the idea of first and second order realities, has suggested a differ-
entiation between a game’s ‘experiential set up’, characterizing the contingent 
spaces opened up by a game’s rules and mechanics, and the ‘experiential per-
spective’ taken by players when values and beliefs are applied to and tested 
against the game world, and actions and decisions within the terms and condi-
tions of the game are explored in an effort to ‘make sense’ (see Chapter 2). 
While this differentiation initially delineates the different aspects which deter-
mine the experiential space within which meaning is generated, the attempt to 
examine the efforts to ‘make sense’ themselves have led to ‘system experience’ 
as a model to make tangible the terms and conditions under which this mean-
ing is generated by suggesting a viable conception of how experiences arising 
within this space may be organized (see Chapter 3.2). It has been a core argu-
ment of this thesis that the experiential spaces opened up between players and 
the rule-based ‘statements’ of the game world can be made tangible, if they are 
approached according to their contingent character and as a result of the inter-
play between both instances, and the concepts developed in the course of this 
argument may provide useful tools for assessing this relation and the experi-
ences and ‘meanings’ it enables.
(3) Expanding ‘play’
Even the most thorough investigation of the interplay between the experience 
of play and the terms and conditions provided by game artifacts cannot hide 
the most crucial implication of the idea of ‘play as an experiential category’: if it 
is the experience of systems as discrete which gives rise to the satisfying experi-
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ences of free exploration constituting ‘play’ (see Chapter 3.4), then the discus-
sion of this idea of ‘play as an experiential category’ cannot be limited to the ob-
servance of ‘play’ emerging from designated ‘game artifacts’. While these arti-
facts are designed with the intention to give rise to ‘play’, following the com-
mon notion that “games create play”229, an assessment of ‘play as an experien-
tial category’ suggests that it it also a viable assumption that ‘play creates 
games’, that the emergence or absence of the ‘play experience’ decides whether 
a ‘game artifact’ actually takes the form of a ‘game’, or merely presents an inter-
active system, utilized and explored under the terms and conditions of ‘real life’ 
purposes and demands; conversely, each and every domain of ‘real life’ can 
take the form of a ‘game’ if it is experienced as a discrete system and open for 
free exploration and, therefore, experienced under the conditions of ‘play’.
From this perspective, virtually everything can be thought of in terms of a game, 
as a ‘game’ is no longer regarded as a specific ‘thing’, an artifact fulfilling cer-
tain structural requirements, but as an organizing principle that may underly 
the most diverse domains of human exertion and experience, an organizing 
principle which comes into effect through the emergence of ‘play’. When ‘play’ 
is no longer thought of as a certain way of action, but as the experiential pre-
condition bringing forth ‘games’ as its manifestation, as an attitude rather than 
a specific activity, then ‘games’ may be found in many different domains, and 
quite independent of the intention to design and create a ‘game artifact’.
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In this regard, a focus on the emergence of ‘play experiences’ might provide an 
expansion of the game studies discourse in two different directions: for one, ef-
forts to widen the scope of strategies game design can employ might benefit 
from an observation of ‘games’ being played off the beaten tracks of established 
‘game definitions’. By drawing on insights about the emergence of play not aris-
ing from artifacts designed as ‘games’, but enabling this experience nonetheless, 
an assessment of games as a mode of negotiation, a form of expression and a 
way of organizing our experiences might serve to extend the range of game de-
sign strategies and the variety of ‘game artifacts’ imaginable in the future.
The more significant implication of this approach, however, is that the field of 
game studies, game theory and even game design might itself find its concep-
tional expansion by opening up whole new areas of investigation. A conception 
of ‘games’ not as a set of interactive design strategies enabling ‘play’, but as a 
manifestation of playful attitudes in the form of discrete experiential systems 
would suggest a wide range of ‘real life phenomena’ to be investigated under 
the terms of play and games. Instead of limiting the field of game studies by a 
strict focus on designated ‘game artifacts’, an according conception might make 
methods, concepts and perspectives deriving from the game studies discourse 
applicable to a variety of activities and interactions that are usually regarded as 
‘serious’ and part of ‘real life’; an according approach to these phenomena 
might not only allow to assess them ‘as games’, but also to examine the implica-
tions of an emergence or absence of an experience of ‘play’:
Which of these phenomena can be experienced in terms of play and, therefore, 
as ‘games’? If they can, what are the preconditions for this experience? Is an ac-
cording experience supported by the way these phenomena are organized, dis-
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cussed and negotiated? Can the emergence of ‘play’ be supported by changing 
the ways of organization, discussion and negotiation? Is this emergence desir-
able, as it enables an emancipatory attitude, or is it objectionable due to the 
gravity of possible consequences? When is an attitude of ‘play’ deemed bene-
factory, when gratuitous or even irresponsible? 
As these questions show, an according assessment does not only promise to 
provide novel insights about ‘real life’ phenomena, but is also linked to more 
fundamental considerations about societal as well as individual values and be-
liefs underlying the evaluation of these phenomena. From this thesis’ perspec-
tive, however, these considerations are closely related to the emergence of the 
‘play experience’ and the resulting manifestation of ‘games’, and offer them-
selves as future challenges for the field of game studies, be it the development 
of viable approaches to ‘gamification efforts’ aiming at the use of actual game 
design strategies in business and commerce, be it the evaluation of emancipa-
tory strategies in processes of societal negotiation, or the use of game theoretical 
approaches for a more thorough understanding of the terms and conditions of 
interactions commonly regarded as ‘serious’. 
4.2.2 Implications for constructivist theory
While the application of a constructivist perspective to the field of game studies 
has implied a variety of possible expansions for this discipline, the implications 
of using observations of play and games as a ‘testing ground’ for constructivist 
theory are much more straightforward, if no less significant. One of these impli-
cations has already been at the core of this thesis when a model of ‘system expe-
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rience’ has been proposed as a viable framework of human mental organization 
(see Chapter 3.2), aimed at the general terms and conditions underlying the 
construction of cognitive realities, which have been argued as a key concern of 
(radical) constructivist theory (see Chapter 3.1.3). But the suggestion of ‘system 
experience’ does not constitute a re-evaluation of constructivist theory, but a 
provisional result of its basic assumptions. 
The assessment of play and games, however, has raised questions which may 
challenge these assumptions on a more fundmental level, a level on which the 
attention is drawn to a basic presupposition underlying constructivist theory. 
Even if radical constructivist theory is guided by an ‘ontological non-
committment’ that does not claim to make any statements about ontological re-
ality230, even if it considers the possibility that ‘the world’ may be the effect of 
our experiences rather than their cause231, and even if the idea of ‘cause and ef-
fect’ itself is explicitly challenged232, there is one basic notion that underlies 
radical constructivist considerations which still remains an unchallenged as-
sumption about the relation between an experienced world and the efforts to 
make sense of it through processes of reality construction: namely, that a dis-
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231 see: Foerster, Heinz von: "Through the Eyes of the Other", in: Steier, Frederick (Ed.): 
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232 see: Watzlawick, Paul: “Effect or Cause?” in: Watzlawick, Paul (Ed.): The Invented 
Reality. How do we know what we believe we know? (Contributions to Constructiv-
ism)”, Norton & Company, New York/London, 1984, p. 63-68.
tinction can be made between the experience of obstacles, problems or conflicts 
on one hand, and the resulting desire to overcome these obstacles, solve these 
problems or resolve these conflicts on the other. Maybe due to the central role 
the re-discovery of Jean Piaget’s considerations on cognitive development has 
for the radical constructivist argument233, this assumption is not explicitly made 
an issue or even questioned, but resonates at the core of constructivist theory: 
“The constructs with which we have furnished our experiential 
world are those we have found useful or, at least, tenable. We use 
them in our schemes of action and in our conceptional operations; 
we drop or modify them if their rate of failure gets too high and we 
are able to construct more reliable ones; and we try to balance and 
coordinate them among each other. The more generally they are ap-
plicable, the less of them we need. And, given the variety of situa-
tions we come to distinguish, economy in the number of schemes be-
comes an important consideration.”234
Not only does radical constructivism claim to be an instrumentalist approach235 
when it comes to its own status as a theory, it also implies the same instrumen-
talism as a conceptional precondition for its considerations, as an unquestioned 
premise of the cognitive construction of realities: based on the assumption that 
obstacles, problems and conflicts are constitutive part of human perceptions - 
no matter whether they are regarded as arising from an ‘ontic world’ or 
whether they are themselves considered to be experiential categories - cognitive 
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constructions of realities are regarded as attempts to overcome these obstacles, 
solve these problems and resolve these conflicts in order to enable succesful op-
eration, a notion which implies a human desire to avoid these impediments as 
good as possible.
This recurring idea of cognitive processes as a means to enable successful op-
eration highlights the anthropological dimension of constructivist theory, as it 
goes beyond the scope of epistemological considerations on the capabilities and 
limitations of gaining knowledge about ‘the world’, but focusses instead on the 
motivations, desires and intentions guiding the processing and organization of 
this assumed ‘knowledge’, the ‘terms and conditions’ underlying cognitive 
processes of reality construction (see Chapter 3.1.3). If the focus is on these mo-
tivations, desires and intentions constituting the terms and conditions of cogni-
tive processes and the construction of realities, however, the pragmatic notion 
of overcoming obstacles, solving problems and resolving conflicts as an unchal-
lenged presupposition must also be put into question. 
It is in the idea of ‘play’ that this notion is challenged on its most fundamental 
level. As this thesis has repeatedly pointed out, players of games willingly and 
enthusiastically engage in overcoming obstacles, solving problems and resolv-
ing conflicts they wouldn’t have if they didn’t decide to play the game in the 
first place. This voluntary confrontation with impediments is not accounted for 
by the idea of ‘avoiding unpleasentness’; instead, the motivations, desires and 
intentions underlying the cognitive constructions of realities may call for these 
impediments as an opportunity to confront them. 
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Obstacles, problems and conflicts, from this perspective, are not simply annoy-
ances that limit successful operations, but may even appear as a goal of human 
constructions of reality themselves (see Chapter 1.2). These efforts of construct-
ing ‘viable cognitive realties’, therefore, may not simply serve the instrumental-
ist goal of overcoming obstacles, solving problems and resolving conflicts; 
rather, the construction of and confrontation with these impediments itself may 
serve a less pragmatic purpose as opportunities to confront challenges, apply 
strategies to solve problems and deal with conflicts - opportunities which be-
come obvious in the human desire to ‘play’ and the persistence of ‘games’. 
Once this human ‘appreciation for impediments’ has been observed in the ideas 
of play and games, it may also change the assumptions on human motivations, 
desires and intentions on a more fundamental level: cognitive efforts of reality 
construction may not simply be tools to avoid and eliminate impediments, but 
an attempt to seek and invent them in the first place. 
When in this thesis, a model of ‘system experience’ as a general human trait has 
been suggested (see Chapter 3.2), this attempt was also guided by the notion 
that pleasure and satisfaction may emerge from the mere application of cogni-
tive strategies of problem solving - a satisfaction which arises from the experi-
ence of confronting impediments, but is not dependent on the gravity of the 
problem itself (see Chapter 3.1). Obstacles, problems and conflicts may simply 
be a necessary and aspired prerequisite for the desire to ‘make sense’: the con-
struction of values can not be accounted for without the challenges presented 
by ‘obstacles’; without the experience of ‘problems’, the experience of failure 
and success in the effort to solve these problems is not possible; and even 
though ‘conflict’ is often regarded as a despisable aberrance of human interac-
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tion, it is through conflict that individuals relate to each other in a most funda-
mental way. 
It is through the observation of games and play that the anthropological dimen-
sion of constructivist theory becomes obvious, and challenges some of its basic 
assumptions by highlighting the significance of obstacles, problems and conflict 
not only as a limiting and constituting opposition to cognitive efforts, but as a 
possible purpose of cognitive constructions in their own right.
4.3 Conclusion
An application of constructivist concepts to the assessment of phenomena of 
play and games has proved to provide an expansion of the theoretical frame-
work underlying the contemporary game studies discourse, while at the same 
time challenging basic constructivist assumptions about the motivations, de-
sires and intentions guiding cognitive processes of reality construction, hence 
making the anthropological dimension of constructivist theory more tangible. 
An emphasis on the idea of ‘play as an experiential category’ has enabled a fo-
cus on the role of players in the construction of meaning in games by highlight-
ing the interplay between cognitive processes of construction and the nature of 
games’ rules and mechanics, and suggests the expansion of the field of game 
studies to include those ‘games’ which do not constitute designated ‘game arti-
facts’, but arise from an experience of ‘play’ in a more general sense. As a con-
tribution to constructivist theory, the ‘play experience’ has been argued as a 
challenge to the persistence of instrumentalist notions of reality constructions, 
and suggested the construction of obstacles, problems and conflict as an equally 
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or possibly more significant aim of cognitive processes than the construction of 
means to overcome these impediments.
The notion of a ‘play experience’, therefore, reflects the two perspectives of this 
thesis: the assessment of ‘play’ as a specific, yet fundamental, mode of human 
experience, and the constructivist-anthropological assessment of ‘experiences’ 
through the lens of ‘play’. Between these diverging but complementary per-
spectives, and not unlike the emergence of play as the negotiatory space be-
tween opposing demands, the possibility of ‘constructivist game studies’ un-
folds as an approach which enables a synergetic liaison between the contempo-
rary game studies discourse and constructivist conceptions of human experi-
ence, a liaison to which this thesis has hopefully contributed some initial con-
siderations.
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Abstract English
“The Play Experience - A Constructivist Anthropology on Computer 
Games” is guided by two different, but complementary perspectives: on 
the one hand, the project’s intention is to show that constructivist theory - 
and especially radical constructivism - can provide a useful framework for 
the assessment of play and games, and enable a beneficial expansion of the 
theoretical framework underlying the contemporary field of ‘(computer) 
game studies’. 
On the other hand, the project aims at an expansion of constructivist the-
ory itself by using phenomena of play and games as an opportunity to 
challenge and re-assess basic constructivist assumptions.
In order to achieve the application of this dual perspective, the project’s 
focus is on the notion of ‘play as an experiential category’ and on the ex-
amination of the resulting ‘Play Experience’. This focus is made tangible 
by the project’s research question: ‘Why do people play games?`, one of 
the larger questions in the game studies discourse.
The first part of the thesis addresses the theoretical and methodical pre-
conditions of assessing play and games from a constructivist perspective. 
Basic (radical) constructivist concepts are related to the assessment of play 
and games; the relation of games and the idea of ‘reality’ is discussed by 
examining the possible transitions between the game rules’ specifications 
and these rules’ significance as guiding factors for players’ desires and in-
teractions; definitions of ‘play’ are examined by showing the dominance of 
delineating conceptions of play in the game studies discourse, and sug-
gesting an alternative definition of ‘play as an intermediating force’, which 
is argued as more viable in regard to various issues of the field; an attempt 
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is made to render the contingency spaces of experience opened up by digi-
tal games accessible for methodic analysis by suggesting a method which 
accounts for the multitude of possible player experiences, while still trac-
ing the emergence of these experiences back to the terms and conditions 
presented by the game.
The second part of the thesis shifts the focus on mediated experiences and 
the role digital games can play in the process of conctructing these experi-
ences. Based on the distinction between first and second order realities, 
three case studies examine the significance of the ‘experiential perspective’ 
taken on mediated events, the ‘experiential set up’ of fictional topoi, and 
the strategies employed in digital games to suggest or neglect the emer-
gence of specific experiences by modelling an ‘experiential set up’ through 
their own means.
After the basic concepts of ‘play’ and ‘experience’ are clarified from a con-
structivist perspective, the third part of the thesis addresses the research 
question ‘why do people play games?’ by examining the ‘play experience’ 
more closely. It is argued how play experiences seem desirable due to their 
inherent features rather than the expectation of beneficial effects. The idea 
of ‘fun’ as a motivation for playing games is given up in favor of the no-
tion of ‘satisfaction’, a notion which is argued to be related to constructiv-
ist considerations. Based on this notion, a constructivist-anthropological 
model of human experience is suggested, which emphasizes the idea of 
cognitive organization in systemic terms. This model of ‘System Experi-
ence’ is discussed in detail, and gives rise to the idea of play as the pleas-
urable and satisfying experience of discrete systems, which  provides a vi-
able answer to the research question.
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Abstract Deutsch
“The Play Experience - A Constructivist Anthropology on Computer 
Games” folgt zwei unterschiedlichen, sich ergänzenden, Perspektiven: 
zum Einen ist es Ziel des Projekts zu zeigen, dass konstruktivistische 
Theorie - insbesondere der Radikale Konstruktivismus - einen nützlichen 
Rahmen für die Untersuchung von Spielphänomenen darstellt, und damit 
eine sinnvolle Erweiterung des theoretischen Fundaments des For-
schungsfelds der  ‘(Computer) Game Studies’ ermöglicht.
Zum Anderen zielt das Projekt auf eine Erweiterung konstruktivistischer 
Theorie selbst ab, indem es Spielphänomene als Anlass nimmt, konstruk-
tivistische Grundannahmen herauszufordern und neu zu bewerten. 
Um dieser zweifachen Perspektive gerecht zu werden, konzentriert sich 
das Projekt auf die Idee von ‘Spiel als Erfahrungskategorie’ und die Unter-
suchung der daraus folgenden ‘Play Experience’. Dieser Fokus wird durch 
die Forschungsfrage des Projekts: ‘warum spielen Menschen Spiele?’ 
zugänglich gamecht, eine der übergeordneten Fragen des ‘Game Studies’ - 
Diskurses.
Der erste Teil der Arbeit beleuchtet die theoretischen und methodischen 
Voraussetzung einer konstruktivistischen Untersuchung von ‘Spiel’ und 
‘Spielen’. Grundlegende (Radikal-)Konstruktivistische Konzepte werden 
in Beziehung mit der Untersuchung von ‘Spiel’ gebracht; die Beziehung 
zwischen Spielen und der Idee der ‘Realität’ wird diskutiert, indem die 
möglichen Übergänge zwischen den Spezifikationen der Spielregeln und 
der Bedeutung dieser Regeln als leitende Faktoren für die SpielerInnen-
bedürfnisse und Interaktionen beleuchtet werden; eine Untersuchung von 
Spieldefinitionen zeigt das Vorherrschen eines abgrenzenden Spielbegriffs 
im ‘Game Studies’ Diskurs, eine Definition von ‘Spiel als vermittelnde 
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Größe’ wird diskutiert und am Beispiel verschiedener Themen des For-
schungsfeld als viablere Alternative vorgschlagen; es wird versucht, die 
durch digitale Spiele eröffneten Kontingenzfelder von Erfahrungen der 
methodischen Analyse zugänglich zu machen, indem die eine Methode 
vorgeschlagen wird, die die Vielfalt möglicher Spielerfahrungen berücksi-
chtigt, und gleichzeitig das Entstehen dieser Erfahrungen zu den Bedin-
gungen des Spiels zurückverfolgen lässt.
Der zweite Teil der Arbeit richtet das Augenmerk auf mediale Erfahrun-
gen und die Rolle, die digitale Spiele im Prozess der Konstruktion dieser 
Erfahrungen einnehmen können. Ausgehend von der Unterscheidung in 
Wirklichkeiten erster und zweiter Ordnung beleuchten drei Fallstudien 
die Bedeutung des Einnehmens von ‘experiential perspectives’ hin-
sichtlich medialer Ereignisse, das ‘experiential set up’ fiktionaler topoi 
und die Strategien, durch die digitale Spiele  das Entstehen spezifischer 
Erfahrungen nahelegen oder Unwahrscheinlich machen können, indem 
sie ein ‘experiential set up’ mit ihren eigenen Mitteln modellieren.
Nachdem die Grundkonzepte ‘Spiel’ und ‘Erfahrung’ aus konstruktivis-
tischer Sicht abgeklärt wurden, widmet sich der dritte Teil der Arbeit einer 
näheren Untersuchung der Forschungsfrage ‘Warum spielen Menschen 
Spiele?’, indem die ‘Play Experience’ genauer beleuchtet wird. Es wird ar-
gumentiert, dass Spielerfahrungen nicht aufgrund erwarteter positiver Ef-
fekte wünschenswert scheinen, sondern aufgrund ihrer inhärenten Merk-
male. Die Idee von ‘fun’ als Motivation für Spiel wird zugunsten des 
Konzepts von ‘satisfaction’aufgegeben, eines Konzepts, das in Beziehung 
zu konstruktivistischen Überlegungen gestellt wird. Basierend auf diesem 
Konzept wird ein konstruktivistisch-anthropologisches Modell menschli-
cher Erfahrung vorgeschlagen, das die Idee kognitiver Organisation in 
Systembegriffen hervorhebt. Dieses Modell von ‘System Experience’ (‘Sys-
temerfahrung’) wird detailliert vorgestellt, und führt zu der Idee von Spiel 
als die lustvolle und befriedigende Erfahrung abgegrenzter Systeme, eine 
Idee dieeine viable Beantwortung der Fortschungsfrage darstellt.
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